St. Thomas Aquinas - Treatise on Law lyrics

OF OATHS. Article I.—Is swearing a calling on God to witness? R. As the Apostle says: “An oath is for confirmation.”1 In matters of science, confirmation is done by reasoning from premises of natural knowledge, that are infallibly true. But the particular facts of the contingent doings of men cannot be confirmed by necessary reasoning; and therefore what is alleged concerning them is usually confirmed by witnesses. Still human testimony is not sufficient for such confirmation, and that on two accounts. First, for lack of truthfulness in man, seeing that very many fall into lying. Secondly, for lack of knowledge, because men cannot discern things to come, nor the secrets of hearts, nor yet the doings of the absent. Still however men talk on all these points; and it is expedient for human society that some certainty should be had about them. And therefore it has been found necessary to recur to the witness of God; because God cannot lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is to swear,—sometimes about things present or past, which is an oath of a**everation; sometimes in confirmation of a future performance, and that is called a promissory oath. Article II.—Is it lawful to swear? R. A thing may very easily be good in itself, and yet turn to his evil who does not use it properly. Thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he who receives unworthily “eateth and drinketh judgment to himself.”1 Thus then an oath is a lawful and virtuous thing in itself, as is evident from its origin and its end. From its origin: because the taking of an oath was brought in by the belief of mankind that God has infallible truth, possesses a universal knowledge, and exercises a universal providence over all things. From its end, because oaths are taken to justify men and put an end to disputes. But an oath works to the evil of a man through his using it badly, without necessity and due caution. Small indeed seems to be his reverence for God, who brings God in as witness to a light matter, which he would not presume to do with any man of honourable position. There is also the danger of perjury, because a man easily errs in word. Hence it is said: “Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing; for in it there are many falls.”2 Article III.—Are these three duly enumerated accompaniments of an oath,—justice, judgment, and truth?3 R. There are two requisites for the good use of an oath: First, that one should not swear lightly, but with a necessary cause, and discreetly: in this respect judgment is necessary, or discretion on the part of him who swears. Secondly, touching the matter sworn to, it is requisite that it be neither a falsehood nor anything unlawful; and in this respect truth is necessary, whereby one swears to what is true; and justice, whereby one swears to what is lawful. Judgment is wanting in an incautious oath; truth in a lying oath; and justice in an iniquitous or unlawful oath. Article V.—Is swearing something desirable and frequently to be practised, as a thing useful and good? R. That which is sought only as a support and stay to infirmity and deficiency, is not counted of the number of things in themselves desirable, but of the number of things necessary, as in the case of medicine. But an oath is sought as a support and stay to the deficiency of the faith that one man can put in another. And therefore an oath is not to be held of the number of things that are in themselves desirable, but of the number of things that are necessary for this life, and which are unduly used by whosoever uses them beyond the bounds of necessity. Article VII. § 1. The case of a simple affirmation is different from that of an oath, in which the witness of God is invoked. For the truth of a simple affirmation it is enough that the person says what he intends to do, because that is true at the time in his case, or in the purpose of the doer. But an oath ought not to come in except upon a matter on which the person's mind is immovably made up. And therefore if an oath is used, then for reverence of the witness of God that is invoked, the man is bound to make true what he has sworn to, to the best of his power, unless the issue is for the worse. § 2. An oath may issue for the worse in two ways. In one way from the beginning, either because the oath is of itself evil, as when one swears to commit adultery; or because it is an obstacle to greater good, as when one swears not to enter the religious or the ecclesiastical state,1 or not to accept a prelacy in a case where it is expedient to accept it. An oath of this kind is unlawful from the beginning. That however it may be in different ways. In the case of a person swearing to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and he sins in keeping the oath. But if a person swears not to do that which is the better good, good however which he is not bound to do, he sins, to be sure, in swearing, inasmuch as he places an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, the inspirer of good purposes, but he does not sin in keeping the oath, though he does much better not to keep it. In another way an oath has issue for the worse on account of something fresh that comes up unforeseen. Thus Herod's oath to give the dancing girl whatever she asked, might have been lawful from the beginning, the due condition being understood, that she should ask what was a proper thing to give, but the fulfilment of the oath was unlawful. § 3. In an oath taken on compulsion there is a twofold obligation: one to the man to whom the promise is made; and such obligation is destroyed by the compulsion, because he who has used violence deserves that the promise made to him be not kept.1 There is another obligation binding the person to God, to fulfil what he has promised by His name. Such obligation is not destroyed in the court of conscience; he who has sworn should rather suffer temporal loss than violate his oath. Still he may take legal measures to recover what he has paid, or he may denounce the matter to his ecclesiastical superior, any oath to the contrary notwithstanding: because such an oath would have issue for the worse, being against public justice. The Roman Pontiffs have absolved men from oaths like these, not as ruling such oaths to be of no binding force, but relaxing the force of them for just reasons. § 4. When the intention of the party taking the oath is not the same as the intention of the party to whom it is taken—if this comes of any guile in him that swears, the oath should be kept according to the sound understanding of him to whom it is taken.1 But if the person taking it uses no guile, he is bound according to his intention in taking it. Article VIII.—Is the obligation of an oath greater than that of a vow? R. Both obligations, that of an oath and that of a vow, are caused by something referring to God, but not in the same way. The obligation of a vow is caused by the fidelity which we owe to God, to discharge our promise to Him; while the obligation of an oath is caused by the reverence that we owe Him, which binds us to make true whatever we promise by His name. Now every violation of fidelity involves irreverence, but it is not every irreverence that contains a violation of fidelity. A subject's violation of the fidelity that he owes his lord, is reckoned the greatest irreverence. And therefore a vow in its own nature is more binding than an oath. Article IX.—Has any one the power to dispense from oaths? R. The need of a dispensation, whether from a law or from a vow, arises from the fact that what is useful and right in itself, viewed generally, may be wrong and hurtful in a particular set of circumstances: and what is wrong and hurtful cannot be matter either of law or vow. The same is out of keeping with the conditions requisite to an oath: for if it is wrong, it is out of keeping with justice; if it is hurtful, it is out of keeping with judgment. And therefore parity of reason proves that a dispensation may be granted also from an oath. § 1. A dispensation from an oath does extend to the man's doing anything against his oath: that is impossible, since the observance of oaths is matter of divine precept, which admits of no dispensation.1 But the effect of a dispensation from an oath is, that what formerly fell under oath, falls under oath no longer, not being due matter of oath, as we said above of a vow.2 The matter of an oath of a**everation, which is of the present or past, is already gone into the region of necessity and become immutable; and therefore a dispensation could not refer to the matter, but would refer to the act itself of swearing; hence such a dispensation would be directly against the divine precept. But the matter of a promissory oath is something future, capable of variation, so that in a certain conjuncture it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently not due matter of oath; and therefore a dispensation may be granted from a promissory oath, because such a dispensation regards the matter of the oath, and is not contrary to the divine precept of the observance of oaths.3 § 2. There are two ways in which a man may promise something under oath to another. One way is when he promises something to that other person's benefit, as that he will serve him, or give him money. He to whom the promise was made, can absolve from such a promise; for the maker of the promise is understood to have discharged his promise to the other, when he acts in the matter according to that other's will. The other way is when one promises to another something that makes for the honour of God, or for the advantage of a third party; as when one promises another under oath to enter religion, or to do some work of piety; and then he to whom the promise is made cannot absolve the promiser; because the promise was made not to him mainly, but to God; unless it happens that a condition has been inserted, giving him that power. § 3. Occasionally a thing is promised on oath, of which it is doubtful whether it is lawful or unlawful, beneficial or hurtful, either absolutely or in a special case; and from such an oath any Bishop can dispense.1 Sometimes again a thing is promised on oath, which is manifestly lawful and useful; and in such an oath there seems to be no room for dispensation or commutation, unless something better occurs to be done for the common advantage, which seems to appertain above all to the power of the Pope, who has care of the Universal Church. Or even there may be an absolute relaxation of the oath, which again appertains to the Pope in all things alike that are part of the administration of Church matters, over which he has plenitude of power. In the same way any man in authority may make void an oath that has been taken by his subjects in the matter that is subject to his authority. Thus a father may make void the oath of one but yet a girl in age, and a husband his wife's oath, as is said in Numbers xxx. QUESTION XCI. OF THE TAKING OF THE DIVINE NAME TO INVOKE IT IN PRAYER OR PRAISE. Article I.