The Supreme Court of the United States - F.C.C. v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.: Artists and F-Bombs lyrics

F.C.C. v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC. 556 U.S. 502, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (2009) Justice SCALIA This case concerns utterances in two live broadcasts aired by Fox Television Stations, Inc., and its affiliates prior to the Commission's Golden Globes Order. The first occurred during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, when the singer Cher exclaimed, “I've also had critics for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every year. Right. So f* * * ‘em.” The second involved a segment of the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, during the presentation of an award by Nicole Richie and Paris Hilton, principals in a Fox television series called “The Simple Life.” Ms. Hilton began their interchange by reminding Ms. Richie to “watch the bad language,” but Ms. Richie proceeded to ask the audience, “Why do they even call it ‘The Simple Life?' Have you ever tried to get cow s* * * out of a Prada purse? It's not so f* * *ing simple.” Following each of these broadcasts, the Commission received numerous complaints from parents whose children were exposed to the language. On March 15, 2006, the Commission released Notices of Apparent Liability for a number of broadcasts that the Commission deemed actionably indecent, including the two described above. Multiple parties petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for judicial review of the order, a**erting a variety of constitutional and statutory challenges. Since the order had declined to impose sanctions, the Commission had not previously given the broadcasters an opportunity to respond to the indecency charges. It therefore requested and obtained from the Court of Appeals a voluntary remand so that the parties could air their objections. The Commission's order on remand upheld the indecency findings for the broadcasts described above. The order first explained that both broadcasts fell comfortably within the subject-matter scope of the Commission's indecency test because the 2003 broadcast involved a literal description of excrement and both broadcasts invoked the “F–Word,” which inherently has a s**ual connotation. The order next determined that the broadcasts were patently offensive under community standards for the medium. Both broadcasts, it noted, involved entirely gratuitous uses of “one of the most vulgar, graphic, and explicit words for s**ual activity in the English language.” It found Ms. Richie's use of the “F–Word” and her “explicit description of the handling of excrement” to be “vulgar and shocking,” as well as to constitute “pandering,” after Ms. Hilton had playfully warned her to “watch the bad language.” And it found Cher's statement patently offensive in part because she metaphorically suggested a s**ual act as a means of expressing hostility to her critics. The order relied upon the “critically important” context of the utterances, noting that they were aired during prime-time awards shows “designed to draw a large nationwide audience that could be expected to include many children interested in seeing their favorite music stars,” Indeed, approximately 2.5 million minors witnessed each of the broadcasts. The order a**erted that both broadcasts under review would have been actionably indecent under the staff rulings and Commission dicta in effect prior to the Golden Globes Order—the 2003 broadcast because it involved a literal description of excrement, rather than a mere expletive, because it used more than one offensive word, and because it was planned, and the 2002 broadcast because Cher used the F–Word not as a mere intensifier, but as a description of the s**ual act to express hostility to her critics. The order stated, however, that the pre- Golden Globes regime of immunity for isolated indecent expletives rested only upon staff rulings and Commission dicta, and that the Commission itself had never held “that the isolated use of an expletive ... was not indecent or could not be indecent,” In any event, the order made clear, the Golden Globes Order eliminated any doubt that fleeting expletives could be actionably indecent, and the Commission disavowed the bureau-level decisions and its own dicta that had said otherwise. Under the new policy, a lack of repetition “weigh[s] against a finding of indecency,” but is not a safe harbor. The order explained that the Commission's prior “strict dichotomy between ‘expletives' and ‘descriptions or depictions of s**ual or excretory functions' is artificial and does not make sense in light of the fact that an ‘expletive's' power to offend derives from its s**ual or excretory meaning.” In the Commission's view, “granting an automatic exemption for ‘isolated or fleeting' expletives unfairly forces viewers (including children)” to take “ ‘the first blow' ” and would allow broadcasters “to air expletives at all hours of a day so long as they did so one at a time.” Although the Commission determined that Fox encouraged the offensive language by using suggestive scripting in the 2003 broadcast, and unreasonably failed to take adequate precautions in both broadcasts, the order again declined to impose any forfeiture or other sanction for either of the broadcasts. Fox returned to the Second Circuit for review of the Remand Order, and various intervenors including CBS, NBC, and ABC joined the action. The Court of Appeals reversed the agency's orders, finding the Commission's reasoning inadequate under the Administrative Procedure Act. The majority was “skeptical that the Commission [could] provide a reasoned explanation for its ‘fleeting expletive' regime that would pa** constitutional muster,” but it declined to reach the constitutional question. Judge Leval dissented. We granted certiorari. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., which sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for procedural correctness, permits the setting aside of agency action that is “arbitrary” or “capricious,” Under what we have called this “narrow” standard of review, we insist that an agency “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.” We have made clear, however, that “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,” and should “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned,” In overturning the Commission's judgment, the Court of Appeals here relied in part on Circuit precedent requiring a more substantial explanation for agency action that changes prior policy. The Second Circuit has interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act as requiring agencies to make clear why the original reasons for adopting the displaced rule or policy are no longer dispositive' ” as well as “ ‘why the new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old rule. