Noam Chomsky - A Debate Between Noam Chomsky and William F. Buckley (Firing Line, 1969) lyrics

William F. Buckley (Hence: WB): Professor Noam Chomsky is listed in anybody's catalogue as one of the half-dozen top heroes of the New Left. This standing he achieved by adopting over the past two or three years a series of adamant positions rejecting at least American foreign policy, at most America itself, and his essays and speeches are collected in his new book, American Power and the New Mandarins. Usually, Mr Chomsky writes non-political books, for instance, Syntactic Structures in 1957, Cartesian Linguistics in 1966 and Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar in 1965. He is a highly esteemed student of modern language and linguistics who teaches nowadays at the Ma**achusetts Institute of Technology and has taught before at Berkeley, Columbia, and other strife-torn universities. **AUDIENCE LAUGHTER** He is a member of many organizations and learned societies including – I'm sure you would want me to mention – The Aristotelian Society of Great Britain. In one of his essays, Mr Chomsky writes, quote: “By accepting the presumption of legitimacy of debate on certain issues – such as this one – one has already lost one's humanity.” I should like to begin by asking him why under the circumstances, if by being here he stands to lose his humanity, he consented to appear in the first place. Noam Chomsky (Hence: NC): Because – first of all, I didn't quite put it in those terms, I don't think – I think that by… WB: It's in the book. NC: Yeah, but I said that there are certain issues, for example, Auschwitz, such that by consenting to discuss them one degrades oneself and to some degree loses one's humanity, and I think that's true. Nevertheless I can easily imagine circumstances in which I would have been glad to debate Auschwitz, for example if there were some chance that by debating Auschwitz it might have been possible to eliminate it, or to at least mitigate the horror of what was going on. And I think I feel the same way about Vietnam, and I really think that there is no – fundamentally – there is no argument any more at an intellectual level, in my opinion, but I think it very important to discuss it nevertheless. WB: At what level is there an argument? NC: Well, there is a policy which I think is a destructive and devastating policy. It's continuing, and the continuation of the policy is to some extent based on the fact of public apathy or public acceptance – hence there still is the necessity to convince people that they should act strongly to put an end to this policy. WB: At what point was there an intellectual argument; at which point did an intellectual argument in favour of our intervening in Vietnam cease to exist? NC: Well as I say there, I think that there may have been a time when there was something to debate. For example I think that in the middle '50s, although I was opposed to the policy and I think that it was right to be opposed to it, nevertheless I think it was a debatable issue in a sense in which it is no longer a debatable issue. WB: Why is that? NC: Because at the moment I think it's really an issue of the survival of the existence of Vietnam as an entity, as a social and cultural entity. I think that's what's at stake. WB: But even that could be intellectually argued, couldn't it? NC: Well in the same sense in which Auschwitz could be intellectually argued… WB: No, I mean in a different sense. NC: No, I think in the same sense. Don't forget, there were people who argued in favour of Auschwitz… WB: Oh I know, I hadn't forgotten that at all. I haven't had any such on this program, nor do I intend to, but it seems to me that even if what you said were correct, there could be a perfectly legitimate argument over, for instance, the continuation of the state of Anguilla, or the continuation of the state of Biafra, or the continuation of the state of Goa… NC: I didn't talk about the existence of the state, I talked about the existence of the society as a social and cultural entity. I think that's what's at stake. WB: OK, well if it's at stake, mightn't there be two points of view about how to help it evolve into its natural forms, right? NC: Oh, there are many different points of view. I think there are very legitimate issues to be argued as to how the United States ought to most efficaciously put an end to its destructive actions in Vietnam. There are many different alternatives that might be thought about… WB: Yes, but one way of course to put an end to America's necessary intervention is to conclude the war successfully. That's a way… NC: Yeah, one possible way is by destroying Vietnam, which I think is probably the most likely outcome. WB: Yeah, well now, for instance one way in which we put an end to the Nazi occupation of France was by destroying Nazi Germany, correct? NC: That's right. WB: And it seems to me that this was a position which is a tenable position, in mutatis mutandis it's a tenable position… NC: No because in mutatis mutandis changes everything in this case… WB: I'll tell you why… it's not only I, but people with whom I disagree and I guess, Arthur Schlesinger Jr refers to your theological certitudes and your liberal application of them to every subject on which you touch, so the subject of your own intolerance of other people's point of view, is I think itself linguistically interesting. NC: First of all I don't accept that criticism. You see, if you look at that quotation you'll notice that I put it in there – and recall the context – I said that when I argue the issue I feel a tone of moral and emotional falseness, which I wanted to explain, but then I go ahead and argue the issue. So that's a side remark intended to explain my own feeling of emotional and moral falseness, which is real – I do feel it, but nevertheless I then go ahead for 300 pages or so to discuss this in relation to… WB: (interrupting) Sure... NC: So I don't really believe that it's fair to say that I'm not willing to tolerate other positions… WB: (interrupting) But you don't end the book by saying, “I've battled hard in feeling this” – you say “everybody's odd who doesn't agree with me,” right? NC: No, I don't think so. Do I say that? WB: This is certainly the burden of your book… NC: I wasn't aware of that. I mean, I think that I've given, you know, an argument… WB: (interrupting) Well maybe this is a universal difficulty you're having – not being aware of certain people's reading of your position. NC: Well then let me say, I think… for example I think I take a very qualified and temperate position on many, many issues in this book. For example, take the issue of the background of the Second World War which I spend a lot of time on. If you notice, I end up with a statement saying that I don't see any way to give a clear, sharp resolution, a clear sharp answer to the question of what we should have done under such-and-such circumstances. I discuss someone who did take a very strong, and I think very honourable position, namely A J Muste, and I say that I wish I could answer the question for myself of whether I feel that I would have taken or would have rejected that position, but I don't see any way to do it because the issue is mixed. There are many issues that I feel that way – on the other hand, see, when the issue is, let's say, three million tons of bombs dropped on Vietnam, I don't