—Is God to be praised by word of mouth? R. We address words to a man to express to him the thought of our heart, which he cannot know otherwise than by our words. And therefore we praise a man by word of mouth, to let him or others know that we have a good opinion of him, that thereby we may provoke him who is praised to do still better, and lead others who hear him praised to think well of him, and revere him and imitate him. But we address words to God, not to manifest our thoughts to Him who is the searcher of hearts, but to lead ourselves and others who hear us to revere Him. And therefore the praise of the lips is necessary, not for the sake of God, but for the sake of him who gives the praise, whose heart is raised to God thereby. The praise of the lips is also useful for moving the affections of other men towards God; hence it is said: “His praise shall be always in my mouth: let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with me.”1 Article II.—Ought singing to be employed in the divine praises? R. Vocal praise is necessary to move man's heart and raise it to God. And therefore all that can help to this purpose is properly employed in the divine praises. And therefore it was a wholesome institution to bring in singing into the divine praises, that the minds of the weak might be more stirred to devotion. Hence Augustine says: “I am led to approve of the custom of singing in church, that by the delight of the ears the weaker mind may rise to an affection of piety;” and he says of himself: “I wept at thy hymns and canticles, much moved by the voices of thy sweet-resounding church.” § 1. “Spiritual canticles”2 may mean, not only those that are inwardly sung in the spirit, but also those that are sung outwardly with the mouth, inasmuch as by such canticles devotion is called forth. § 2. Jerome when he says, “God is to be sung to, not with the voice, but with the heart,” is not absolutely condemning singing, but is rebuking those who sing in the church in a theatrical strain, not for the exciting of devotion, but for ostentation or to give pleasure. § 5. By singing of set purpose for pleasure, the mind is withdrawn from the consideration of the things that are sung. But if any one sings for devotion, he considers more attentively what is said, lingering longer upon the same phrase. And among the hearers, though some understand not what is sung, still they understand why it is sung, namely, to the praise of God; and this is enough to excite devotion. QUESTION XCII. OF VICES OPPOSED TO RELIGION, AND FIRST OF SUPERSTITION. Article I.—Is superstition a vice opposed to religion? R. Religion is a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue lies in some golden mean. And therefore two manner of vices are opposed to moral virtue, one by excess, and one by defect. Now the golden mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only in the circumstance of quantity, but also in other circumstances. Hence in some virtues, as munificence and magnanimity, the vice exceeds the mean of the virtue, not because it tends to a greater height than the virtue does—very possibly it tends to less—but it oversteps the mean of virtue, inasmuch as it does something to the wrong person, or at the wrong time, or something of that sort. Thus then superstition is a vice opposed to religion in point of excess, not that it renders more to divine worship than true religion does, but because it pays divine worship either to the wrong object, or in some way in which it ought not to be paid. QUESTION XCIII. OF THE SPECIES OF SUPERSTITION; AND FIRST OF SUPERSTITION BY UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD. Article I.—Can there be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God? R. As Augustine says: “A lie is most pernicious in what appertains to the Christian religion.” A lie is when one gives outward signification of something contrary to truth. Signification may be given by deed as well as by word: it is in this signification given by deed, that the outward worship of religion consists. And therefore if by outward worship any false signification is given, the worship will be pernicious. This may happen in either of two ways: in one way on the part of the thing signified, if the signification of the worship be in disagreement with it. Thus in the time of the New Law, the mysteries of Christ being now accomplished, it is pernicious to use the ceremonies of the Old Law, by which the mysteries of Christ were signified as things to come: as it would be pernicious also if one were to avow in word that Christ was still to suffer. In another way, falsehood may arise in exterior worship on the part of the worshipper, and this especially in public worship, which is rendered by ministers of religion on the part of the whole Church. For as he would be a forger, who should make any proposition on the part of his principal, which he had not been commissioned to make, so the vice of falsehood or forgery is incurred by whoever on the part of the Church renders worship to God, contrary to the rite which the Church has ordained by divine authority, and which is customary in the Church.1 Hence Ambrose says: “He is unworthy, who celebrates the mystery otherwise than as Christ has delivered.” And the gloss: “It is superstition, when the name of religion is applied to human tradition.” Article II.—Can there be anything superfluous in the worship of the true God? R. There are two ways in which a thing may be called superfluous. In one way in point of absolute quantity; and in this way there can be nothing superfluous in divine worship, because man can do nothing that is not less than what he owes to God. In another way, a thing may be superfluous in point of quantity of proportion, because it is not proportionate to the end. Now the end of divine worship is that a man should give glory to God, and subject himself to God in mind and body. And therefore whatever a man does that bears on the glory of God, and on the subjection of man's mind to God, and of his body also by a moderate restraint of the appetites, according to God's and the Church's ordinance, and the custom of the community with whom he lives,—that is not superfluous in divine worship. But if there be anything that of itself belongs not to God's glory, nor to the carrying of man's thoughts to God, nor to the restraint of the inordinate lusts of the flesh,—or again, if it be against the institution of God and of the Church, or against the common custom, which is to be held for a law,—all this is to be accounted superfluous and superstitious, because it rests on externals alone, and reaches not to the inward worship of God. QUESTION XCIV. OF IDOLATRY. Article I.—Is idolatry rightly set down as a species of superstition? R. It belongs to superstition to exceed the due mode and measure of divine worship. This is done most of all when divine worship is paid to an object to which it ought not to be paid. Now it ought to be paid to the supreme, uncreated God alone; and therefore whenever divine worship is paid to any creature whatsoever, it is a superstitious practice. Divine worship thus paid to sensible creatures1 was shown by sensible signs, as sacrifices, games, &c.; so also it was paid to creatures represented by some sensible form or figure, which is termed an idol. But there were different ways in which divine worship was paid to idols. Some persons by a nefarious art put together certain images, which wrought certain effects due to the power of demons: hence they thought that there was some divinity in the images themselves, and consequently that divine honour was due to them. Others did not pay divine honours to the mere images themselves, but to the creatures whose images they were.1 Among these latter worshippers there were three opinions. Some thought that certain men had been gods, whom they worshipped through their images, as Jupiter, Mercury, and other such. Some thought that the whole world was one god, not for its corporal substance, but for its soul, which they believed to be God, saying that God was nothing else than a soul, by movement and reason governing the world. Hence they thought that divine worship should be paid to the world and to all the parts thereof, to the heavens, to the air, to water, and to all such parts. Others, the Platonists, laid it down that there was one supreme God, the cause of all; after whom they placed certain spiritual substances, called gods, created by the supreme God with some participation of Divinity; after these they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, and under them the genii, who they said were certain living creatures in the air; and under them they placed the souls of men, which they believed to be raised by the merit of virtue to the society of the gods or of the genii; and to all these beings they paid divine honours. These last two opinions they said belonged to natural theology, which philosophers studied in nature and taught in the schools. That other opinion, of the worship of men, they said belonged to legendary theology, which was represented in theatres according to the fancies of poets. The other opinion, about images, they said belonged to political theology, which is matter of celebration by pontiffs in temples. Now all these things were part of the superstition of idolatry. § 1. As religion is not faith, but a protestation of faith by external signs; so superstition is a protestation of infidelity by external worship. § 3. From the common heathen custom of worshipping all manner of creatures under certain images, the name of idolatry has been applied to any worship whatever of a creature, even if it be without images. Article II.