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has similarly indicated that a court's standard of review is “heightened somewhat” when an agency reverses course. NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 998 (1982). We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review. The Act mentions no such heightened standard. To be sure, the requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position. An agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books. And of course the agency must show that there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account. It would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters. In such cases it is not that further justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy. In this appeal from the Second Circuit's setting aside of Commission action for failure to comply with a procedural requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, the broadcasters' arguments have repeatedly referred to the First Amendment. If they mean to invite us to apply a more stringent arbitrary-and-capricious review to agency actions that implicate constitutional liberties, we reject the invitation. The so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts. We know of no precedent for applying it to limit the scope of authorized executive action. In the same section authorizing courts to set aside arbitrary or capricious agency action, the Administrative Procedure Act separately provides for setting aside agency action that is “unlawful,” which of course includes unconstitutional action. We think that is the only context in which constitutionality bears upon judicial review of authorized agency action. If the Commission's action here was not arbitrary or capricious in the ordinary sense, it satisfies the Administrative Procedure Act's “arbitrary or capricious” standard; its lawfulness under the Constitution is a separate question to be addressed in a constitutional challenge. Judged under the above described standards, the Commission's new enforcement policy and its order finding the broadcasts actionably indecent were neither arbitrary nor capricious. First, the Commission forthrightly acknowledged that its recent actions have broken new ground, taking account of inconsistent “prior Commission and staff action” and explicitly disavowing them as “no longer good law.” To be sure, the (superfluous) explanation in its Remand Order of why the Cher broadcast would even have violated its earlier policy may not be entirely convincing. But that unnecessary detour is irrelevant. There is no doubt that the Commission knew it was making a change. That is why it declined to a**ess penalties; and it relied on the Golden Globes Order as removing any lingering doubt. Moreover, the agency's reasons for expanding the scope of its enforcement activity were entirely rational. It was certainly reasonable to determine that it made no sense to distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words, requiring repetitive use to render only the latter indecent. As the Commission said with regard to expletive use of the F–Word, “the word's power to insult and offend derives from its s**ual meaning.” And the Commission's decision to look at the patent offensiveness of even isolated uses of s**ual and excretory words fits with the context-based approach we sanctioned in Pacifica. Even isolated utterances can be made in “pander[ing,] ... vulgar and shocking” manners, and can constitute harmful first blows to children. It is surely rational (if not inescapable) to believe that a safe harbor for single words would likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive language. When confronting other requests for per se rules governing its enforcement of the indecency prohibition, the Commission has declined to create safe harbors for particular types of broadcasts. The fact that technological advances have made it easier for broadcasters to bleep out offending words further supports the Commission's stepped-up enforcement policy. And the agency's decision not to impose any forfeiture or other sanction precludes any argument that it is arbitrarily punishing parties without notice of the potential consequences of their action. The Court of Appeals found the Commission's action arbitrary and capricious on three grounds. First, the court criticized the Commission for failing to explain why it had not previously banned fleeting expletives as harmful first blows. In the majority's view, without evidence that suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful and serious enough to warrant government regulation, the agency could not regulate more broadly. As explained above, the fact that an agency had a prior stance does not alone prevent it from changing its view or create a higher hurdle for doing so. And it is not the Commission, but Congress that has proscribed “any ... indecent ... language.” 18 U.S.C. § 1464. There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is one of them. One cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in which some children are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated from all other indecency), and others are shielded from all indecency. It is one thing to set aside agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act because of failure to adduce empirical data that can readily be obtained. It is something else to insist upon obtaining the unobtainable. Here it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior they observe—or at least the behavior that is presented to them as normal and appropriate. Programming replete with one-word indecent expletives will tend to produce children who use (at least) one-word indecent expletives. Congress has made the determination that indecent material is harmful to children, and has left enforcement of the ban to the Commission. If enforcement had to be supported by empirical data, the ban would effectively be a nullity. The Commission had adduced no quantifiable measure of the harm caused by the language in Pacifica, and we nonetheless held that the “government's interest in the ‘well-being of its youth' ... justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.” If the Constitution itself demands of agencies no more scientifically certain criteria to comply with the First Amendment, neither does the Administrative Procedure Act to comply with the requirement of reasoned decision-making. The court's second objection is that fidelity to the agency's “first blow” theory of harm would require a categorical ban on all broadcasts