feel that way any more. Nevertheless, I'm still perfectly willing to argue the issue, calmly, quietly, you know… WB: As you would have, say, the dropping of the bombs in Dresden. NC: Exactly, or the atom bomb. You see I would have been willing to argue the dropping of the atom bomb, though I do feel that it's a war crime. WB: Sure, but I do think that you put some people at a disadvantage by your a-priori a**ertion that any position that disagrees with your own is intellectually barren. NC: Oh, I didn't mean that really. Let me explain. Maybe it didn't come across, but what I meant was something else. I wanted to honestly state my own emotional – my own feeling about entering into a debate over this issue. WB: [unclear] NC: No, I think that, the point is that I think it's only fair to say to an audience of readers to say, this is the way I approach the issue, and you'll read me on the basis of this understanding, and the best I can give is the way I'm approaching this issue. And it's perfectly true when I do – if you notice, what I say is that increasingly, over the years, in discussing this issue, I've felt this feeling of emotional and moral falseness. And I think it would only be honest to express it, and go ahead with the discussion. WB: Oh, quite so. But you also say that you hate yourself for not having come to that position earlier. NC: Yeah, I do. I think that was a very great, great mistake. WB: Well I hope to give you a little solace there… [edit in tape] WB: The reason I do raise this, and I rejoice in your disposition to argue the Vietnam question, especially when I recognize what an act of self-control this must involve... NC: It does. WB: Sure. NC: It really does. I mean, I think that it's the kind of issue where… WB: And you're doing very well. You're doing very well. NC: Sometimes I lose my temper. Maybe not tonight. WB: Maybe not tonight, because if you would, I'd smash you in the goddamn face. NC: That's a good reason for not losing my temper. WB: You say the war is simply an obscenity, a depraved act by weak and miserable men. NC: Including all of us. Including myself. WB: Well, then… NC: Including every – that's the next sentence. WB: Yeah. NC: The same sentence. WB: Oh, sure, sure, sure. Sure, because you count everybody in the company of the guilty. NC: I think that's true in this case. WB: Yeah, but then… NC: You see, one of the points I was trying… WB: This is, in a sense, a theological observation, isn't it? NC: No, I don't think so. WB: Because if someone points out if everybody is guilty of everything, then nobody is guilty of anything. NC: No, I don't… I don't believe that. See, I think that the point that I'm trying to make, and I think ought to be made, is that the real – at least to me – I say this elsewhere in the book – what seems to me a very, in a sense, terrifying aspect of our society and other societies is the equanimity and the detachment with which sane, reasonable, sensible people can observe such events. I think that's more terrifying than the occasional Hitler or LeMay or other that crops up. These people would not be able to operate were it not for this apathy and equanimity, and therefore I think that it's in some sense the sane and reasonable and tolerant people who share a very serious burden of guilt that they very easily throw on the shoulders of others who seem more extreme and more violent. WB: Oh, I agree, but surely the emotional temperature of yourself or myself, or of other people is not in and of itself an index – an automatic index – to the righteousness of our emotions… NC: Certainly not, certainly not. WB: For instance, people approximately equally brought up, in the late '30s, whether or not America should help the Western powers defend themselves against the Axis powers, and I think it is incorrect to suppose that people of either side were necessarily right, simply because they weren't exorcised… NC: Oh, I'd agree with that totally. There's no connection whatsoever between the degree of emotion and the degree of correctness. WB: But as you understand the existing situation, it ought to be in your judgment a transparently evil thing that we are engaged in and you are derivatively concerned because there is not a shared sense of indignation like your own. NC: Correct… no I don't say that I am right because I am indignant; rather, I say that I think in this case I am right to be indignant, which is different – I have to prove that. WB: You are right to be indignant if you are right. NC: That's right, and that has to be demonstrated, that's why… WB: That has to be demonstrated… NC: You know, dozens of pages of argument about it, which may or may not convince people. It convinces me… WB: Sure, sure. [SCHEDULED BREAK IN SHOW (at approx 11:15)] WB: Excuse me, did I interrupt you? I'm sorry. NC: No, no WB: Let me ask you this: If in fact your concern is to communicate your moral concern, to what extent have you spent time thinking about your techniques – I say this seriously, because it is probably true that under certain circumstances the communication of one's own indignation and fury and strength is best communicated emotionally [indecipherable] by screaming and yelling. But if it becomes observable that this doesn't bring people around, then you've got to consider the problem of communication – it becomes a moral problem, just as you consent to argue Auschwitz or Buchenwald with somebody, if there was a chance of dissipating something. Now, if you have given that problem any thought, how come that you end up saying, as you do in your book, that Senator Mike Mansfield is, quote, “the kind of man who is the terror of our age”? NC: Well, let me put that in its context as well. I believe that, and what I say is that Senator Mansfield is an American intellectual in the best sense – a sane, reasonable, scholarly man – the kind of man who is the terror of our age, and that's essentially what I was saying before. I think that the terror of our age is the sane, responsible, serious, quiet man who watches these things unfold, and doesn't react to them. I include myself in that, as I tried to make clear in the earlier statements. WB: Well… put it this way. Your counsel is surely a counsel of despair if, on the one hand you accost us with your own relative moral superiority, and yet end up despising yourself, appealing to scrupulosity for your own shortcomings. I mean, this makes things pretty… NC: Not really. For one thing I don't feel any relative moral superiority and I tried – maybe failed – but I tried very hard to express that in the book. I said somewhere in the beginning that if there is any tone of self-righteousness or anything like that, it's unintended and certainly undeserved, and I mean that very much. After all, given the feelings that I have, which I've just expressed, and which you perceived, I should be doing really strong things which I don't think I am doing – so there's no sense of moral superiority, and I'm not interested in simply throwing blame around or giving people marks. I think that the beginning of wisdom in this case is to recognise something about what we stand for in the world, what we are doing in the world, and I think when we do recognise that, we will feel an enormous sense of guilt, and I say somewhere in there that one should be very careful not to let confessions of guilt overcome the possibility of action. I said that