—Is idolatry a sin? R. Some have thought that it was lawful and in itself good to offer sacrifice and other acts of divine worship, not only to the supreme God, but also to other beings above mentioned, on the ground that divine reverence was to be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But this is an irrational thing to say. For though we ought to reverence all superior beings, yet the same reverence is not due to all; but something special is due to the supreme God, who in a singular manner excels them all: and that is the worship of latria. Others have thought that the paying of the exterior worship of latria to idols was not to be adopted as a practice in itself good or the best thing, but as being in accordance with the custom of the vulgar, as Augustine introduces Seneca saying: “In adoring we will still remember that this worship is rather a point of convention than of reality.” Some heretics also have fallen into this error, saying that there is no danger in one externally worshipping idols, if he is seized in time of persecution, provided he keeps the faith in his heart. The falsity of this position is clear and manifest: for seeing that exterior worship is a sign of the worship that is interior, it is quite as pernicious a falsehood for one to pay exterior worship to any object against the inner sentiment of his mind, as for one to a**ert in words the contrary of that which with true belief he holds in his heart. Hence Augustine says against Seneca that “his worship of idols was all the more condemnable, for that, acting as he was mendaciously in the matter, he yet so acted as to cause people to think that he was acting veraciously.” § 1. Neither in the Tabernacle, or Temple of the Old Law, nor again now in the Church, are images set up for divine worship to be paid to them; but they are there for a symbolical purpose, that by these images faith in the exalted prerogatives of the angels and the saints may be imprinted and confirmed in the minds of men. But it is otherwise with the image of Christ, to which on account of His Divinity divine worship is due, as will be explained in Part III. Question xxv. Article iii.1 Article III.2 —Is the image of Christ to be adored with the adoration of “latria”? R. There are two affections of the soul towards an image: one towards the image itself, considered as an object; the other towards the image, considered as the image of another being. And between these two affections there is this difference: that the first affection—that towards the image considered as an object—is different from the affection towards the object itself which the image represents: whereas the second affection—that towards the image considered as an image—is one and the same with the affection towards the object which the image represents. Thus then we must say that to the image of Christ, considered as an object—a sculptured or painted piece of wood—no reverence is paid; because reverence is due only to a rational nature. It remains therefore that reverence is paid to it, only inasmuch as it is an image; and thus it follows that the same reverence is paid to the image of Christ as to Christ Himself. Since then Christ is adored with the adoration of latria, it follows that His image is to be adored with the adoration of latria. § 1. The precept: “Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing, nor the likeness of any thing,”1 does not forbid the making of any sculptured figure or likeness, but the making of them for adoration. Hence it is added: “Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.” And because the affection to the image and to the thing is one affection, the prohibition of the adoration of the image stands on the same footing as the prohibition of the adoration of the thing, of which it is the image. Hence the text is to be understood as prohibiting the adoration of the images which the Gentiles made for the veneration of their gods, that is, of demons. And therefore it is prefaced with the command: “Thou shalt not have strange gods before me.” But of the true God Himself, seeing that He is incorporeal, no material image could be set up, because, as the Damascene says: “It is the height of folly and impiety to make a figure of the Divinity.” Since however in the New Covenant God has become man, He may be adored in His material image. § 2. The Apostle forbids us1 to have any fellowship with the unfruitful works of the Gentiles; but fellowship with their fruitful works the Apostle does not forbid. Now the adoration of images is to be counted among unfruitful works from two points of view: first, inasmuch as some of the Gentiles adored the images themselves as objects, believing that there was a divinity resident in them, on account of the answers which the devils in them gave, and other such wonderful effects; secondly, by reason of the objects which the images represented; for they erected these images to certain creatures, which they venerated in them with the veneration of latria. But we adore with the adoration of latria the image of Christ, who is true God; adoring it, not for the sake of the image itself, but for the sake of the object of which it is an image. QUESTION XCV. OF THE SUPERSTITION OF DIVINATION. Article I.—Is divination a sin? R. By the name of divination is understood some sort of prediction of things to come. Now things to come may be predicted in two ways: one way in their causes; in another way in themselves. Causes of things to come fall into three cla**es. Some there are that produce their effects necessarily and invariably: such effects may be known for certain, and predicted by foreknowledge of their causes, as astronomers predict eclipses. Some causes produce their effects, not necessarily and invariably, but generally, failing however at times; and through such causes future effects may be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but conjecturally, as astronomers can predict rain or drought, and physicians recovery or d**h. There are other causes that, considered in themselves, are indeterminate, and may work either way, as is seen especially in the rational powers; and such effects, as also any effects that happen unusually and by chance from natural causes, cannot be foreknown from the consideration of their causes, because their causes have no determinate inclination to such effects. And therefore effects of this kind cannot be foreknown, unless they be viewed in themselves. Now human eyes can view these effects in themselves only while they are present, as when a man sees Socrates running or walking: but to consider such effects in themselves before they take place, is proper to God, who alone in His eternity sees future things as present. Hence it is said: “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.”1 If any one therefore presumes to foretell or foreknow future things of this character, otherwise than by God's revealing them to him, he manifestly usurps to himself the prerogative of God; and from this some are called diviners. Hence Isidore says: “Diviners are so called as being full of God: for they pretend to be full of the Divinity, and with fraudulent cunning they conjecture what is to befall men in the future.” It is not therefore called divination, if one foretells things that happen of necessity, or happen generally, which things can be foreknown by human reason; or if one knows by revelation of God other events that are to happen, though not of necessity, in the future: for then he is not himself divining, that is, doing what is divine, rather he is receiving what is divine. But then only is a man said to divine, when he arrogates to himself in an undue manner the foretelling of future events; and this is certainly a sin: hence divination is always sinful. Article IV.—Is divination by invocation of evil spirits lawful? R. All divination by invocation of evil spirits is unlawful for two reasons. The first is taken from consideration of the principle, or prime means of this divination, which is a pact expressly entered into with the Evil One, by invocation of the same: and this is altogether unlawful; and it would be still more grievous if sacrifice or reverence were paid to the fiend thus invoked. The second reason is taken from consideration of the future event. For the devil, who aims at the perdition of mankind, though he sometimes tells the truth, intends by these his answers to accustom men to give him credence, and thus he seeks to lure them on to something prejudicial to their salvation. Hence Athanasius says: “Though the devil told the truth, Christ restrained his speech, lest he might utter his iniquity along with the truth: to accustom us not to care for such utterances, though they seem to be true; for it is monstrous that, having the Divine Scripture at hand, we should take instruction of the devil.” Article VIII.