TO THE REVEREND FATHER ANNAT, JESUIT
March 24, 1657
REVEREND FATHER,
Long have you laboured to discover some error in the creed or
conduct of your opponents; but I rather think you will have to
confess, in the end, that it is a more difficult task than you
imagined to make heretics of people who, are not only no heretics, but
who hate nothing in the world so much as heresy. In my last letter I
succeeded in showing that you accuse them of one heresy after another,
without being able to stand by one of the charges for any length of
time; so that all that remained for you was to fix on their refusal to
condemn "the sense of Jansenius," which you insist on their doing
without explanation. You must have been sadly in want of heresies to
brand them with, when you were reduced to this. For who ever heard
of a heresy which nobody could explain? The answer was ready,
therefore, that if Jansenius has no errors, it is wrong to condemn
him; and if he has, you were bound to point them out, that we might
know at least what we were condemning. This, however, you have never
yet been pleased to do; but you have attempted to fortify your
position by decrees, which made nothing in your favour, as they gave
no sort of explanation of the sense of Jansenius, said to have been
condemned in the five propositions. This was not the way to
terminate the dispute. Had you mutually agreed as to the genuine sense
of Jansenius, and had the only difference between you been as to
whether that sense was heretical or not, in that case the decisions
which might pronounce it to be heretical would have touched the real
question in dispute. But the great dispute being about the sense of
Jansenius, the one party saying that they could see nothing in it
inconsistent with the sense of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and the
other party a**erting that they saw in it an heretical sense which
they would not express. It is clear that a constitution which does not
say a word about this difference of opinion, and which only condemns
in general and without explanation the sense of Jansenius, leaves
the point in dispute quite undecided.
You have accordingly been repeatedly told that as your
discussion turns on a matter of fact, you would never be able to bring
it to a conclusion without declaring what you understand by the
sense of Jansenius. But, as you continued obstinate in your refusal to
make this explanation, I endeavored, as a last resource, to extort
it from you, by hinting in my last letter that there was some
mystery under the efforts you were making to procure the
condemnation of this sense without explaining it, and that your design
was to make this indefinite censure recoil some day or other upon
the doctrine of efficacious grace, by showing, as you could easily do,
that this was exactly the doctrine of Jansenius. This has reduced
you to the necessity of making a reply; for, had you pertinaciously
refused, after such an insinuation, to explain your views of that
sense, it would have been apparent to persons of the smallest
penetration that you condemned it in the sense of efficacious grace- a
conclusion which, considering the veneration in which the Church holds
holy doctrine, would have overwhelmed you with disgrace.
You have, therefore, been forced to speak out your mind; and we
find it expressed in your reply to that part of letter in which I
remarked, that "if Jansenius was capable of any other sense than
that of efficacious grace, he had no defenders; but if his writings
bore no other sense, he had no errors to defend." You found it
impossible to deny this position, father; but you have attempted to
parry it by the following distinction: "It is not sufficient," say
you, "for the vindication of Jansenius, to allege that he merely holds
the doctrine of efficacious grace, for that may be held in two ways-
the one heretical, according to Calvin, which consists in
maintaining that the will, when under the influence of grace, has
not the power of resisting it; the other orthodox, according to the
Thomists and the Sorbonists, which is founded on the principles
established by the councils, and which is, that efficacious grace of
itself governs the will in such a way that it still has the power of
resisting it."
All this we grant, father; but you conclude by adding:
"Jansenius would be orthodox, if he defended efficacious grace in
the sense of the Thomists; but he is heretical, because he opposes the
Thomists, and joins issue with Calvin, who denies the power of
resisting grace." I do not here enter upon the question of fact,
whether Jansenius really agrees with Calvin. It is enough for my
purpose that you a**ert that he does, and that you now inform me
that by the sense of Jansenius you have all along understood nothing
more than the sense of Calvin. Was this all you meant, then, father?
Was it only the error of Calvin that you were so anxious to get
condemned, under the name of "the sense of Jansenius?" Why did you not
tell us this sooner? You might have saved yourself a world of trouble;
for we were all ready, without the aid of bulls or briefs, to join
with you in condemning that error. What urgent necessity there was for
such an explanation! What a host of difficulties has it removed! We
were quite at a loss, my dear father, to know what error the popes and
bishops meant to condemn, under the name of "the sense of
Jansenius." The whole Church was in the utmost perplexity about it,
and not a soul would relieve us by an explanation. This, however,
has now been done by you, father- you, whom the whole of your party
regard as the chief and prime mover of all their councils, and who are
acquainted with the whole secret of this proceeding. You, then, have
told us that the sense of Jansenius is neither more nor less than
the sense of Calvin, which has been condemned by the council. Why,
this explains everything. We know now that the error which they
intended to condemn, under these terms- the sense of Jansenius- is
neither more nor less than the sense of Calvin; and that,
consequently, we, by joining with them in the condemnation of Calvin's
doctrine, have yielded all due obedience to these decrees. We are no
longer surprised at the zeal which the popes and some bishops
manifested against "the sense of Jansenius." How, indeed, could they
be otherwise than zealous against it, believing, as they did, the
declarations of those who publicly affirmed that it was identically
the same with that of Calvin?