confessions of guilt can be very good therapy, as they can, as is well known. They're also a very good preventative to the action, and I think one should be very wary of that. In fact… WB: I think we should… NC: And I have some remarks about that… WB: I think your formulation of it is at least saintly. But it still is dislocating, at least, to people who fancy themselves as spending an equal amount of time attempting to refine their whole apparatus of moral discrimination, and who come up with conclusions directly at variance with your own. Now, the reason I haven't asked you at this moment to say, ‘why are we in Vietnam' etc is because we've been arguing about this for four, five, six years, and the chances of our coming up with anything especially new are small. NC: There's one other respect in which I think it is sort of an unarguable issue – you know, the issues are just – one has been over them and over them and over them… [edit in tape] WB: But there are perhaps certain aspects of the quarrel in Vietnam that touch especially on your thesis and your concern on the whole nature of it, and that is the suspicion that some people have of a double standard – of selective indignation. For instance you refer to the heroic – heroic – Vietnamese resistance to American power… NC: I think it's absolutely heroic, and… WB: Yeah, sure. Now, I understand enough about language to understand the use of ‘heroism' in that way… NC: If you notice there are a few lines below where I say, or above, I say something about, quite apart from any question of politics. WB: Yeah, yeah. Now, suppose I were to write about the heroic resistance of the Nazis to the liberation army, for instance their use of torture, their use of ma** reprisals… NC: I don't consider them heroic at all… WB: Well why not? That means that they were doing everything… NC: Reprisals are criminal… I don't think that… heroism doesn't… [overtalking each other]… well then I do think we disagree on the use of language, and I don't think that reprisals against the indigenous population… WB: The Vietcong have used fire weapons to destroy whole villages, children that they have disembowelled, may have hung them up… now this is heroic… NC: No, that is not. That's depraved. WB: That's depraved. NC: In my opinion. But that's very, very marginal. WB: Well, why is it marginal? NC: In fact it's marginal. It's a question of fact. In fact, I think there's perfect unanimity about this in the people who've studied it. For example if you look at someone like say, Douglas Pike, you know, the American foreign service agent, who's the chief expert of the Vietcong, and read his book carefully, you discover that he points out that it was in response to the American military effort that the Vietcong turned from their attempt to build ma** popular support through the organisational methods that involved giving people an actual role in organising and controlling their own society and institutions, they turned from that to physical force in reaction to the American intervention. I have many examples of this quoted in the book, from aid documents let's say, or from pacification manuals, where people point out… WB: How about by the same token you say that the Nazis turned to torture in France in reaction to Eisenhower's landing in Normandy. The answer is that people so disposed to act are certain kinds of people. Now you're in full recognition of this in your writings when Douglas Pike says – as a matter of fact Douglas Pike, as you know, has certain difficulties with the fact that it is acknowledged that up to 25 [or] 30,000 people were individually k**ed by terrorists before America's… NC: When was that? WB: It was between 1950 and 1962… NC: I think up to 9,000 is the figure that's given usually. And it's interesting to see what it was. If one really wants to talk about Vietcong terror during the period prior to the American intervention, then again, I think just about all commentators, Dennis Warner, Bernard Fall, whoever you like, has agreed that by and large this was terror directed extremely selectively against oppressive and external village officials sent in by… WB: The burning of Joan of Arc was selective too. It was intended to establish a universal point. The execution of Eichmann was selective… NC: Well… personally I'm against all kinds of terror. No question. But if you want to understand the Vietcong situation then let's recognise a very great distinction – let's see what the political point of the terror was. See, after all during that period there were about 9 or 10,000 – according to the American sources – there were maybe 9 or 10,000 village officials of one sort or another k**ed by the Vietcong, largely with the support of the villagers. But at the same time recall that there were perhaps 160,000 Vietnamese, if we accept Bernard Fall's figures again, k**ed by the Saigon government and the Americans. This is prior to 1965. Those are very different kinds of terror both in quantity and also in its political consequences… WB: Yeah I know but… it seems to me that you are attempting here to match things which are not equal… NC: No – 9,000 and 160,000 are by no means equal… WB: My point is that one presumably distinguishes between an act of terrorism – which you called depraved a moment ago – and… NC: Well, what you described – burning a village is depraved… WB: …and military action which is part of a military operation. NC: It's even more depraved. For example, let me give you some examples of what I consider depraved. Malcolm Brown back in 1962 or 3, I don't remember, reported – there was an AP or UP correspondent – reported that Saigon officials were sending American Skyhawks – you know, airplanes – over Vietnamese villages to wipe them out with napalm raids, in order to cover instances of grafts for example. Well that's, I think, depraved. And certainly, I don't condemn that because, you see, just to mention this matter of double standard, there are really three kinds of terror in Vietnam. There's Vietcong terror, there's the Saigon government terror and there's American terror. And if you read what I've written, I say practically nothing about either Vietcong terror, or terror carried out by the Saigon government. Now, if one wanted to talk about that one would have to point out that the terror carried out by the Saigon government is incredibly greater in extent, and has a very different political purpose which one could discuss, but I restrict myself to discussing American terror... WB: I happen to disagree with you on that generality, but I gather that you believe it. Go ahead. NC: I do. And that then does become matter of fact, which one could discuss. But I, as a matter of principle almost, restrict myself to the discussion of American terror – not the terror carried out by the various sides in Vietnam, for many reasons. For one thing, because it's just qualitatively different in scale, and for another thing because I feel that we have some responsibility for it. You see, in the same sense I've never written about the terror carried out by both sides in Nigeria, let's say. I don't like it, obviously, but I don't see any point in my giving them good or bad marks for it. On the other hand if we were carrying out the terror I would very definitely write about it. So there's no double standard as far as I can see – at least, let's say I have a standard in mind. One may or may