—Is divination by lot unlawful? R. If the point to be determined by lot is, what is to be a**igned and to whom, be it a matter of property or of dignity, or of punishment, or of employment; that is called a dividing lot. If the inquiry is, what is to be done, it is called a consulting lot. If the inquiry is, what is to happen in the future, that is called a divining lot. Now the issue of proceedings that are committed to lot, must be looked for either from chance or from spiritual cause directing the lot. If from chance—which can have place only in a dividing lot—there seems to be no fault there, except perhaps the fault of silliness. Thus parties unable to agree to a division may draw lots for it, leaving the apportionment to chance. But if the decision by lot is looked for from a spiritual cause, that cause sometimes is the agency of evil spirits. Thus we read: “The king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows: he inquired of the idols and consulted entrails.”1 Such use of lots is unlawful. Sometimes again the issue is looked for from God, according to the text: “Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord.”2 Such use of lots is not evil in itself, but sin may attach to it incidentally; and first of all, if recourse is had to lots without any need; for that looks like tempting God. Secondly, if even in need lots are used without show of reverence for God. Hence Bede says: “But if any persons under stress of necessity think that they should consult God by lot after the example of the Apostles,3 let them observe that the Apostles did not do this except after gathering an a**embly of the brethren, and pouring forth prayers to God.” Thirdly, if the divine oracles are turned to use for earthly business. Hence Augustine says: “As for those who gather decisions by lot from opening the pages of the Gospels, though one is glad to see them doing that rather than consulting evil spirits, still I must say I like not the custom of trying to turn the divine oracles to use of secular business and the vanity of this life.”1 But in case of necessity it is lawful, with due reverence, to implore the judgment of God by recourse to lots. Hence Augustine says: “If there arises among the ministers of God a discussion, which of them are to stay at their posts in time of persecution, that there be not a flight of all, and which of them are to fly, that the Church be not left deserted by the d**h of all; if this discussion cannot be otherwise terminated, my opinion is that the selection should be made by lot, who are to stay and who are to fly.” And again: “If you had something in abundance, to give to one who had none, and there was no giving of it to two; and two persons came in your way, neither of whom surpa**ed the other either in need or in any connection with you; you could do nothing fairer than to select by lot him to whom you should give what could not be given to both.” § 3. The ordeal of the hot iron, or of the boiling water, is intended for the detection of secret sin by means of something done by man: still there is further expected a miraculous effect to be wrought by God. Hence this kind of judicial inquiry is rendered unlawful, both because it is directed to the judging of secret things that are reserved to the divine judgment; and also because such a judicial procedure is not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence in a decree of Pope Stephen V.1 it is said: “The holy canons do not approve of confession being extorted from any one by the ordeal of the hot iron or boiling water; and what is not sanctioned by the testimony of the holy Fathers, no modern superstitious invention must presume to do. It is offences made public by spontaneous confession or the evidence of witnesses, that are granted to our government to judge, having the fear of God before our eyes; but things hidden and unknown are to be left to Him who alone knows the hearts of the children of men.” QUESTION XCVI. OF SUPERSTITIOUS OBSERVANCES. Article II.—Are those observances unlawful, that are directed to producing changes in animal bodies, health, and the like effects? R. In what is done for the producing of any particular effects, we must consider whether the agents employed seem naturally capable of producing such effects; for in that case the operation will not be unlawful, for it is lawful to employ natural causes to their own proper effects. Hence if the agents used do not seem naturally capable of causing such effects, it follows that they are not employed as causes to the causation of these effects, but only as signs; and thus they are part of a concerted system of signalling to evil spirits. § 1. If physical agents are simply employed to produce certain effects, for which they are thought to have a natural efficiency, that will not be superstitious or unlawful. But it will be superstitious and unlawful, if letters are brought in, or names, or any other vain observances, which manifestly have no natural efficiency in the case. § 3. It belongs to the dominion of the Divine Majesty, to which the devils are subject, that God should use them for whatever purpose He wills. But man has no authority given him over the devils, lawfully to use them for whatever purpose he will, but he has a war declared against the devils. Hence it is nowise lawful for man to employ the aid of devils by any compacts tacit or express. Article III.—Is it unlawful to observe omens of good or bad luck? R. Men make these observations, not as observing causes, but as observing signs of future events, good or evil. Now they are not observed as signs given by God, seeing that they are not introduced by divine authority, but rather by human folly, abetted by diabolical malice, as the devils endeavour to entangle the minds of men in such follies. Manifestly therefore all such observations are superstitious and unlawful, and seem to be relics of idolatry. § 2. The fact that, in the beginning, men have found some truth in these observances, is a result of chance; but once men begin to entangle their minds in such observances, many things turn out accordingly by the deception of evil spirits,—“to the end that, entangled in these observances, men may become more curious, and put their necks further and further into the manifold snares of pernicious error,” as Augustine says. Article IV. § 3. As for the wearing of relics upon the person, if they are worn from a motive of confidence in God and the saints, whose relics they are, it will not be unlawful; but if there were any vain observance about the matter, as taking care that the locket should be triangular, or anything of that sort, which has nothing to do with reverence to God and to the saints, it would be a superstitious and unlawful observance. QUESTION XCVII. OF TEMPTING GOD. Article I.—Does tempting God consist in certain proceedings, in which an effect is looked for that is possible to divine power alone? R. A man tempts God sometimes in words, sometimes in deeds. In words we speak with God in prayer. Hence a man expressly tempts God in his petition, when he asks anything of God with the intention of making trial of God's knowledge, power, or will. A man expressly tempts God in deeds, when he means by what he does to make experiment of the divine power, or loving-kindness, or knowledge. He tempts God, as we may say, constructively, who though he does not intend to make experiment of God, nevertheless asks for something, or does something, which is useful for nothing else but to put God's power, or goodness, or knowledge, to the test. Thus if one gallops a horse to escape the enemy, that is not making trial of the horse; but if one gallops a horse without any useful purpose, that is reckoned to be nothing else than making trial of the horse's speed. When then for some necessary or useful purpose, a man trusts himself to divine help in his petitions or deeds, that is not tempting God, for it is said: “As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to thee.”1 But when this is done without any useful and necessary purpose, it is constructive tempting of God. Hence on the text, “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God,”2 the gloss says: “He tempts God, who, having a safe line of action open to him, unreasonably puts himself in danger by way of making trial of the possibility of a divine deliverance.” § 2. The saints, when they work miracles by their prayers, are moved by some consideration of necessity or utility to seek for effects of divine power. § 3. It is in view of great necessity and utility that the preachers of the Kingdom of God leave aside temporal succours, that they more readily give themselves to preaching the Word of God; but if they were to abandon human aids without any utility or necessity, they would be tempting God. QUESTION XCVIII. OF PERJURY. Article II.—Is all perjury a sin? R. To swear is to call God to witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness to a falsehood, as though God either did not know the truth, or were willing to be a witness to what is false. And therefore perjury is manifestly a sin against religion, the virtue which has for its office to show reverence to God. § 1. He who swears to do an unlawful act, in swearing incurs the guilt of perjury for lack of justice.1 If however he does not fulfil his oath, he does not thereby incur the guilt of perjury: because it was not a matter that could fall under oath. § 2. He who swears not to enter religion,2 or not to give alms, or anything of that nature, in swearing incurs the guilt of perjury for lack of judgment. And therefore when he goes and does the better thing, it is not perjury, but quite the contrary: for the contrary of what he now does could not be matter of an oath. § 4. An oath being a personal action, a newly admitted citizen is not bound on oath to observe what the city has sworn to observe. He is bound however in fidelity to share the burdens and obligations of the city, as he has become a partaker in its advantages. A canon who swears to observe the statutes made in any college, is not bound on oath to observe the statutes to be made hereafter, unless it was his intention to bind himself to all statutes past and to come. He is bound however to observe them by the mere force of the statues themselves, which are compulsory. Article III.—Is all perjury a mortal sin? R. According to the doctrine of the Philosopher, “that which makes other things of this or that quality, is itself of the same quality in a higher degree.” But we see that sins of themselves venial, or even actions good of their kind, are mortal sins, if they are done on a motive of contempt of God. Much more therefore is everything a mortal sin, that of its own nature appertains to contempt of God. But perjury of its own nature implies a contempt of God: for this is the element of guilt in it, that it is a piece of irreverence to God. Hence perjury of its own nature is a mortal sin. § 1. As was said above, q. 89. art. 7. § 3. compulsion does not take away from a promissory oath its binding power in respect of that which may lawfully be done. And therefore if a party does not keep an oath taken on compulsion, he none the less commits perjury and sins mortally. He may, however, be absolved from the obligation of his oath by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, especially if he were constrained by threats, formidable enough to cause fear in a resolute man. QUESTION XCIX. OF SACRILEGE. Article I.—Is sacrilege the violation of a sacred thing? R. A thing is called sacred from its being ordained to divine worship. From the fact of a thing being set aside for the worship of God, it is rendered something divine; and thus there is due to it a certain reverence, which is referred to God. And therefore every piece of irreverence to sacred things is something of an injury to God, and bears the character of sacrilege. Article II.