I must maintain, then, father, that you have no further reason
to quarrel with your adversaries; for they detest that doctrine as
heartily as you do. I am only astonished to see that you are
ignorant of this fact, and that you have such an imperfect
acquaintance with their sentiments on this point, which they have so
repeatedly expressed in their published works. I flatter myself
that, were you more intimate with these writings, you would deeply
regret your not having made yourself acquainted sooner, in the
spirit of peace, with a doctrine which is in every respect so holy and
so Christian, but which pa**ion, in the absence of knowledge, now
prompts you to oppose. You would find, father, that they not only hold
that an effective resistance may be made to those feebler graces which
go under the name of exciting or inefficacious, from their not
terminating in the good with which they inspire us; but that they are,
moreover, as firm in maintaining, in opposition to Calvin, the power
which the will has to resist even efficacious and victorious grace, as
they are in contending against Molina for the power of this grace over
the will, and fully as jealous for the one of these truths as they are
for the other. They know too well that man, of his own nature, has
always the power of sinning and of resisting grace; and that, since he
became corrupt, he unhappily carries in his breast a fount of
concupiscence which infinitely augments that power; but that,
notwithstanding this, when it pleases God to visit him with His mercy,
He makes the soul do what He wills, and in the manner He wills it to
be done, while, at the same time, the infallibility of the divine
operation does not in any way destroy the natural liberty of man, in
consequence of the secret and wonderful ways by which God operates
this change. This has been most admirably explained by St.
Augustine, in such a way as to dissipate all those imaginary
inconsistencies which the opponents of efficacious grace suppose to
exist between the sovereign power of grace over the free-will and
the power which the free-will has to resist grace. For, according to
this great saint, whom the popes and the Church have held to be a
standard authority on this subject, God transforms the heart of man,
by shedding abroad in it a heavenly sweetness, which surmounting the
delights of the flesh, and inducing him to feel, on the one hand,
his own mortality and nothingness, and to discover, on the other hand,
the majesty and eternity of God, makes him conceive a distaste for the
pleasures of sin which interpose between him and incorruptible
happiness. Finding his chiefest joy in the God who charms him, his
soul is drawn towards Him infallibly, but of its own accord, by a
motion perfectly free, spontaneous, love-impelled; so that it would be
its torment and punishment to be separated from Him. Not but that
the person has always the power of forsaking his God, and that he
may not actually forsake Him, provided he choose to do it. But how
could he choose such a course, seeing that the will always inclines to
that which is most agreeable to it, and that, in the case we now
suppose, nothing can be more agreeable than the possession of that one
good, which comprises in itself all other good things? "Quod enim
(says St. Augustine) amplius nos delectat, secundum operemur necesse
est- Our actions are necessarily determined by that which affords us
the greatest pleasure."
Such is the manner in which God regulates the free will of man
without encroaching on its freedom, and in which the free will,
which always may, but never will, resist His grace, turns to God
with a movement as voluntary as it is irresistible, whensoever He is
pleased to draw it to Himself by the sweet constraint of His
efficacious inspirations.
These, father, are the divine principles of St. Augustine and
St. Thomas, according to which it is equally true that we have the
power of resisting grace, contrary to Calvin's opinion, and that,
nevertheless, to employ the language of Pope Clement VIII in his paper
addressed to the Congregation de Auxiliis, "God forms within us the
motion of our will, and effectually disposes of our hearts, by
virtue of that empire which His supreme majesty has over the volitions
of men, as well as over the other creatures under heaven, according to
St. Augustine."
On the same principle, it follows that we act of ourselves, and
thus, in opposition to another error of Calvin, that we have merits
which are truly and properly ours; and yet, as God is the first
principle of our actions, and as, in the language of St. Paul, He
"worketh in us that which is pleasing in his sight"; "our merits are
the gifts of God," as the Council of Trent says.
By means of this distinction we demolish the profane sentiment
of Luther, condemned by that Council, namely, that "we co-operate in
no way whatever towards our salvation any more than inanimate things";
and, by the same mode of reasoning, we overthrow the equally profane
sentiment of the school of Molina, who will not allow that it is by
the strength of divine grace that we are enabled to cooperate with
it in the work of our salvation, and who thereby comes into hostile
collision with that principle of faith established by St. Paul:
"That it is God who worketh in us both to will and to do."
In fine, in this way we reconcile all those pa**ages of
Scripture which seem quite inconsistent with each other such as the
following: "Turn ye unto God"- "Turn thou us, and we shall be turned"-
"Cast away iniquity from you"- "It is God who taketh away iniquity
from His people"- "Bring forth works meet for repentance"- "Lord, thou
hast wrought all our works in us"- "Make ye a new heart and a new
spirit"- "A new spirit will I give you, and a new heart will I
create within you," &c.