not accept it. WB: We will explore that. [SCHEDULED BREAK IN SHOW (at approx 21:23)] WB: Mr Chomsky, we were talking there about American terror and I think you make a very accurate observation that we are responsible for what we do, but hardly responsible for what other people do, except insofar as we are in a position to influence them. For instance if there is a ma** starvation in Biafra, even though we did not cause it there is a sense in which we are responsible if we don't do something to attempt to alleviate it. Now by the same token, if we are prepared to agree that it is not always easy to taxonomise military action into that which is terroristic and that which is purely a military operation, we are left with doubt, for instance, about the bombing of Germany in 1942, 43, 44. You might contend that this was terroristic and unnecessary, and you might be right although you're not a military expert and neither am I, but I do judge that even if we all agree that what we did in Dresden was inexcusable, as a moral question it's got to be understood in context of what it was that brought us to Dresden in the first instance. NC: Absolutely. WB: And what brought us to South Vietnam in the first instance, in my judgment was clearly an uninterested, or I should say disinterested concern for the stability and possibilities of a region of the world… NC: What period do you feel that we had this disinterested relationship with Vietnam? WB: Well right now! NC: No – at what period did we have it – did it begin, let's say? 1951 for example, when the State Department Bulletin points out that we must help the French re-conquer their former colony and we must eradicate all Vietnamese resistance down to its last roots in order to re-establish the French in power – was that disinterested… WB: Well, I personally wish – to increase my vulnerability – I wish we had helped the French. NC: We did. We supported… WB: Well not sufficiently, not sufficiently. There's no point in helping somebody insufficiently… NC: But it was hardly disinterested when we attempted, you know, with tremendous support in fact to reinstate French imperialism in South Vietnam. WB: It was disinterested in this sense, and I think this is an important distinction which you do touch on in your book – it's a disinterested act if my attempt to help, or your attempt to help a particular nation is in order to spare you the possibility of a great ordeal in the future, which will harm you, your family, your children… NC: In that sense, Nazi Germany was also disinterested. Because after all, Nazi Germany was conquering Eastern Europe only in order to advance the values of Christian spiritual civilisation, and to restore the Slavs to their rightful home and so on and so forth… WB: Look, I follow you, I follow you. But if you want me to pursue that digression I will, but let's suspend it for a moment. I'm distinguishing that kind of disinterestedness with the kind… NC: But that's not a kind of disinterestedness. You see, that's something which includes as a special case every case of military aggression and colonialism in history. It's all disinterested in your sense. WB: Well, alright, let me simply rest my case by saying that there is an observable distinction by intelligent men between a country that reaches out and interferes with the affairs of another country because it has reason to believe that a failure to do so will result in universal misery, and that country which reaches out and interferes with another country because is wants to establish Coca-Cola plants there, and Chase National Banks, and whatever, and exploit it. Now, that is an observable… NC: It is a conceptual… well, let's distinguish between a conceptual distinction and a factual distinction… WB: OK. I'm prepared to do that… NC: Alright. It is a conceptual distinction, but in actual fact the history of colonialism shows that these two motivations coincide. That is, practically every – I mean, there are exceptions, you know, probably the Belgians in the Congo are an exception – but by and large, the major imperialist ventures have been in the economic, in the material interest – or in the perceived material interests of… WB: Yeah, I'm not interested in the mathematics of… I'm interested… NC: Let me finish… WB: You have already conceded that it is not merely a conceptual difference… NC: I say it is a conceptual difference… WB: …because you say that there are exceptions… NC: There are a few exceptions… WB: Alright – OK, OK, well, let's talk about the exceptions then. NC: Well no, but the exceptions are at the difference… no, wait a minute. The exceptions – I mentioned for example the Belgians in the Congo. There, they didn't even pretend to have a civilising mission. There, it was pure material self-interest. These are the exceptions. There are, as far as I know, no exceptions on the other side. I mean, maybe I've left out a case of history, but as I see the history of colonialism, the great ma** of cases are cases where a powerful country was working in its perceived material self-interest, and was covering what it was doing, to itself and to the world, with very pleasant phrases about preserving Christian values, or helping the poor benighted natives, or one thing or another. Now there are a few exceptions where there was pure predatory imperialism, not even a pretence of doing anything, but these are quite rare. And we're in the mainstream of… WB: Well not at that… not all that rare… NC: Pure predatory imperialism? WB: Sure. The history of the Roman Empire… NC: Well let's take modern… I mean, since the Industrial Revolution… WB: Since the Industrial Revolution. Well, if you say that people have refined the art of apologising, I don't deny it. But, it is also true, and I think manifestly true, that there have been interferences with the affairs of other nations whose purposes were, in my judgment, manifestly benign. NC: For example? WB: Well, for instance the Truman Doctrine. NC: Oh, I don't think that was manifestly benign at all. That was an attempt to develop an... WB: Well, the Greek… NC: The Greek situation was benign? Not at all. We were trying to… WB: I say the Greeks' testimony is more interesting to me than yours… NC: Which Greek testimony? WB: The testimony… NC: The testimony of the thousands of people who were thrown into jail, and, er… WB: Well, no. I grant, not the testimony of the Greek communists who were beaten… NC: Or the Greek peasants who were… WB: Well, I – there again – is it a conceptual difference between the person who desires a life under some kind of freedom, and one who desires life under some kind of… under communism? NC: Well, no, because there's no such opposition in Greece. There was a distinction between a very repressive regime which we instituted in 1946, and another regime – I don't know what it would have been – that would have grown out of a victory of the so-called communists. Now, you see, what we did had nothing to do with freedom. What we instituted was a… WB: This is absolute historical romanticism… NC: Oh I don't believe… Take a look at the… WB: The number of people who were slaughtered in Greece, first by the communist insurgency, then by the Nazis, then again by the communists… NC: A communist insurgency before the Nazis? Which one are you talking about? WB: Not insurgency, conquest. NC: A communist conquest before the Nazis? WB: A communist