—Is sacrilege a special sin? R. Wherever there is found a special ground of deformity, there must needs be there a special sin; because the species of everything is fixed principally according to the formal character, not according to the matter or the subject. But in sacrilege there is found a special ground of deformity, by which a sacred thing is violated by irreverence; and therefore it is a special sin, and is opposed to religion. For as Damascene says: “The purple is honoured and glorified for being made the royal robe; and if any makes a rent in it, he is condemned to d**h,”—as acting against the King. § 2. One special character of sin may be found in many different kinds of sins, according as these different sins are directed to the end of one sin. The like is seen in different virtues, all commanded1 by one virtue. And thus whatever be the kind of sin by which one acts against the reverence due to sacred things, he formally commits sacrilege, though materially there be there different kinds of sin. § 3. Sacrilege is sometimes found separate from other sins, for that the act in question has no other deformity than being in violation of a sacred thing: as if a judge should arrest and carry off from a sacred place one whom he might lawfully arrest in other places. Article III.—Are the species of sacrilege distinguished according to the distinction of sacred things? R. The sin of sacrilege consists in irreverent behaviour towards a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing on account of its sanctity. And therefore according to difference in the character of sanctity attaching to the sacred things to which irreverence is done, we must distinguish different species of sacrilege. For the greater the sanctity that attaches to the sacred thing that is sinned against, the more grievous is the sacrilege. Now sanctity is attributed both to sacred persons, that is, persons dedicated to divine worship, and to sacred places, and to certain other sacred things. The sanctity of a place is referred to the sanctity of the man who pays worship to God in the sacred place. For it is said: “God did not choose the people for the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake.”1 And therefore the sacrilege that sins against a sacred person, is a graver sin than the sacrilege that sins against a sacred place. There are however in both these species of sacrilege different grades, according to differences of sacred persons and places. In like manner also the third species of sacrilege, that is committed on sacred things, admits of different grades according to the differences of sacred things. Among them the highest place is held by the sacraments, whereby man is sanctified, chief of which is the Sacrament of the Eucharist, which contains Christ Himself. And therefore sacrilege against this Sacrament is the most grievous of all sacrileges. The second place after the sacraments is held by the vessels consecrated for the receiving of the sacraments, and by sacred images, and by the relics of the saints, in which in a manner the very persons of the saints are venerated or dishonoured; then by what belongs to the ornamentation of the church and of its ministers; lastly, by what is set aside for the sustenance of the ministers of religion, in the shape either of movable goods or of immovable. Whoever sins against any of the afore-mentioned objects, incurs the crime of sacrilege. § 3. Every sin that a sacred person commits is materially and incidentally a sacrilege. Hence Bernard says: “Trifles are trifles among seculars: in a priest's mouth they are blasphemies.”1 But formally and properly that sin alone in a sacred person is a sacrilege, which is committed directly against the sanctity of the said person, as if a virgin dedicated to God should be guilty of fornication. QUESTION C. OF SIMONY. Article I.—Is simony a will of deliberate choice to buy or sell something spiritual, or annexed to what is spiritual? R. An act is evil of its kind from falling upon undue matter. Now there are three reasons that render a spiritual thing undue matter of buying and selling. First, because a spiritual thing cannot have its equivalent in any earthly price, as is said of wisdom: “She is more precious than all riches.”2 Therefore also Peter, condemning the wickedness of Simon at its very root, said: “Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money.”1 Secondly, because that cannot be due matter of sale, of which the seller is not the owner; but a prelate in the Church is not owner of spiritual goods, but steward or dispenser, according to the text: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God.”2 Thirdly, because selling is inconsistent with the origin of spiritual things, which proceed from the gratuitous will of God: hence the Lord says, “Freely have you received, freely give.”3 Article II.—Is it always unlawful to give money for the sacraments? R. The sacraments of the New Law are especially spiritual, seeing that they are the cause of spiritual grace, which has not a money price; and it is inconsistent with the essential notion of this grace that it should not be given gratuitously. But the sacraments are dispensed by the ministers of the Church, who ought to be supported by the people, according to the Apostle.4 Thus then we must say that to take money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments is the crime of simony, which no custom can excuse, because custom avails not to the prejudice of natural or divine law. Now by money is understood everything that has a money price. But to take something for the sustenance of those who administer the sacraments of Christ, when it is done according to the ordinance of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor any sin; for it is not taken as the price of hire, but as the wages of necessity. Hence on 1 Tim. v. 17, Augustine's gloss says: “Let them receive the sustenance of necessity from the people, the reward of their dispensation from the Lord.” § 6. Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office of nature. Hence it is lawful to give money for matrimony, inasmuch as it is an office of nature; unlawful, inasmuch as it is a sacrament of the Church. Article III. § 2. It would be an unlawful ordinance to enact in any church, that there should be no procession at any one's funeral unless he paid a certain sum of money: because such a statute would bar the way to any gratuitous rendering of that pious office. But it would be a more lawful ordinance to enact that such an honour should be paid to all who gave a certain alms: because that would not bar the way to paying it to others. And besides, the first ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, but the second the appearance of a return of gratitude. § 4. It is not lawful to exact anything or take anything as a price for entrance into a monastery. But if the monastery is poor, and not able to maintain so many persons, it is lawful, while granting entrance to the monastery gratuitously, to take something for the keep of the person received, if the funds of the monastery are not sufficient for that purpose. Article IV.—Is it lawful to take money for what is annexed to spiritualities? R. A thing may be annexed to spiritualities in either of two ways: in one way as depending on spiritualities, as the holding of ecclesiastical benefices is said to be annexed to spiritualities, because it is not within the competence of any but the holder of clerical office: hence such things can nowise be at all without spiritualities. And therefore it is nowise lawful to sell them, because in the sale of them spiritualities also are understood to be subject to sale. Other things again are annexed to spiritualities as being directed to spiritual ends: as the right of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and the sacred vessels, which are meant for use in the sacraments: hence such things do not presuppose spiritualities, but rather precede them in order of time. And therefore in some respect they may be sold, but not inasmuch as they are annexed to spiritualities. § 2. The sacred vessels are annexed to spiritualities as to their end, and therefore their consecration cannot be sold; but the material of them may be sold for the need of the Church and of the poor. QUESTION CI. OF NATURAL AFFECTION. Article I.—Are there certain definite persons who come within the range of natural affection? R. A man comes to stand in the debt of others in various ways, according to their various excellences and various benefits received from them. In both these respects God holds the chief place: for He is at once most excellent, and is to us the first principle of being and of government. In the second place our parents and our country, of whom and in which we were born and reared, are the principles of our being and government. And therefore, after God, man is most in debt to his parents and to his country. Hence as it belongs to religion to worship God, so in a secondary degree it belongs to natural affection to worship parents and country. In the cultus of parents is included the cultus of all kinsmen who are sprung of the same parents. Again, in the cultus of country is included the cultus of all fellow-citizens and friends of our country. And these are mainly the bounds of natural affection. Article II.