The only way of reconciling these apparent contrarieties, which
ascribe our good actions at one time to God and at another time to
ourselves, is to keep in view the distinction, as stated by St.
Augustine, that "our actions are ours in respect of the free will
which produces them; but that they are also of God, in respect of
His grace which enables our free will to produce them"; and that, as
the same writer elsewhere remarks, "God enables us to do what is
pleasing in his sight, by making us will to do even what we might have
been unwilling to do."
It thus appears, father, that your opponents are perfectly at
one with the modern Thomists, for the Thomists hold with them both the
power of resisting grace, and the infallibility of the effect of
grace; of which latter doctrine they profess themselves the most
strenuous advocates, if we may judge from a common maxim of their
theology, which Alvarez, one of the leading men among them, repeats so
often in his book, and expresses in the following terms (disp. 72,
n. 4): "When efficacious grace moves the free will, it infallibly
consents; because the effect of grace is such, that, although the will
has the power of withholding its consent, it nevertheless consents
in effect." He corroborates this by a quotation from his master, St.
Thomas: "The will of God cannot fail to be accomplished; and,
accordingly, when it is his pleasure that a man should consent to
the influence of grace, he consents infallibly, and even
necessarily, not by an absolute necessity, but by a necessity of
infallibility." In effecting this, divine grace does not trench upon
"the power which man has to resist it, if he wishes to do so"; it
merely prevents him from wishing to resist it. This has been
acknowledged by your Father Petau, in the following pa**age (Book i,
p.602):. "The grace of Jesus Christ insures infallible perseverance in
piety, though not by necessity; for a person may refuse to yield his
consent to grace, if he be so inclined, as the council states; but
that same grace provides that he shall never be so inclined."
This, father, is the uniform doctrine of St. Augustine, of St.
Prosper, of the fathers who followed them, of the councils, of St.
Thomas, and of all the Thomists in general. It is likewise, whatever
you may think of it, the doctrine of your opponents. And, let me
add, it is the doctrine which you yourself have lately sealed with
your approbation. I shall quote your own words: "The doctrine of
efficacious grace, which admits that we have a power of resisting
it, is orthodox, founded on the councils, and supported by the
Thomists and Sorbonists." Now, tell us the plain truth, father; if you
had known that your opponents really held this doctrine, the interests
of your Society might perhaps have made you scruple before pronouncing
this public approval of it; but, acting on the supposition that they
were hostile to the doctrine, the same powerful motive has induced you
to authorize sentiments which you know in your heart to be contrary to
those of your Society; and by this blunder, in your anxiety to ruin
their principles, you have yourself completely confirmed them. So
that, by a kind of prodigy, we now behold the advocates of efficacious
grace vindicated by the advocates of Molina- an admirable instance
of the wisdom of God in making all things concur to advance the
glory of the truth.
Let the whole world observe, then, that, by your own admission,
the truth of this efficacious grace, which is so essential to all
the acts of piety, which is so dear to the Church, and which is the
purchase of her Saviour's blood, is so indisputably Catholic that
there is not a single Catholic, not even among the Jesuits, who
would not acknowledge its orthodoxy. And let it be noticed, at the
same time, that, according to your own confession, not the slightest
suspicion of error can fall on those whom you have so often
stigmatized with it. For so long as you charged them with
clandestine heresies, without choosing to specify them by name, it was
as difficult for them to defend themselves as it was easy for you to
bring such accusations. But now, when you have come to declare that
the error which constrains you to oppose them, is the heresy of Calvin
which you supposed them to hold, it must be apparent to every one that
they are innocent of all error; for so decidedly hostile are they to
this, the only error you charge upon them, that they protest, by their
discourses, by their books, by every mode, in short, in which they can
testify their sentiments, that they condemn that heresy with their
whole heart, and in the same manner as it has been condemned by the
Thomists, whom you acknowledge, without scruple, to be Catholics,
and who have never been suspected to be anything else.
What will you say against them now, father? Will you say that they
are heretics still, because, although they do not adopt the sense of
Calvin, they will not allow that the sense of Jansenius is the same
with that of Calvin? Will you presume to say that this is matter of
heresy? Is it not a pure question of fact, with which heresy has
nothing to do? It would be heretical to say that we have not the
power, of resisting efficacious grace; but would it be so to doubt
that Jansenius held that doctrine? Is this a revealed truth? Is it
an article of faith which must be believed, on pain of damnation? Or
is it not, in spite of you, a point of fact, on account of which it
would be ridiculous to hold that there were heretics in the Church?
Drop this epithet, then, father, and give them some other name,
more suited to the nature of your dispute. Tell them, they are
ignorant and stupid- that they misunderstand Jansenius. These would be
charges in keeping with your controversy; but it is quite irrelevant
to call them heretics. As this, however, is the only charge from which
I am anxious to defend them, I shall not give myself much trouble to
show that they rightly understand Jansenius. All I shall say on the
point, father, is that it appears to me that, were he to be judged
according to your own rules, it would be difficult to prove him not to
be a good Catholic. We shall try him by the test you have proposed.