of expletives; the Commission's failure to go to this extreme thus undermined the coherence of its rationale. This objection, however, is not responsive to the Commission's actual policy under review—the decision to include patently offensive fleeting expletives within the definition of indecency. The Commission's prior enforcement practice, unchallenged here, already drew distinctions between the offensiveness of particular words based upon the context in which they appeared. Any complaint about the Commission's failure to ban only some fleeting expletives is better directed at the agency's context-based system generally rather than its inclusion of isolated expletives. More fundamentally, however, the agency's decision to consider the patent offensiveness of isolated expletives on a case-by-case basis is not arbitrary or capricious. “Even a prime-time recitation of Geoffrey Chaucer's Miller's Tale,” we have explained, “would not be likely to command the attention of many children who are both old enough to understand and young enough to be adversely affected.” The same rationale could support the Commission's finding that a broadcast of the film Saving Private Ryan was not indecent—a finding to which the broadcasters point as supposed evidence of the Commission's inconsistency. The frightening suspense and the graphic violence in the movie could well dissuade the most vulnerable from watching and would put parents on notice of potentially objectionable material. Finally, the Court of Appeals found unconvincing the agency's prediction (without any evidence) that a per se exemption for fleeting expletives would lead to increased use of expletives one at a time. But even in the absence of evidence, the agency's predictive judgment (which merits deference) makes entire sense. To predict that complete immunity for fleeting expletives, ardently desired by broadcasters, will lead to a substantial increase in fleeting expletives seems to us an exercise in logic rather than clairvoyance. The Court of Appeals was perhaps correct that the Commission's prior policy had not yet caused broadcasters to “barrage the airwaves with expletives.” That may have been because its prior permissive policy had been confirmed (save in dicta) only at the staff level. In any event, as the Golden Globes order demonstrated, it did produce more expletives than the Commission (which has the first call in this matter) deemed in conformity with the statute. We doubt, to begin with, that small-town broadcasters run a heightened risk of liability for indecent utterances. In programming that they originate, their down-home local guests probably employ vulgarity less than big-city folks; and small-town stations generally cannot afford or cannot attract foul-mouthed glitteratae from Hollywood. Their main exposure with regard to self-originated programming is live coverage of news and public affairs. But the Remand Order went out of its way to note that the case at hand did not involve “breaking news coverage,” and that “it may be inequitable to hold a licensee responsible for airing offensive speech during live coverage of a public event,” As for the programming that small stations receive on a network “feed”: This will be cleansed by the expensive technology small stations (by Justice BREYER's hypothesis) cannot afford. But never mind the detail of whether small broadcasters are uniquely subject to a great risk of punishment for fleeting expletives. The fundamental fallacy of Justice BREYER's small-broadcaster gloomy scenario is its demonstrably false a**umption that the Remand Order makes no provision for the avoidance of unfairness—that the single-utterance prohibition will be invoked uniformly, in all situations. The Remand Order made very clear that this is not the case. It said that in determining “what, if any, remedy is appropriate” the Commission would consider the facts of each individual case, such as the “possibility of human error in using delay equipment,” Thus, the fact that the agency believed that Fox (a large broadcaster that used suggestive scripting and a deficient delay system to air a prime-time awards show aimed at millions of children) “fail[ed] to exercise ‘reasonable judgment, responsibility and sensitivity,' says little about how the Commission would treat smaller broadcasters who cannot afford screening equipment. Indeed, that they would not be punished for failing to purchase equipment they cannot afford is positively suggested by the Remand Order' s statement that “holding Fox responsible for airing indecent material in this case does not ... impose undue burdens on broadcasters.” There was, in sum, no need for the Commission to compose a special treatise on local broadcasters. And Justice BREYER can safely defer his concern for those yeomen of the airwaves until we have before us a case that involves one. The Second Circuit did not definitively rule on the constitutionality of the Commission's orders, but respondents nonetheless ask us to decide their validity under the First Amendment. This Court, however, is one of final review, “not of first view.” It is conceivable that the Commission's orders may cause some broadcasters to avoid certain language that is beyond the Commission's reach under the Constitution. Whether that is so, and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional, will be determined soon enough, perhaps in this very case. Meanwhile, any chilled references to excretory and s**ual material “surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern. We see no reason to abandon our usual procedures in a rush to judgment without a lower court opinion. We decline to address the constitutional questions at this time. * * * The Second Circuit believed that children today “likely hear this language far more often from other sources than they did in the 1970's when the Commission first began sanctioning indecent speech,” and that this cuts against more stringent regulation of broadcasts. 489 F.3d, at 461. Assuming the premise is true (for this point the Second Circuit did not demand empirical evidence) the conclusion does not necessarily follow. The Commission could reasonably conclude that the pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media such as cable, justify more stringent regulation of broadcast programs so as to give conscientious parents a relatively safe haven for their children. In the end, the Second Circuit and the broadcasters quibble with the Commission's policy choices and not with the explanation it has given. We decline to “substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency,” we find the Commission's orders neither arbitrary nor capricious. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.