—Does natural affection find sustenance for parents? R. There are two ways in which a thing is due to parents and fellow-countrymen: in one way a thing is due ordinarily, in another way incidentally. Ordinarily there is due to them that which becomes a father, inasmuch as he is a father: now a father being the superior, and as it were the origin and principle of his son, there is due to him from the son reverence and service. A thing is due to a father incidentally, when it becomes him to receive it in respect of some accident that has befallen him: for instance, if he is sick, it is becoming that he should be visited and endeavour made to cure him; if he is poor, it is becoming that he should receive sustenance—and so of the rest, all which attentions come under the head of due service. § 1. Under the honouring of parents is understood all the support that ought to be rendered to parents, as our Lord interprets the commandment;1 and this because support is rendered to a father as a tribute due to a superior. § 2. To the text, “Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents,”2 it is to be said that because a father stands for a source and originating principle, and a child for that which has being of that originating principle, therefore it is ordinarily proper for a father to support his child; and therefore he ought to support him not for a season only, but for the whole course of his life, and this is the meaning of “laying up.” But as for the son bestowing anything on his father, that happens incidentally, on account of some need of the hour, in which he is bound to give him support; but he is not bound to lay up for a distant day, because in the natural course of things parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents. Article III.—Is natural affection a special virtue distinct from others? R. A virtue is special by regarding some object in some special light. But since it belongs to the notion of justice to give another his due, there is a special virtue wherever there is found a special way in which anything is due to any person. Now there is something specially due to a person for being a connatural originating principle, productive of existence and governing the same. This is the principle that natural affection regards in paying duty and worship to parents and country and their adjuncts. And therefore natural affection is a special virtue. § 1. As religion is a protestation of faith, hope, and charity, by which virtues a man is primarily referred to God, so natural affection is a protestation of the charity which one has to his parents and his country. Article IV.—Is religion an occasion for laying aside the offices of natural affection to parents? R. Religion and natural affection are two virtues. Now no virtue is contrary to or inconsistent with any other virtue, because according to the Philosopher, “good is not contrary to good.” Hence religion and natural affection cannot possibly get in one another's way, so that the act of the one should be excluded by the act of the other. But the act of every virtue is limited by due circumstances, transgressing which it will cease to be an act of virtue, and become vicious. Hence it is the part of natural affection to render duty and worship to parents according to the manner due. But it is not the manner due, that a man should lay himself out more for worshipping his father than for worshipping God; but as Ambrose says, “The piety of divine worship is preferred to the tie of kindred.” If therefore the worship of parents were to withdraw us from the worship of God, it would no longer be the part of natural affection to go on with the worship of parents against God. Hence Jerome says: “Go your way, pa** over father and mother; fly with dry eyes to the standard of the Cross; it is the highest kind of natural affection in this matter to have been cruel.” And therefore in such a case the offices of natural affection for parents are to be dropped for the sake of worshipping God in religion. But if it be that by paying due services to parents we are not withdrawn from the worship of God, then such services will belong to natural affection; and in that case there will be no need to abandon natural affection for the sake of religion. § 1. Gregory on that word of our Lord1 says: “We ought to ignore our parents, hating them and flying from them when they are an obstacle to us in the way of the Lord.” For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from worshipping God, we ought in that respect to abandon and hate them. And in this way the Levites are said1 not to have known their kinsmen, because according to the command of the Lord2 they spared not the idolaters. § 4. A different tone must be taken in speaking of one who is still in the world, and of one who is already professed in religion. For he who is still in the world, if he has parents who cannot be supported without him, ought not to leave them and enter religion, because in so doing he would be transgressing the commandment of honouring parents. Some indeed say that even in this case he may lawfully abandon them and commit the care of them to God. But looking at the matter rightly, we see that it would be tempting God, for a man who has human means at his command, to go and expose his parents to danger in the hope of divine a**istance. But if his parents could contrive to live without him, it would be lawful for him to leave his parents and enter religion: because children are not bound to support their parents except in case of necessity. But he who is already professed in religion, counts as one dead to the world: hence he ought not, on any plea of supporting his parents, to quit the cloister in which he is buried with Christ, and entangle himself again in worldly business. He is bound however, saving his obedience to his superior and his state as a religious, to make pious efforts to get relief for his parents. QUESTION CIV. OF OBEDIENCE. Article II.—Is obedience a special virtue? R. A special virtue is set and appointed for all good works that have a special character of praiseworthiness: for it is the proper function of virtue to render a work good. Now to obey a superior is due according to the divine order laid down in creation, and consequently is a good thing, since goodness consists in measure, decency, and order, as Augustine says. This act has a special character of praiseworthiness from having a special object. For among the many other things that inferiors are bound to render to their superiors, this is one thing special, that they are bound to obey their commands. Hence obedience is a special virtue, and its special object is a command, tacit or express; for the will of a superior, in whatsoever way it becomes known, is a sort of tacit command, and the obedience seems all the readier when, understanding the superior's will, it forestalls any express command. § 1. Two special ideas, regarded by two special virtues, may easily meet in one and the same material object. Thus a soldier defending a royal fortress performs at once a work of fortitude, in not shrinking from the danger of d**h in a good cause; and a work of justice, in yielding due service to his Sovereign. So then the idea which obedience fixes upon, that of a command, goes along with acts of all virtues, but not with all acts of virtue, because not all acts of virtue are enjoined under a command. In like manner also some things fall under a command which belong to no other virtue but obedience, as is clear in things that are not evil except for their being forbidden. Thus then if obedience is taken in its proper sense, as regarding and going upon the precise idea of a command, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin: for, taking it in this way, it is requisite for obedience that one should perform an act of justice, or of any other virtue, with the intention of accomplishing a command; and for disobedience it is requisite that one should actually set at nought a command. § 3. Obedience, like any other virtue, ought to have a ready will for its own proper object, and not for anything inconsistent with that object. But the proper object of obedience is a command, proceeding from the will of another. Hence obedience renders a man's will prompt and ready to fulfil the will of another commanding him. But if what is commanded him is something willed on its own account, apart from any idea of a command, as happens in prosperity, he is already tending to it of his own will, and seems to accomplish it, not for the command, but for the gratification of his own will. But when what is commanded is in no way willed of itself, but, looked at in itself, is repugnant to the person's own will, as happens in hard times, then it is quite clear that the thing is done only on account of the command. And therefore Gregory says that “the obedience that has something of its own in prosperity, is either no obedience at all, or is of inferior degree; but in adversity or difficulty the obedience is greater.”1 This however is to be understood, judging by external appearances. But in the judgment of God, who searches hearts, it may happen that, even in prosperity, obedience, having something of the man's own about it, may not be on this account less praiseworthy, if the man's own will does none the less devoutly tend to the accomplishment of the precept. Article III.—Is obedience the greatest of virtues? R. As sin consists in man's cleaving to changeable goods, to the contempt of God; so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man's cleaving to God, as to his last end, to the contempt of created goods. But the end has the preference over the means to the end. If then created goods are contemned in order that the soul may cleave to God, it is greater praise of a virtue to say that it cleaves to God than to say that it contemns earthly goods. And therefore those virtues which of themselves make the soul cleave to God, namely, the theological virtues, have the preference over the moral virtues, by which some earthly object is contemned in order that the soul may cleave to God. But among moral virtues a virtue has the preference, the greater the object that it contemns in order to cleave to God. Now there are three kinds of human goods which a man may contemn for God's sake. The lowest of the three are external goods; intermediate are goods of the body; and highest of all are goods of the soul. Of these last chiefest in one way is the will, inasmuch as by the will it is that a man uses all other goods. And therefore, ordinarily speaking, the virtue of obedience, which contemns the man's own will for God's sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn for God's sake sundry other goods. Hence also all other works of virtue are meritorious with God as being done in obedience to the divine will. For if one even were to endure martyrdom, or had distributed all his goods to the poor, unless he referred it to the fulfilment of the divine will, which reference belongs directly to obedience, there could be no merit in such acts, no more than if they were done without charity; and indeed charity cannot be without obedience, for it is said: “He that keepeth his word, in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected;”1 and that because friendship makes identity in willing and willing not. § 3. Good is of two sorts: one sort which a man is necessarily bound to do, as to love God; and such good nowise ought to be omitted for obedience. There is another sort of good which a man is not necessarily bound to do; and such good a man ought at times to omit for the obedience to which he is necessarily bound, because one ought not to incur any fault in doing good; and yet, as Gregory says: “He who forbids his subjects any one good deed, must needs allow them many others, lest the spirit of him who obeys die out entirely, if he is kept fasting and quite turned away from all good deeds.” And thus by obedience and other good exercises the loss of one good exercise may be made up. Article IV. § 2. As God works no effect against nature, because “that is the nature of everything, which God works in the thing,” as the gloss says, quoting Augustine; and yet He works sundry effects against the usual course of nature: so God can command nothing against virtue, because virtue and the rectitude of the human will consist principally in conformity to the will of God and compliance with His command, though that command be against the usual manner of virtue.1 Thus then the command given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not against justice, because God is the author of life and d**h. Article V.