"To know," say you, "whether Jansenius is sound or not, we must
inquire whether he defends efficacious grace in the manner of
Calvin, who denies that man has the power of resisting it- in which
case he would be heretical; or in the manner of the Thomists, who
admit that it may be resisted- for then he would be Catholic."
judge, then, father, whether he holds that grace may be resisted
when he says: "That we have always a power to resist grace,
according to the council; that free will may always act or not act,
will or not will, consent or not consent, do good or do evil; and that
man, in this life, has always these two liberties, which may be called
by some contradictions." Judge. likewise, if he be not opposed to
the error of Calvin, as you have described it, when he occupies a
whole chapter (21st) in showing "that the Church has condemned that
heretic who denies that efficacious grace acts on the free will in the
manner which has been so long believed in the Church, so as to leave
it in the power of free will to consent or not to consent; whereas,
according to St. Augustine and the council, we have always the power
of withholding our consent if we choose; and according to St. Prosper,
God bestows even upon his elect the will to persevere, in such a way
as not to deprive them of the power to will the contrary." And, in one
word, judge if he does not agree with the Thomists, from the following
declaration in chapter 4th: "That all that the Thomists have written
with the view of reconciling the efficaciousness of grace with the
power of resisting it, so entirely coincides with his judgement that
to ascertain his sentiments on this subject we have only to consult
their writings."
Such being the language he holds on these heads my opinion is that
he believes in the power of resisting grace; that he differs from
Calvin and agrees with the Thomists, because he has said so; and
that he is, therefore, according to your own showing, a Catholic. If
you have any means of knowing the sense of an author otherwise than by
his expressions; and if, without quoting any of his pa**ages, you
are disposed to maintain, in direct opposition to his own words,
that he denies this power of resistance, and that he is for Calvin and
against the Thomists, do not be afraid, father, that I will accuse you
of heresy for that. I shall only say that you do not seem properly
to understand Jansenius; but we shall not be the less on that
account children of the same Church.
How comes it, then, father, that you manage this dispute in such a
pa**ionate spirit, and that you treat as your most cruel enemies,
and as the most pestilent of heretics, a cla** of persons whom you
cannot accuse of any error, nor of anything whatever, except that they
do not understand Jansenius as you do? For what else in the world do
you dispute about, except the sense of that author? You would have
them to condemn it. They ask what you mean them to condemn. You
reply that you mean the error of Calvin. They rejoin that they condemn
that error; and with this acknowledgement (unless it is syllables
you wish to condemn, and not the thing which they signify), you
ought to rest satisfied. If they refuse to say that they condemn the
sense of Jansenius, it is because they believe it to be that of St.
Thomas, and thus this unhappy phrase has a very equivocal meaning
betwixt you. In your mouth it signifies the sense of Calvin; in theirs
the sense of St. Thomas. Your dissensions arise entirely from the
different ideas which you attach to the same term. Were I made
umpire in the quarrel, I would interdict the use of the word
Jansenius, on both sides; and thus, by obliging you merely to
express what you understand by it, it would be seen that you ask
nothing more than the condemnation of Calvin, to which they
willingly agree; and that they ask nothing more than the vindication
of the sense of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, in which you again
perfectly coincide.
I declare, then, father, that for my part I shall continue to
regard them as good Catholics, whether they condemn Jansenius, on
finding him erroneous, or refuse to condemn him, from finding that
he maintains nothing more than what you yourself acknowledge to be
orthodox; and that I shall say to them what St. Jerome said to John,
bishop of Jerusalem, who was accused of holding the eight propositions
of Origen: "Either condemn Origen, if you acknowledge that he has
maintained these errors, or else deny that he has maintained them- Aut
nega hoc dixisse eum qui arguitur; aut si locutus est talia, eum damna
qui dixerit."
See, father, how these persons acted, whose sole concern was
with principles, and not with persons; whereas you who aim at
persons more than principles, consider it a matter of no consequence
to condemn errors, unless you procure the condemnation of the
individuals to whom you choose to impute them.