insurgency. NC: Prior to the Nazis in Greece? WB: Yes, the civil war of the early '40s. My point is… NC: The early… prior to the Nazis? Your history is quite confused… WB: No, not at all. NC: There was no communist insurgency prior to the Nazis. There were communist resistance bands that fought against the Nazis… WB: This is a matter of nomenclature. The point is that the 40-year-old or the 45-year-old Greek has fought three times in certain ventures, in one of which they acknowledge that we bailed them out… NC: Who is ‘they'? The rulers of Greece acknowledge that. WB: No, also the people of Greece. NC: Oh, I'm quite unaware of that. I'm quite unaware that the people of Greece have spoken on this issue. WB: Even Papandreou, and you like him I a**ume, because he hates us… NC: No, not at all. Not at all. George Papandreou was one of people who we… WB: I'm talking about Andreas, which makes it very… NC: Was Andreas [indecipherable] WB: Both on record as being grateful to President Truman for his intervention in that part of the world in 1947… NC: In that case I disagree with them on that issue. I really do. I think that we had no right to intervene in Greece in 1947. WB: Now we're talking about rights, which gets us away from the discussion. NC: Alright, let's talk about whether we did it disinterestedly… WB: The question is whether or not there is such a thing as relatively disinterested international interference, and it seems to me America's record is rather good. We went through an imperialist phase, but we pulled out of it faster than any country in the history of civilization… NC: I don't… I think we're very deeply in it at the moment… WB: Why did we pull out of the Philippines for instance? NC: We pulled out of the Philippines because it became a bad investment. WB: Why? NC: Because if you look, American agricultural interests were very much opposed to the – back in the mid-'30s – they were very strongly opposed to the free trade relationships which allowed Philippine crops to compete with them. That's why we pulled out of the Philippines. WB: Why did these agricultural interests authorise us to intervene in South Vietnam? NC: They didn't. WB: If you consider this as… NC: Because we didn't intervene on the basis of WB: …as a critical dimension… NC: No, I say that in the Philippines it was the critical dimension. Look, the world is a complex place, you know… WB: I am aware of that… NC: There are certain interests that were involved in our… WB: MIT is a complex place. NC: Well, there were certain interests that were involved in our Philippines venture, there are different interests that are involved in our Vietnam venture. Don't forget that with the Second World War, America's imperialist interests expanded enormously. I mean, prior to the Second World War, we were sort of a marginal imperialist power, except for the Munroe Doctrine, but since the Second World War we became the world's major imperialist power, and Vietnam is simply one piece of an attempt to construct a very large integrated world system, of which Greece was another piece. WB: Yeah, we became an imperialist power, Mr Chomsky, in this sense: in the sense that we inherited primary responsibility for any chain of action that might involve us in a third world war… NC: I don't believe that is correct… WB: And something that might involve the entire world in holocaust… NC: No, I don't believe that's true… WB: Circumstances that – well, I know you don't believe it but… NC: In fact I think that our… WB: …but it might be refreshing to listen to this point of view, which is that there are people who do believe that America unhappily and certainly not designedly, inherited the responsibility for trying to abort international holocaust, and has from time-to-time done so by such measures as the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid and things like that. NC: I don't agree with that. WB: Was Marshall Aid not disinterested either? NC: No, Marshall Aid is quite different. First of all, Marsh… WB: I'm sorry [for breaking the debate for a scheduled interlude] [SCHEDULED BREAK IN SHOW (at approx 31:06)] WB: I interrupted you, I'm sorry. NC: Yeah, well first of all, you've now mentioned Marshall Aid for the first time, and Marshall Aid – Marshall Plan Aid – has to be distinguished quite sharply from the Truman Doctrine… WB: Why? NC: Why? Because the Truman Doctrine was a doctrine of military intervention, and the Marshall Plan was our first attempt at a major aid programme… WB: But you do understand that sometimes a soldier can be as useful as a bushel of wheat, don't you? NC: No, look... Nevertheless if we're going to be at all clear about the American role, we're certainly going to distinguish between military intervention and economic intervention. They're very different in the way they function. Now, the fact of the matter is that neither was disinterested in your sense, I don't think, but they're very different in the impact that they had. The Truman Doctrine, I think, was a disastrous venture. I think the Marshall Plan was arguable – I mean, one understood what it was for… WB: Well how do you explain the schizophrenia… NC: I don't agree with its consequences… WB: How do you explain the schizophrenia of a public which willed both more or less simultaneously? NC: The public didn't will either… WB: On the one hand you said the public is incapable of acting disinterestedly… NC: The public didn't will either… WB: Well, the government, the government, alright, the government. NC: Because both were… WB: The government backed by the public, how's that? How do you explain that the same government on Monday did the Truman Doctrine which you consider simply, sort of, being a projection of the evil impulse of the government, and on Tuesday it did something which you consider to be very good? NC: I didn't say I considered – just a minute… WB: What happened to the government between Monday and Tuesday? NC: First of all I didn't say I considered it to be very good, I said it's rather different and one has to bring different standards to bear in evaluating it… WB: Why are they different? Let me give you an example. Suppose you are a farmer… NC: Because there's a difference between receiving… WB: …and you need agriculture, you need fertilizer, so you apply to me for fertilizer but just before I get it to you, somebody comes up with a bayonet and is about to make it impossible for you to continue farming. Now… NC: You see, you're begging… WB: In that particular instance, is there a strategic difference between my giving you the fertilizer and my giving you the soldier who… NC: That's not – you're talking about a dream world. The real world is one in which the alternatives were coming with a bayonet which is on an American rifle, held by an American-backed Greek soldier, and the alternative to that was giving the kind of aid which was used in fact to construct the kind of society in Western Europe that we wanted to see developed there. Now, these are two very different things. It's a very different thing to run for the Greek army a counter-insurgency programme with military support and many military men involved – that's one kind of thing, one sort of repression imposed on the Greek population through American intervention – one might argue whether it's right or wrong but that's to be very sharply distinguished… WB: Why do you say ‘imposed'? Is it because your