—Are subjects bound to obey their superiors in all things? R. It may happen on two grounds that a subject is not bound to obey his superior in all things. One ground is the commandment of a higher authority to the contrary. Another ground is in the case of a command being given in a matter in which the receiver of the command is not subject to the authority from which the command proceeds. For Seneca says: “It is a mistake to suppose that slavery descends upon the whole man; the better part of the man remains free: bodies are liable to ownership and are made over as property, but the mind is its own master.”1 And therefore in what concerns the inward motion of the will man is not bound to obey man, but only God. Still man is bound to obey man in what has to be done externally by the body. Yet even here man is not bound to obey man, but only God, in what belongs to the nature and physical being of the body, because in the physical order all men are equal,2 as touching the nourishment of the body and the begetting of offspring. Hence neither slaves are bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, about contracting marriage, or preserving virginity, or anything of that kind. But in the laying out of his day and the transaction of business the subject is bound to obey his superior according to the character of his superiority, a soldier his commanding officer in matters of war, a slave his master in doing slave's work, a son his father in conduct of life and household management, and so of the rest. § 2. Man is subject to God absolutely in all respects both within and without, and therefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. But inferiors are subject to their superiors, not in all things, but in certain matters of limited range; and in those matters superiors are intermediaries between God and their subjects: in other matters the latter are subject immediately to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or the written law. § 3. Religious profess obedience according to regular observance, in which they are subject to their superiors; and therefore they are bound to obey in those points only which can form a part of regular observance; and this is obedience sufficient for salvation. But if they choose to obey in other matters also, that will be carrying perfection to a height; provided the things enjoined be not against God, nor against the perfection of the rule, because such obedience would be unlawful. Thus then we may distinguish three degrees of obedience: one sufficient for salvation, which obeys in what it is obliged to; another, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful; a third, indiscreet, which obeys even in things unlawful. Article VI.—Are Christians bound to obey civil authority? R. The faith of Christ is the principle and cause of justice, according to the text: “The justice of God by the faith of Jesus Christ;”1 and therefore by the faith of Jesus Christ the order of justice is not taken away, but is rather confirmed. But the order of justice requires that inferiors obey their superiors: otherwise the state and condition of human society could not be preserved. And therefore the faith of Christ does not excuse the faithful from the duty of obedience to secular princes.2 § 1. The slavery by which man is subject to man reaches to the body, not to the soul, which remains free. But in the present state of this life we are set free by the grace of Christ from the defects of the soul, but not from the defects of the body, as is clear by the Apostle, who says of himself: “With the mind I serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin.”3 And therefore they who become the children of God by grace are free from the spiritual slavery of sin, but not from the slavery of the body, by which they are bound over to temporal masters. QUESTION CVI. OF GRATITUDE. Article II.—Is the innocent more bound to render thanks to God than the penitent? R. Where the favour is greater, there greater gratitude is requisite. But a favour is a favour because it is bestowed gratuitously. Hence there are two ways in which a favour may be greater: in one way from the amount of the thing given; and in this way the innocent is bound to greater return of thanks, because, absolutely speaking, other things being equal, there is given him a greater gift from God, and a more continuous gift. In another way a favour may be said to be greater because it is bestowed more gratuitously; and in this way the penitent is more bound to return thanks than the innocent, because, being as he was worthy of punishment, there is given him grace and favour. And thus, though the gift that is given to the innocent is, absolutely considered, the greater, still the gift that is given to the penitent is greater in reference to him, as a small gift given to a poor man is greater than a great gift to a rich one. § 4. “To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less.”1 Article IV.—Ought a benefit received to be requited on the spot? R. As in the conferring of a benefit there are two things to consider, the affection and the gift, so the same two things are to be considered in returning a benefit. As for the affection, the return should be made immediately: hence Seneca says, “Do you wish to return a benefit? accept it graciously.” But as for the gift, a time should be waited for in which the return may be opportune for the benefactor; but if at an inconvenient time one wishes at once to render service for service, that has not the air of a virtuous, but of an unwilling return. For as Seneca says: “If he seeks to pay too quickly, he owes unwillingly; and he who owes unwillingly, is ungrateful.” § 4. “He who is in a hurry to return a kindness, has not the mind of a grateful man, but of a debtor.”1 Article VI.—Ought the return of kindness to exceed the kindness received? R. The return of kindness has regard to the benefit, as the benefit was in the will of the benefactor. Now in the benefactor this is reckoned specially commendable, that he has gratuitously conferred a benefit to which he was not obliged. And therefore the recipient of the benefit is bound by a debt of moral decency to some similar gratuitous payment. But the payment does not seem to be gratuitous, unless it exceeds the quantity of the benefit received: because so long as the requital is less or equal, it has not the look of a thing gratuitously done, but of a return of something received. And therefore the return of kindness always strives to the best of the person's ability to give back something greater than has been received. § 2. The debt of gratitude is derived from charity; and charity, the more it is paid, the more it is due, according to the text: “Owe no man anything but to love one another.”1 And therefore no harm if the obligation of gratitude is interminable. QUESTION CVII. OF INGRATITUDE. Article II.—Is ingratitude a special sin? R. Ingratitude means want of gratitude. Now every want or privation has its species according to the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing. Hence as gratitude is one special virtue, so ingratitude is one special sin. But it has different degrees, according to the order of things requisite for gratitude. There the first thing requisite is that the man should recognize the benefit he has received; the second is praise and rendering of thanks; the third is that he should give something in return according to place and time and his ability. But because what is last to be generated is the first to decay, therefore the first degree of ingratitude is not to return the kindness; the second is to dissemble the kindness, as being unwilling to show that you have received any; the third and most grievous is failing to recognize it as such, either by forgetting it or in any other way. And because in an affirmation there is understood the denial of the opposite statement,1 therefore it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude that a man should render evil for good; to the second, that he should disparage the benefit he has received; to the third, that he should account the benefit an ill turn done him. Article IV.—Are kindnesses to be withdrawn from the ungrateful? R. About the ungrateful person two things are to be considered: first, what it is that he deserves to have done to him; and putting the question that way, it is certain that he deserves withdrawal of kindness. In another way it is to be considered, what it befits the benefactor to do. In the first place, he ought not to be too ready to judge that there is ingratitude, for “frequently,” as Seneca says, “he who has made no return is grateful,” the reason being perhaps that he has not had the means or due opportunity of making any return. Secondly, he ought to aim at making the ungrateful person grateful; which if he cannot do with the first act of kindness, he will perhaps do with the second. But if after repeated kindnesses the other increases his ingratitude and becomes worse, the benefactor ought to desist from bestowing kindnesses. § 2. He who bestows a kindness on an ungrateful person, does not give him an occasion of sin, but rather of gratitude and love. If the recipient thence takes occasion of ingratitude, that is not to be imputed to the giver. § 3. He who bestows a kindness, ought not to pose as a punisher of ingratitude, but rather as a benevolent physician, seeking to cure ingratitude by reiterated acts of kindess. QUESTION CVIII. OF VENGEANCE.1 Article I.