How ridiculously violent your conduct is, father! and how ill
calculated to insure success! I told you before, and I repeat it,
violence and verity can make no impression on each other. Never were
your accusations more outrageous, and never was the innocence of
your opponents more discernible: never has efficacious grace been
attacked with greater subtility, and never has it been more
triumphantly established. You have made the most desperate efforts
to convince people that your disputes involved points of faith; and
never was it more apparent that the whole controversy turned upon a
mere point of fact. In fine, you have moved heaven and earth to make
it appear that this point of fact is founded on truth; and never
were people more disposed to call it in question. And the obvious
reason of this is that you do not take the natural course to make them
believe a point of fact, which is to convince their senses and point
out to them in a book the words which you allege are to be found in
it. The means you have adopted are so far removed from this
straightforward course that the most obtuse minds are unavoidably
struck by observing it. Why did you not take the plan which I followed
in bringing to light the wicked maxims of your authors- which was to
cite faithfully the pa**ages of their writings from which they were
extracted? This was the mode followed by the cures of Paris, and it
never fails to produce conviction. But, when you were charged by
them with holding, for example, the proposition of Father Lamy, that a
"monk may k** a person who threatens to publish calumnies against
himself or his order, when he cannot otherwise prevent the
publication," what would you have thought, and what would the public
have said, if they had not quoted the place where that sentiment is
literally to be found? or if, after having been repeatedly demanded to
quote their authority, they still obstinately refused to do it? or if,
instead of acceding to this, they had gone off to Rome and procured
a bull, ordaining all men to acknowledge the truth of their statement?
Would it not be undoubtedly concluded that they had surprised the
Pope, and that they would never have had recourse to this
extraordinary method, but for want of the natural means of
substantiating the truth, which matters of fact furnish to all who
undertake to prove them? Accordingly, they had no more to do than to
tell us that Father Lamy teaches this doctrine in Book 5, disp.36,
n.118, page 544. of the Douay edition; and by this means everybody who
wished to see it found it out, and nobody could doubt about it any
longer. This appears to be a very easy and prompt way of putting an
end to controversies of fact, when one has got the right side of the
question.
How comes it, then, father, that you do not follow this plan?
You said, in your book, that the five propositions are in Jansenius,
word for word, in the identical terms- iisdem verbis. You were told
they were not. What had you to do after this, but either to cite the
page, if you had really found the words, or to acknowledge that you
were mistaken. But you have done neither the one nor the other. In
place of this, on finding that all the pa**ages from Jansenius,
which you sometimes adduce for the purpose of hoodwinking the
people, are not "the condemned propositions in their individual
identity," as you had engaged to show us, you present us with
Constitutions from Rome, which, without specifying any particular
place, declare that the propositions have been extracted from his
book.
I am sensible, father, of the respect which Christians owe to
the Holy See, and your antagonists give sufficient evidence of their
resolution ever to abide by its decisions. Do not imagine that it
implied any deficiency in this due deference on their part that they
represented to the pope, with all the submission which children owe to
their father, and members to their head, that it was possible he might
be deceived on this point of fact- that he had not caused it to be
investigated during his pontificate; and that his predecessor,
Innocent X, had merely examined into the heretical character of the
propositions, and not into the fact of their connection with
Jansenius. This they stated to the commissary of the Holy Office,
one of the principal examiners, stating that they could not be
censured according to the sense of any author, because they had been
presented for examination on their own merits; and without considering
to what author they might belong: further, that upwards of sixty
doctors, and a vast number of other persons of learning and piety, had
read that book carefully over, without ever having encountered the
proscribed propositions, and that they have found some of a quite
opposite description: that those who had produced that impression on
the mind of the Pope might be reasonably presumed to have abused the
confidence he reposed in them, inasmuch as they had an interest in
decrying that author, who has convicted Molina of upwards of fifty
errors: that what renders this supposition still more probable is that
they have a certain maxim among them, one of the best authenticated in
their whole system of theology, which is, "that they may, without
criminality, calumniate those by whom they conceive themselves to be
unjustly attacked"; and that, accordingly, their testimony being so
suspicious, and the testimony of the other party so respectable,
they had some ground for supplicating his holiness, with the most
profound humility, that he would ordain an investigation to be made
into this fact, in the presence of doctors belonging to both
parties, in order that a solemn and regular decision might be formed
on the point in dispute. "Let there be a convocation of able judges
(says St. Basil on a similar occasion, Epistle 75); let each of them
be left at perfect freedom; let them examine my writings; let them
judge if they contain errors against the faith; let them read the
objections and the replies; that so a judgement may be given in due
form and with proper knowledge of the case, and not a defamatory libel
without examination."
It is quite vain for you, father, to represent those who would act
in the manner I have now supposed as deficient in proper subjection to
the Holy See. The popes are very far from being disposed to treat
Christians with that imperiousness which some would fain exercise
under their name. "The Church," says Pope St. Gregory, "which has been
trained in the school of humility, does not command with authority,
but persuades by reason, her children whom she believes to be in
error, to obey what she has taught them." And so far from deeming it a
disgrace to review a judgement into which they may have been
surprised, we have the testimony of St. Bernard for saying that they
glory in acknowledging the mistake. "The Apostolic See (he says,
Epistle 180) can boast of this recommendation, that it never stands on
the point of honour, but willingly revokes a decision that has been
gained from it by surprise; indeed, it is highly just to prevent any
from profiting by an act of injustice, and more especially before
the Holy See."
Such, father, are the proper sentiments with which the popes ought
to be inspired; for all divines are agreed that they may be surprised,
and that their supreme character, so far from warranting them
against mistakes, exposes them the more readily to fall into them,
on account of the vast number of cares which claim their attention.