presumption here… NC: My presumption is… WB: Your presumption is that the Greeks… NC: Well, let me tell you what… WB: …like the kind of regime which, you said… NC: No. Look, my a**umption is that all intervention is imposed, by any country. That is, you see, I believe that quite generally… WB: Well, did we impose on the French when we liberated them from the Nazis? Was that an imposition? NC: We didn't conquer France, we moved the Germans out of it… WB: The hell we didn't! NC: From an outside invading force. WB: We invaded France. NC: But we didn't conquer it from its own people. See, in Greece, we were trying to conquer it from its own people. WB: But there you're willing to credit the anti-Nazis as their own people but you're not, in Greece, willing to credit the anti-communists as their own people… NC: The German army was there. There was no outside army in Greece, other than ours. WB: Look, there are modalities of outside intervention… NC: But, look. There's a very sharp difference between… WB: Laval was not a Nazi… NC: But Laval wouldn't have lasted for five minutes without the German army. WB: And nor would Makarios have lasted for five minutes without the help of Russian aid… NC: But wait a minute. There's a big difference. There were no Russian troops… WB: …In fact, as you know, when Stalin got tired of Makarios he pulled out. NC: But look – now, let's be careful again. I mean, there's a difference between – first of all, I'm opposed to military aid to other countries, whether by us or by the Soviet Union… WB: Why? NC: Well, let's come back to that because there's a more important thing – and that is that I'm far more opposed to the imposition of regimes by foreign troops. Now, in the case of Germany, let's say, in the case of France, the Pétain-Laval government – the Vichy government – was supported by German troops. Had the German military – they weren't throughout the country necessarily, because there was certainly indigenous support – but there's no question that if German military support had been withdrawn to the other side of the Rhine, then there would have been an overthrow of the Vichy government, and France would have had some different form of government. Now, in that case, our invasion of France was, whether one likes it or not, was in reaction to an occupying, external force. It's just pure confusion to identify that with the case of Greece, when we were trying to liberate… we were trying to select the kind of society that Greece would have, and we were trying to save the rulers that we had designated as appropriate, from their own population. There were no outside forces. WB: But don't you realise that in your book, that's where you're not willing to be consistent in carrying out this argument. You're constantly talking about our satellizing of places like Cuba and the Dominican Republic and so on and so forth, and yet we never occupied them in the sense in which you're talking about. NC: Well – we never occupied the Dominican Republic? We sent 25,000 troops there in 1965, in an occupation... WB: No, I'm talking about pre-, I'm talking about… NC: Well, the American Marines were in there dozens of times since 1900… WB: Alright, look, I think you're being evasive, and I don't think you want to be… NC: Evasive? No, not at all… WB: Let me ask you this. Is it possible… NC: It's not evasive at all. We just simply, repeatedly sent troops to Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, etc. etc. WB: Is it possible to satellize a nation without having an occupying army there? NC: Yes it is. WB: Alright, then there goes your French, your tedious French explanation, if I may say… NC: Oh, not at all, because that doesn't happen to be the – you see we're talking about a real situation. We could talk about some ideal situation and, you know, have an academic discussion about it, but we're talking about the real situation in France… WB: I'm saying, therefore it is possible for North Vietnam to satellize South Vietnam presumably, without even… NC: It's logically possible… WB: …occupying it militarily in any formal sense. NC: But it didn't happen though, so there's no point in discussing it. WB: Well, this is an argument concerning which there are two points of view, historically… NC: Let's discuss it then. In fact, you see, there's much more – if you want to be serious about it – there's more evidence that South Vietnam tried to colonise North Vietnam than conversely. In fact, South Vietnamese commandoes were going – military forces, regular military forces – were going north considerably earlier than the time when we even proclaimed that the infiltration began from north to south. WB: Did they bump into the refugees coming south? NC: The refugees were coming south in – er, were going in both directions in fact – in 1954-55, and according, at least according to Bernard Fall, the commandoes began going north in '56 or '57. The first claimed infiltration from the north was in '59, and that was South Vietnamese coming south. So, if one wants to talk about, again, the real world, the first motion of… WB: Yeah, the trouble is, you know, your difficulty Mr Chomsky is, in my judgment, you never know where neatly to begin your historical sequence… NC: Well, you choose the point of beginning, then. WB: Well, the point really is that if you're starting to say that 1959 was a provocation because there were southerners going north… NC: No it wasn't a provocation. I say that's only a claim of when the provocation began. WB: …I say but how about the people who were going from north to south, who were talking about the misery that [indecipherable]… NC: When? When was that? Which people are you talking about? I don't know. WB: Well, I'm talking about the Vietnamese, North and South… NC: The Vietnamese, North and South?... WB: Your trouble in neatly captured in the remark made recently by Czechoslovakia that, er – Czechoslovakia is, after all, the most neutralist country in the world, since it declines to interfere even with its own internal affairs. NC: I'm afraid I don't see the relevance of that remark.. WB: Well, the relevance of that is simply that you start your line of discussion at a moment that is historically useful for you… NC: That's what I say – you pick the beginning… WB: The blunt fact of the post-war world is that the communist imperialists, by the use of terrorism, by deprivation of freedom, have contributed to the continuing bloodshed, and the sad thing about it is not only the bloodshed but the fact they seem to dispossess you of the power of rationalisation… NC: May I say something? WB: Sure. NC: I think that's about five percent true, and about – or maybe ten percent true. It's certainly is… WB: Why do you give that? NC: May I complete a sentence? WB: Sure. NC: It's perfectly true that there were areas of the world, in particular Eastern Europe, where Stalinist imperialism very brutally took control and still maintains control. But, there are also very vast areas of the world where we were doing the same thing, and there's quite an interplay in the Cold War. You see, what you just described is, I believe, a mythology about the Cold War which might have been tenable ten years ago but which is quite inconsistent with contemporary scholarship… WB: Ask a Czech. NC: Ask a Guatemalan, ask a person from the Dominican Republic, ask a person from South Vietnam, you know, ask a Thai… WB: [indecipherable] if