—Is vengeance lawful? R. Vengeance is taken by some penal evil inflicted on the offender. In judging of vengeance then we are to consider the mind and purpose of him who takes it. For if his intention makes principally for the evil of him on whom he takes vengeance, and rests there, it will be altogether unlawful; because to take delight in the evil of another belongs to hatred, which is repugnant to the charity with which we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse for any one to say that he intends the evil of him who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as it is no excuse for a man that he hates another who hates him; for a man ought not to sin against another, simply because that other has first sinned against him; for this is being overcome by evil, which the Apostle tells us not to be, saying, “Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.”1 But if the intention of him who takes vengeance makes principally for some good that is reached by the punishment of the offender, say his amendment, or the restraint of that party and the quiet of others, and the maintenance of justice, and the honour of God, then vengeance may be lawful, other due circumstances being observed. § 1. To the text, “Vengeance is mine, I will repay,”2 it is to be said that he who according to his rank and order exercises vengeance upon evildoers, does not usurp to himself what is God's, but uses the power divinely bestowed on him; for it is said of the earthly prince: “He is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.”3 But if any one exercises vengeance contrary to the order of divine institution, he usurps to himself what is God's, and therefore sins.4 § 2. The good bear with the wicked to this extent, that, so far as it is proper to do so, they patiently endure at their hands the injuries done to themselves; but they do not bear with them to the extent of enduring the injuries done to God and their neighbours. For [pseudo-] Chrysostom says: “It is praiseworthy to be patient under one's own wrongs, but the height of impiety to dissemble injuries done to God.” § 3. The Gospel law is a law of love; and therefore into them who do good works on a motive of love, who alone properly belong to the Gospel, fear is not to be inspired by punishments, but only into such as are not moved by love to good, who though they are of the Church in number, are not so in merit. § 4. The wrong that is done to an individual, sometimes redounds to God and to the Church, and then the person ought to avenge his own wrong: as is clear of Elias, who made fire to descend upon them who had come to arrest him;1 and in like manner Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him;2 and Pope Silverius excommunicated those that sent him into exile. But inasmuch as the wrong done you concerns your own individual person, you ought to put up with it patiently, if so it be expedient: for these precepts of patience3 are to be understood as obligatory “in readiness of heart,” as Augustine says.4 § 5. When a whole people sins, vengeance is to be taken upon them either to the extent of the whole people, as the Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea, and as the Sodomites all perished together, or to the extent of a great portion of the people, as in the punishment of those who adored the golden calf.1 But sometimes, if there is hope of the amendment of the many, the severity of vengeance should be exercised only upon a few ringleaders, whose punishment may serve to terrify the rest, as the Lord2 ordered the princes of the people to be hung for the sin of the multitude. But if it is not the whole community that has sinned, but only a part, then if the wicked can be got at apart from the good, vengeance should be exercised on them alone, provided it can be done without scandal to others; otherwise the community must be spared, and abatement of severity made. And the same holds good for the prince whom the people follow. For his sin must be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal of the people, unless it happens to be such a sin on his part as would do more harm to the people in spirituals or temporals than the scandal to be apprehended from his punishment. Article II.—Is vengeance a special virtue? R. As the Philosopher says, fitness for virtue is in us by nature, but the fulness of virtue comes by practice, or by some other cause.3 Hence it appears that the virtues perfect us, duly to carry out those natural inclinations which are part of the ordinance of nature. And therefore to every definite natural inclination there is attached some special virtue. Now there is one special inclination of nature to remove causes of hurt: hence to animals there is given an irascible faculty distinct from the concupiscible faculty. Now a man repels causes of hurt by defending himself against wrongs, to prevent their being done him; or in case of wrongs already done, revenging them, not with any intention of hurting, but with the intention of removing causes of hurt. Article III.—Ought vengeance to be taken by means of the punishments customary amongst men? R. Vengeance is so far lawful and virtuous, as it makes for the restraint of evil. Now they who have no love of virtue, are restrained from offending by fear of losing something that they love more than what they gain by offending. And therefore vengeance is to be taken for offences by the withdrawal of all that the offender most loves—life, limb, liberty, property, country, and glory. § 2. All who sin mortally are worthy of eternal d**h in the retribution of the world to come, which is according to the truth of divine judgment. But the punishments of the present life are rather medicinal; and therefore the punishment of d**h is inflicted on those sins alone which tend to do serious mischief to others. § 3. When along with the fault the punishment also becomes known, be it d**h or any other of those things that man has a dread of, his will is thereby weaned from sin; because the punishment terrifies him more than the example of the fault allures him.1 Article IV.—Is vengeance to be exercised on those who have sinned involuntarily?1 R. Punishment may be considered in two ways, in one way precisely as punishment, and in this way punishment is not due except to sin, because by punishment the equilibrium of justice is restored, inasmuch as he who by sinning has had too much of his own will, suffers something now against his will. In another way punishment may be considered as a medicine, inasmuch as medicine is not only remedial of past sin, but is also preservative against future sin, or promotive of some good; and in this way one is sometimes punished without fault, but not without cause. It is to be observed however that medical treatment never withdraws a greater good to promote a less; it never blinds the eye to cure the heel; but it does sometimes inflict hurt in lesser matters to afford remedy in greater things. And because spiritual goods are the greatest goods, and temporal goods the least, therefore a man is sometimes punished in temporal goods without his fault; this is the case in many of the punishments of the present life, divinely inflicted to prove a man or to humble him; but never is a man punished in spiritual goods without his own fault, neither in the present life nor in the life to come: because there in the world to come punishments are not medicines, but follow upon spiritual condemnation. § 1. One man is never punished with a spiritual punishment for the sin of another, because spiritual punishment reaches to the soul, in which every man is free and independent. But sometimes one is punished with temporal punishment for the sin of another, for three reasons. First, because one man is temporally the chattel of another; and so he is punished to punish that other: thus children are in the body the chattels of their father, and slaves in a certain sense the chattels of their owners. In another way, inasmuch as the sin of one spreads to another, either by imitation, as children imitate their parents' sins, and slaves their masters', to sin more boldly; or by way of merit, as the sins of subjects merit a sinner to be set over them, according to the text, “Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people;”1 or by way of some consent or dissembling, as sometimes the good are temporally punished with the wicked because they have not rebuked their sins, as Augustine says. Thirdly, to commend the unity of human society, in consequence of which unity one man ought to be solicitous for another that he sin not; and to excite a detestation of sin, when it is found that the punishment of one redounds to all, as though all made one body, as Augustine says of the sin of Achan.2 But as for the saying of the Lord, “Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation,”3 that seems rather to point to mercy than to severity, in that He does not wreak His vengeance at once, but waits for the time to come, that posterity at least may mend their ways; but as the malice of posterity increases, it becomes in a manner necessary for vengeance to fall. § 2. The secret judgments of God, whereby He temporally punishes some persons without fault of theirs, are not within the competence of human judgment to imitate; because man cannot comprehend the reasons of these judgments so as to know what is expedient for each individual soul. And therefore never by human judgment ought a man to be punished with the pain of the lash, so as to be put to d**h, or maimed, or beaten with stripes, without his own fault.1 But with the pain of loss one is punished even in human judgment without fault, but not without cause.