This is what the same St. Gregory says to some persons who were
astonished at the circumstance of another pope having suffered himself
to be deluded: "Why do you wonder," says he, "that we should be
deceived, we who are but men? Have you not read that David, a king who
had the spirit of prophecy, was induced, by giving credit to the
falsehoods of Ziba, to pronounce an unjust judgement against the son
of Jonathan? Who will think it strange, then, that we, who are not
prophets, should sometimes be imposed upon by deceivers? A
multiplicity of affairs presses on us, and our minds, which, by
being obliged to attend to so many things at once, apply themselves
less closely to each in particular, are the more easily liable to be
imposed upon in individual cases." Truly, father, I should suppose
that the popes know better than you whether they may be deceived or
not. They themselves tell us that popes, as well as the greatest
princes, are more exposed to deception than individuals who are less
occupied with important avocations. This must be believed on their
testimony. And it is easy to imagine by what means they come to be
thus overreached. St. Bernard, in the letter which he wrote to
Innocent II, gives us the following description of the process: "It is
no wonder, and no novelty, that the human mind may be deceived, and is
deceived. You are surrounded by monks who come to you in the spirit of
lying and deceit. They have filled your ears with stories against a
bishop, whose life has been most exemplary, but who is the object of
their hatred. These persons bite like dogs, and strive to make good
appear evil. Meanwhile, most holy father, you put yourself into a rage
against your own son. Why have you afforded matter of joy to his
enemies? Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they be
of God. I trust that, when you have ascertained the truth, all this
delusion, which rests on a false report, will be dissipated. I pray
the spirit of truth to grant you the grace to separate light from
darkness, and to favour the good by rejecting the evil." You see,
then, father, that the eminent rank of the popes does not exempt
them from the influence of delusion; and I may now add, that it only
serves to render their mistakes more dangerous and important than
those of other men. This is the light in which St. Bernard
represents them to Pope Eugenius: "There is another fault, so common
among the great of this world that I never met one of them who was
free from it; and that is, holy father, an excessive credulity, the
source of numerous disorders. From this proceed violent persecutions
against the innocent, unfounded prejudices against the absent, and
tremendous storms about nothing (pro nihilo). This, holy father, is
a universal evil, from the influence of which, if you are exempt, I
shall only say you are the only individual among all your compeers who
can boast of that privilege."
I imagine, father, that the proofs I have brought are beginning to
convince you that the popes are liable to be surprised. But, to
complete your conversion, I shall merely remind you of some
examples, which you yourself have quoted in your book, of popes and
emperors whom heretics have actually deceived. You will remember,
then, that you have told us that Apollinarius surprised Pope Damasius,
in the same way that Celestius surprised Zozimus. You inform us,
besides, that one called Athanasius deceived the Emperor Heraclius,
and prevailed on him to persecute the Catholics. And lastly, that
Sergius obtained from Honorius that infamous decretal which was burned
at the sixth council, "by playing the busybody," as you say, "about
the person of that pope."
It appears, then, father, by your own confession, that those who
act this part about the persons of kings and popes do sometimes
artfully entice them to persecute the faithful defenders of the truth,
under the persuasion that they are persecuting heretics. And hence the
popes, who hold nothing in greater horror than these surprisals, have,
by a letter of Alexander III, enacted an ecclesiastical statute, which
is inserted in the canonical law, to permit the suspension of the
execution of their bulls and decretals, when there is ground to
suspect that they have been imposed upon. "If," says that pope to
the Archbishop of Ravenna, "we sometimes send decretals to your
fraternity which are opposed to your sentiments, give yourselves no
distress on that account. We shall expect you eitherto carry them
respectfully into execution, or to send us the reason why you conceive
they ought not to be executed; for we deem it right that you should
not execute a decree which may have been procured from us by
artifice and surprise." Such has been the course pursued by the popes,
whose sole object is to settle the disputes of Christians, and not
to follow the pa**ionate counsels of those who strive to involve
them in trouble and perplexity. Following the advice of St. Peter
and St. Paul, who in this followed the commandment of Jesus Christ,
they avoid domination. The spirit which appears in their whole conduct
is that of peace and truth. In this spirit they ordinarily insert in
their letters this clause, which is tacitly understood in them all:
"Si ita est; si preces veritate nitantur- If it be so as we have heard
it; if the facts be true." It is quite clear, if the popes
themselves give no force to their bulls, except in so far as they
are founded on genuine facts, that it is not the bulls alone that
prove the truth of the facts, but that, on the contrary, even
according to the canonists, it is the truth of the facts which renders
the bulls lawfully admissible.