you can't distinguish between the nature of our venture in Guatemala and the nature of the Soviet Union's in Prague, then we have real difficulties. NC: Explain the difference. WB: Sorry [for breaking the debate for a scheduled interlude] [SCHEDULED BREAK IN SHOW (at approx 40:15)] *The formal debate ends here, and there follows a question and answer section with members of the audience. WB: Mr Greenfield… Greenfield: Mr Chomsky, you state in one of the essays in your book, “the unpleasant fact is that if one wishes to pursue the Munich an*logy, there's only one plausible candidate for the role of Hitler,” and by that you mean the United States. There are other references to Nazi Germany's conduct and foreign policy in the world. And you also less emphatically suggest that a lot of the internal policies of the United States government have left millions of its own citizens hungry or exploited. If this is the fact, that is to say if the nature of our society is functionally indistinguishable in this respect from Nazi Germany, then doesn't that legitimate any tactic that one wishes to use in opposition? NC: Well, I certainly don't believe that your a**umption, that is – I don't believe, and I don't think I ever say that our society is functionally indistinguishable from Nazi Germany… Greenfield: No… NC: What I say is that if one wants to a**ume… Greenfield: I want to zero in… If, by blowing up a troop train we prevent 5,000 American soldiers from going to Vietnam to participate in what you do explicitly call a criminal war, isn't that a moral act? NC: Oh, I think that yes it would be. If sabotage would in fact contribute to ending the war, I would be in favour of sabotage, and let me give you some concrete examples… Greenfield: So that's a tactical decision, not a moral… NC: It's a tactical decision. In fact I'll give you some examples. What the Berrigans have done for example, at Catonsville in Milwaukee, I think is very heroic and in fact saintly… Greenfield: But that is not k**ing American soldiers. NC: Oh no, not – but you were talking about sabotage trying to blow up an American troop train… Greenfield: Trying to blow up a troop train! I would a**ume there'd be loss of life. NC: I'm sorry, I thought you meant, let's say, you know, preventing a train from going… Greenfield: I mean blowing up… WB: Blow up the tracks but not the people. Greenfield: …I mean sabotage, a**a**ination, you know. What all the heroes in America… NC: I would first of all make a sharp distinction as, for example, the Berrigans did, between attacks on property and attacks on people… Greenfield: That's what I want to know. NC: A fundamental distinction. But then, you see, if one raises the question about attacks on people, then I think there are very tricky issues. You see, one would – I can concede – I would have been against a**a**inating Hitler, for example, because I'm against murder. But if I believed that a**a**ination of Hitler would have really contributed to the ending of the war, I think one could have given an argument. Now, if it was true… Greenfield: And that would pertain to Lyndon Johnson? NC: And that would pertain to Lyndon Johnson, but in neither case incidentally, do I think that it tactically would have, and… Greenfield: Yeah, I under… [there is a tape edit here, and thereafter, Buckley directs the debate to a different audience member.] WB: Miss Hoffman… Hoffman: I would like to ask Mr Buckley what he thinks the motives of the people who are in favour of the war in Vietnam are. Putting it very simply, how can we possibly hope to help universal misery when we are so miserable here? WB: Well, I think we're less miserable here. I mean… you may not be a happy young lady but I'm sure you're not as miserable as you would be if, for instance, you didn't have a free press, if you weren't able to write such poetry as you want to write, or you couldn't join a labour union, if you couldn't express yourself as you liked, if the mayor of your town might be disembowelled tomorrow. I think that there are observable differences… Hoffman: Aren't you in favour of it? WB: …between what freedom you have here – or put it this way, between your misery and theirs. I'd prefer your misery… NC: If you wouldn't have saturation bombing taking place in your… WB: Sure, sure… Hoffman: I want to disagree with you for the moment, because I think that there is a certain condition, a human condition, a condition of guilt which Mr Chomsky speaks about, and which for me is the most interesting point of his argument. The guilt that we feel here which in a way may keep people from writing poetry, or from writing anything that they think, because they're absolutely stifled by the climate of guilt… WB: They manage to write their complaints and get on the best-seller list. Hoffman: Excuse me? WB: They manage to write their complaints… and get on the best-seller list… Hoffman: But I know of many people who are not writing now because of the war in Vietnam, who are not functioning because of their guilt. WB: Well, it's not an aspect of my responsibility to foreign policy to encourage you to externalise your complaints, but if you want to, there are any number of book publishers, magazine publishers and radio stations, television stations who are glad to hear them out, which I think is qualitatively different from what exists for instance in North Vietnam. Audience member: Or South. NC: Or Greece… WB: Well, not quite so much… NC: or Brazil, or dozens of other countries… WB: Well, a little bit less so, sure... NC: Less so? WB: I think it's true… NC: No. It's not true… WB: No, wait a minute… Hoffman: Then publishing is the only motive. WB: What's true is that a nation at war does not have the same amount of liberties as a nation at peace. Abraham Lincoln suspended the right to Habeas Corpus, and the oldest Parliament in the history of the world didn't have an election for eleven years, during the [indecipherable] war… NC: You know, if you compare the state of freedom in North and South Vietnam prior to the war, as some people have done, like Joseph bu*tinger, I'm afraid it doesn't come out the way you like. WB: Well, I think it does come out the way I like. NC: Not by the evidence that's been asked of them… WB: The refugees who, or a number of the refugees who left North Vietnam – compare them with those of the South… NC: That's a very different issue. What I was talking about is the right of free expression in North and South Vietnam. Take a look at, for example, at bu*tinger's an*lysis, you know, where he runs through cases. And quite apart from that, take a look for example – again, you know, pick your authority – let it be Bernard Fall, let it be almost anyone you like – you see, there's a great amount of village democracy which was instituted in North Vietnam and in fact has also been instituted in the [indecipherable] dominated areas of South Vietnam, which is something qualitatively different than anything that has existed in Asian societies before. And this exists simultaneously with – let me be quite clear – this exists simultaneously with a good deal of repression and certainly not civil liberties of the sort that we are used to… WB: Chomsky this is… one of the most libertarian constitutions in the history of the world was written by the Soviet Union and… NC: I'm not talking about constitutions, I'm talking about fact… WB: …my point is, what