In what way, then, are we to learn the truth of facts? It must
be by the eyes, father, which are the legitimate judges of such
matters, as reason is the proper judge of things natural and
intelligible, and faith of things supernatural and revealed. For,
since you will force me into this discussion, you must allow me to
tell you that, according to the sentiments of the two greatest doctors
of the Church, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, these three principles of
our knowledge, the senses, reason, and faith, have each their separate
objects and their own degrees of certainty. And as God has been
pleased to employ the intervention of the senses to give entrance to
faith (for "faith cometh by hearing"), it follows, that so far from
faith destroying the certainty of the senses, to call in question
the faithful report of the senses would lead to the destruction of
faith. It is on this principle that St. Thomas explicitly states
that God has been pleased that the sensible accidents should subsist
in the eucharist, in order that the senses, which judge only of
these accidents, might not be deceived.
We conclude, therefore, from this, that whatever the proposition
may be that is submitted to our examination, we must first determine
its nature, to ascertain to which of those three principles it ought
to be referred. If it relate to a supernatural truth, we must judge of
it neither by the senses nor by reason, but by Scripture and the
decisions of the Church. Should it concern an unrevealed truth and
something within the reach of natural reason, reason must be its
proper judge. And if it embrace a point of fact, we must yield to
the testimony of the senses, to which it naturally belongs to take
cognizance of such matters.
So general is this rule that, according to St. Augustine and St.
Thomas, when we meet with a pa**age even in the Scripture, the literal
meaning of which, at first sight, appears contrary to what the
senses or reason are certainly persuaded of, we must not attempt to
reject their testimony in this case, and yield them up to the
authority of that apparent sense of the Scripture, but we must
interpret the Scripture, and seek out therein another sense
agreeable to that sensible truth; because, the Word of God being
infallible in the facts which it records, and the information of the
senses and of reason, acting in their sphere, being certain also, it
follows that there must be an agreement between these two sources of
knowledge. And as Scripture may be interpreted in different ways,
whereas the testimony of the senses is uniform, we must in these
matters adopt as the true interpretation of Scripture that view
which corresponds with the faithful report of the senses. "Two
things," says St. Thomas, "must be observed, according to the doctrine
of St. Augustine: first, That Scripture has always one true sense; and
secondly, That as it may receive various senses, when we have
discovered one which reason plainly teaches to be false, we must not
persist in maintaining that this is the natural sense, but search
out another with which reason will agree.
St. Thomas explains his meaning by the example of a pa**age in
Genesis where it is written that "God created two great lights, the
sun and the moon, and also the stars," in which the Scriptures
appear to say that the moon is greater than all the stars; but as it
is evident, from unquestionable demonstration, that this is false,
it is not our duty, says that saint, obstinately to defend the literal
sense of that pa**age; another meaning must be sought, consistent with
the truth of the fact, such as the following, "That the phrase great
light, as applied to the moon, denotes the greatness of that
luminary merely as it appears in our eyes, and not the magnitude of
its body considered in itself."
An opposite mode of treatment, so far from procuring respect to
the Scripture, would only expose it to the contempt of infidels;
because, as St. Augustine says, "when they found that we believed,
on the authority of Scripture, in things which they a**uredly knew
to be false, they would laugh at our credulity with regard to its more
recondite truths, such as the resurrection of the dead and eternal
life." "And by this means," adds St. Thomas, "we should render our
religion contemptible in their eyes, and shut up its entrance into
their minds.
And let me add, father, that it would in the same manner be the
likeliest means to shut up the entrance of Scripture into the minds of
heretics, and to render the pope's authority contemptible in their
eyes, to refuse all those the name of Catholics who would not
believe that certain words were in a certain book, where they are
not to be found, merely because a pope by mistake has declared that
they are. It is only by examining a book that we can ascertain what
words it contains. Matters of fact can only be proved by the senses.
If the position which you maintain be true, show it, or else ask no
man to believe it- that would be to no purpose. Not all the powers
on earth can, by the force of authority, persuade us of a point of
fact, any more than they can alter it; for nothing can make that to be
not which really is.
It was to no purpose, for example, that the monks of Ratisbon
procured from Pope St. Leo IX a solemn decree, by which he declared
that the body of St. Denis, the first bishop of Paris, who is
generally held to have been the Areopagite, had been transported out
of France and conveyed into the chapel of their monastery. It is not
the less true, for all this, that the body of that saint always lay,
and lies to this hour, in the celebrated abbey which bears his name,
and within the walls of which you would find it no easy matter to
obtain a cordial reception to this bull, although the pope has therein
a**ured us that he has examined the affair "with all possible
diligence (diligentissime), and with the advice of many bishops and
prelates; so that he strictly enjoins all the French (districte
praecipientes) to own and confess that these holy relics are no longer
in their country." The French, however, who knew that fact to be
untrue, by the evidence of their own eyes, and who, upon opening the
shrine, found all those relics entire, as the historians of that
period inform us, believed then, as they have always believed since,
the reverse of what that holy pope had enjoined them to believe,
well knowing that even saints and prophets are liable to be imposed
upon.
It was to equally little purpose that you obtained against Galileo
a decree from Rome condemning his opinion respecting the motion of the
earth. It will never be proved by such an argument as this that the
earth remains stationary; and if it can be demonstrated by sure
observation that it is the earth and not the sun that revolves, the
efforts and arguments of all mankind put together will not hinder
our planet from revolving, nor hinder themselves from revolving
along with her.
Again, you must not imagine that the letters of Pope Zachary,
excommunicating St. Virgilius for maintaining the existence of the
antipodes, have annihilated the New World; nor must you suppose
that, although he declared that opinion to be a most dangerous heresy,
the King of Spain was wrong in giving more credence to Christopher
Columbus, who came from the place, than to the judgement of the
pope, who had never been there, or that the Church has not derived a
vast benefit from the discovery, inasmuch as it has brought the
knowledge of the Gospel to a great multitude of souls who might
otherwise have perished in their infidelity.
You see, then, father, what is the nature of matters of fact,
and on what principles they are to be determined; from all which, to
recur to our subject, it is easy to conclude that, if the five
propositions are not in Jansenius, it is impossible that they can have
been extracted from him; and that the only way to form a judgement
on the matter, and to produce universal conviction, is to examine that
book in a regular conference, as you have been desired to do long ago.
Until that be done, you have no right to charge your opponents with
contumacy; for they are as blameless in regard to the point of fact as
they are of errors in point of faith- Catholics in doctrine,
reasonable in fact, and innocent in both.
Who can help feeling astonishment, then, father, to see on the one
side a vindication so complete, and on the other accusations so
outrageous! Who would suppose that the only question between you
relates to a single fact of no importance, which the one party
wishes the other to believe without showing it to them! And who
would ever imagine that such a noise should have been made in the
Church for nothing (pro nihilo), as good St. Bernard says! But this is
just one of the principal tricks of your policy, to make people
believe that everything is at stake, when, in reality, there is
nothing at stake; and to represent to those influential persons who
listen to you that the most pernicious errors of Calvin, and the
most vital principles of the faith, are involved in your disputes,
with the view of inducing them, under this conviction, to employ all
their zeal and all their authority against your opponents, as if the
safety of the Catholic religion depended upon it; Whereas, if they
came to know that the whole dispute was about this paltry point of
fact, they would give themselves no concern about it, but would, on
the contrary, regret extremely that, to gratify your private pa**ions,
they had made such exertions in an affair of no consequence to the
Church. For, in fine, to take the worst view of the matter, even
though it should be true that Jansenius maintained these propositions,
what great misfortune would accrue from some persons doubting of the
fact, provided they detested the propositions, as they have publicly
declared that they do? Is it not enough that they are condemned by
everybody, without exception, and that, too, in the sense in which you
have explained that you wish them to be condemned? Would they be
more severely censured by saying that Jansenius maintained them?
What purpose, then, would be served by exacting this acknowledgment,
except that of disgracing a doctor and bishop, who died in the
communion of the Church? I cannot see how that should be accounted
so great a blessing as to deserve to be purchased at the expense of so
many disturbances. What interest has the state, or the pope, or
bishops, or doctors, or the Church at large, in this conclusion? It
does not affect them in any way whatever, father; it can affect none
but your Society, which would certainly enjoy some pleasure from the
defamation of an author who has done you some little injury. Meanwhile
everything is in confusion, because you have made people believe
that everything is in danger. This is the secret spring giving impulse
to all those mighty commotions, which would cease immediately were the
real state of the controversy once known. And therefore, as the
peace of the Church depended on this explanation, it was, I
conceive, of the utmost importance that it should be given that, by
exposing all your disguises, it might be manifest to the whole world
that your accusations were without foundation, your opponents
without error, and the Church without heresy.
Such, father, is the end which it has been my desire to
accomplish; an end which appears to me, in every point of view, so
deeply important to religion that I am at a loss to conceive how those
to whom you furnish so much occasion for speaking can contrive to
remain in silence. Granting that they are not affected with the
personal wrongs which you have committed against them, those which the
Church suffers ought, in my opinion, to have forced them to
complain. Besides, I am not altogether sure if ecclesiastics ought
to make a sacrifice of their reputation to calumny, especially in
the matter of religion. They allow, you, nevertheless, to say whatever
you please; so that, had it not been for the opportunity which, by
mere accident, you afforded me of taking their part, the scandalous
impressions which you are circulating against them in all quarters
would, in all probability, have gone forth without contradiction.
Their patience, I confess, astonishes me; and the more so that I
cannot suspect it of proceeding either from timidity or from
incapacity, being well a**ured that they want neither arguments for
their own vindication, nor zeal for the truth. And yet I see them
religiously bent on silence, to a degree which appears to me
altogether unjustifiable. For my part, father, I do not believe that I
can possibly follow their example. Leave the Church in peace, and I
shall leave you as you are, with all my heart; but so long as you make
it your sole business to keep her in confusion, doubt not but that
there shall always be found within her bosom children of peace who
will consider themselves bound to employ all their endeavours to
preserve her tranquillity.