kind of freedom is experienced by somebody in North Vietnam, and the answer is that their freedom is perpetually insecure… NC: Oh, well, you don't know that… WB: …for reasons that NC: …you see… WB: …Ho Chi Minh himself has wept over the occasional necessity to k** 40 or 50,000 of his own… NC: …not the necessity, the occasional fact. But just one moment… WB: …I was being sarcastic… NC: …what I was talking about – yeah, very – not only sarcastic, but also wrong. And, you see, it's very important to recognise, if you want to understand what communism means in South East Asia, to realise that along with many authoritarian and repressive practices, which I certainly don't condone, there is on the side a great deal of democratisation. There's been a liberation of energies and involvement… WB: …utter nonsense, if I may say so. NC: I don't think you're right. WB: After all, the great paradigm of Red China, in which the AFL-CIO itself concedes to something in the neighbourhood of 28 million victims on that particular… NC: Oh, come on! That's not… WB: I'm talking – I'm supporting them! NC: But the AFL-CIO… WB: …perhaps I didn't ask you if that was correct… NC: …the AFL-CIO WB: …I didn't have your permission, against… NC: No one has claimed a million people k**ed through Chinese Communist purges, absolutely no one. No one serious, at least. WB: Well, I… it was published in the New Leader. NC: Fine, the New Leader. Yes, of course the New Leader might, I mean… WB: Is that a CIA plant?... NC: Well, I said no one serious has. Take a look at the China Journal. Take a look at China [indecipherable]… You see, I think you're missing the point really, and I think it's an important point. You see, I think that in looking at China one has to recognise a great deal of repressive practice, a great deal of authoritarianism – and one also has to recognise a great deal of spontaneous democratic structure of a sort which never existed in Asia before, and if you want to know the truth, to some extent doesn't even exist in our society. Now these things exist side by side… WB: If you read A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, you find out that there's an extraordinary democratic structure even inside concentration camps, but it seems to me that… NC: No… no…. WB: …it's almost profane to make this observation… NC: I think it's profane to make that an*logy because I'm talking about true democracy in which… WB: I don't think so… NC: …Look – in which people, in which the peasants who live in a village control the institutions of their lives. They control the organisation of work… WB: …and if you want to get out you bump into the Berlin Wall on either side of [indecipherable]… NC: There's no Berlin Wall in China, to my knowledge. WB: There's the equivalent of a Berlin Wall. There's the sea and there's starvation and the concentration camps… NC: No, there's no – that's just the point, you see – starvation has been very largely overcome in China. WB: Yeah, because they have something like 94 percent of people working on agriculture. But I think Mr Darcy has a question for you… NC: They also haven't had two bumper crops in the last few years… Darcy: Professor Chomsky, when you say, as you said about 30 minutes ago that there's a relativity of truth between nations, would you cla**ify… NC: Relativity of truth? I don't… Darcy: Relativity of truth, you said, in the international scene. NC: I don't understand the comment. If I said it, I don't know what it means. Darcy: Well, would you call yourself a political relativist? NC: I don't understand the concept. Darcy: Well, put it this way – do you believe in a natural law? In a transcendental truth, let's say, a fixing social unit? NC: I think that there's something in the doctrine of natural law, but I think that that's much more abstract than anything we've been discussing here. Darcy: Well, but, wouldn't that then justify the use of terror in, let's say, stopping a tenet of the natural law from being broken? Or stopping, let's say the ends from… NC: Let's bring it down to Earth. I'm of course opposed to terror, any rational person is. But I think that if we're serious about the question of terror, if we're serious about the question of violence, we have to recognise that it is a tactical and hence moral matter. Incidentally, tactical issues are basically moral issues – they have to do with human consequences, and if we're interested in, let's say, diminishing the amount of violence in the world, it's at least arguable, and perhaps even sometimes true, that a terroristic act does diminish the amount of violence in the world. Hence a person who's opposed to violence will not be opposed to that terroristic act. Greenfield: Walt Rostow says exactly the same thing. NC: That's right, yeah. He happens to be wrong in the case in which he applies it. You see, these principles tell you very little about real cases… Greenfield: That's – I must say, that's the one thing that bothers me more about what you've been saying and the way you write, that that kind of language, that is the notion of a terroristic act which restricts consequent violence, is precisely what Rostow says in The View From the Seventh Floor, when after this whole an*lysis about the moral world, he says there's not a single place where we don't have major military might to support it. NC: I think that the real point here is that when you try to formulate general principles that will apply to arbitrary political affairs, you find that you can only make very vacuous and empty statements. See, if one wants to talk in perfect abstraction from any real situation, about the justification for violence and terror, then you come up with platitudes and empty remarks and so on. The point is that, you know, there are no very general principles that apply to such circumstances, or if there are, no one has enunciated and formulated them. So what one really has to do is look at the concrete historical situation. Now where I would… maybe Rostow and I would agree at this level of abstraction on the use of violence to prevent greater violence. Where we would disagree is in our evaluation of what is happening in this concrete historical situation. And that's where one's attention ought to… WB: So therefore you have no philosophical objection to the way in which Mr Rostow states his case, merely to its applicability in the existing circumstances… NC: No, I say at this level I wouldn't – I might not – I don't know what he says about other things… WB: But you would on other things… NC: …but on other things I have a very great difference. For example, Walt Rostow says that we should try to… that the great threat of China to us that it will succeed, and provide a model to other countries, and we have to make sure that that doesn't happen… WB: Is that why you kept him out of MIT? NC: I a**ure you that I had nothing to do with keeping him out of MIT! I'd be delighted to have him back.. He's a great help to us when he's around. WB: Thank you very much Mr Chomsky and thank you all. [ENDS] Postscript Comment by Chomsky in 2008: "Although this was not on the tape, it's hard to forget the final moments as he [Buckley] walked off stage, in a fury, shouting that he'd have me back on again soon and teach me a thing or too. When I answered politely that I'd be glad to arrange it, he got even more furious. Of course I never heard from him again, or expected to."