561 U.S. 368, 130 S.Ct 2896, 177 LEd.2d 619 (2010).
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 2001, Enron Corporation, then the seventh highest-revenue-grossing company in America, crashed into bankruptcy. We consider in this opinion two questions arising from the prosecution of Jeffrey Sk**ing, a longtime Enron executive, for crimes committed before the corporation's collapse. First, did pretrial publicity and community prejudice prevent Sk**ing from obtaining a fair trial? Second, did the jury improperly convict Sk**ing of conspiracy to commit “honest-services” wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343, 1346?
Answering no to both questions, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Sk**ing's convictions. We conclude, in common with the Court of Appeals, that Sk**ing's fair-trial argument fails; Sk**ing, we hold, did not establish that a presumption of juror prejudice arose or that actual bias infected the jury that tried him. But we disagree with the Fifth Circuit's honest-services ruling. In proscribing fraudulent deprivations of “the intangible right of honest services,” § 1346, Congress intended at least to reach schemes to defraud involving bribes and kickbacks. Construing the honest-services statute to extend beyond that core meaning, we conclude, would encounter a vagueness shoal. We therefore hold that § 1346 covers only bribery and kickback schemes. Because Sk**ing's alleged misconduct entailed no bribe or kickback, it does not fall within § 1346's proscription. We therefore affirm in part and vacate in part.
I. Founded in 1985, Enron Corporation grew from its headquarters in Houston, Texas, into one of the world's leading energy companies. Sk**ing launched his career there in 1990 when Kenneth Lay, the company's founder, hired him to head an Enron subsidiary. Sk**ing steadily rose through the corporation's ranks, serving as president and chief operating officer, and then, beginning in February 2001, as chief executive officer. Six months later, on August 14, 2001, Sk**ing resigned from Enron.
Less than four months after Sk**ing's departure, Enron spiraled into bankruptcy. The company's stock, which had traded at $90 per share in August 2000, plummeted to pennies per share in late 2001. Attempting to comprehend what caused the corporation's collapse, the U.S. Department of Justice formed an Enron Task Force, comprising prosecutors and FBI agents from around the Nation. The Government's investigation uncovered an elaborate conspiracy to prop up Enron's short-run stock prices by overstating the company's financial well-being. In the years following Enron's bankruptcy, the Government prosecuted dozens of Enron employees who participated in the scheme. In time, the Government worked its way up the corporation's chain of command: On July 7, 2004, a grand jury indicted Sk**ing, Lay, and Richard Causey, Enron's former chief accounting officer.
These three defendants, the indictment alleged,
“engaged in a wide-ranging scheme to deceive the investing public, including Enron's shareholders, ... about the true performance of Enron's businesses by: (a) manipulating Enron's publicly reported financial results; and (b) making public statements and representations about Enron's financial performance and results that were false and misleading.” App. ¶ 5, p. 277a.
Sk**ing and his co-conspirators, the indictment continued, “enriched themselves as a result of the scheme through salary, bonuses, grants of stock and stock options, other profits, and prestige.” Id., ¶ 14, at 280a.
Count 1 of the indictment charged Sk**ing with conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud; in particular, it alleged that Sk**ing had sought to “depriv[e] Enron and its shareholders of the intangible right of [his] honest services.” Id., ¶ 87, at 318a.FN1 The indictment further charged Sk**ing with more than 25 substantive counts of securities fraud, wire fraud, making false representations to Enron's auditors, and insider trading.
In November 2004, Sk**ing moved to transfer the trial to another venue; he contended that hostility toward him in Houston, coupled with extensive pretrial publicity, had poisoned potential jurors. To support this a**ertion, Sk**ing, aided by media experts, submitted hundreds of news reports detailing Enron's downfall; he also presented affidavits from the experts he engaged portraying community attitudes in Houston in comparison to other potential venues.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in accord with rulings in two earlier instituted Enron-related prosecutions, denied the venue-transfer motion. Despite “isolated incidents of intemperate commentary,” the court observed, media coverage “ha[d] [mostly] been objective and unemotional,” and the facts of the case were “neither heinous nor sensational.” App. to Brief for United States 10a–11a.FN3 Moreover, “courts ha[d] commonly” favored “effective voir dire ... to ferret out any [juror] bias.” Id., at 18a. Pretrial publicity about the case, the court concluded, did not warrant a presumption that Sk**ing would be unable to obtain a fair trial in Houston. Id., at 22a.
In the months leading up to the trial, the District Court solicited from the parties questions the court might use to screen prospective jurors. Unable to agree on a questionnaire's format and content, Sk**ing and the Government submitted dueling documents. On venire members' sources of Enron-related news, for example, the Government proposed that they tick boxes from a checklist of generic labels such as “[t]elevision,” “[n]ewspaper,” and “ [r]adio,” Record 8415; Sk**ing proposed more probing questions asking venire members to list the specific names of their media sources and to report on “ what st[ood] out in [their] mind[s]” of “all the things [they] ha[d] seen, heard or read about Enron,” id., at 8404–8405.
The District Court rejected the Government's sparer inquiries in favor of Sk**ing's submission. Sk**ing's questions “[we]re more helpful,” the court said, “because [they] [we]re generally ... open-ended and w[ould] allow the potential jurors to give us more meaningful information.” Id., at 9539. The court converted Sk**ing's submission, with slight modifications, into a 77–question, 14–page document that asked prospective jurors about, inter alia, their sources of news and exposure to Enron-related publicity, beliefs concerning Enron and what caused its collapse, opinions regarding the defendants and their possible guilt or innocence, and relationships to the company and to anyone affected by its demise.
In November 2005, the District Court mailed the questionnaire to 400 prospective jurors and received responses from nearly all the addressees. The court granted hardship exemptions to approximately 90 individuals, id., at 11773–11774, and the parties, with the court's approval, further winnowed the pool by excusing another 119 for cause, hardship, or physical disability, id., at 11891, 13594. The parties agreed to exclude, in particular, “each and every” prospective juror who said that a preexisting opinion about Enron or the defendants would prevent her from impartially considering the evidence at trial. Id., at 13668.
On December 28, 2005, three weeks before the date scheduled for the commencement of trial, Causey pleaded guilty. Sk**ing's attorneys immediately requested a continuance, and the District Court agreed to delay the proceedings until the end of January 2006. Id., at 14277. In the interim, Sk**ing renewed his change-of-venue motion, arguing that the juror questionnaires revealed pervasive bias and that news accounts of Causey's guilty plea further tainted the jury pool. If Houston remained the trial venue, Sk**ing urged that “jurors need to be questioned individually by both the Court and counsel” concerning their opinions of Enron and “publicity issues.” Id., at 12074.
The District Court again declined to move the trial. Sk**ing, the court concluded, still had not “establish[ed] that pretrial publicity and/or community prejudice raise[d] a presumption of inherent jury prejudice.” Id., at 14115. The questionnaires and voir dire, the court observed, provided safeguards adequate to ensure an impartial jury. Id., at 14115–14116.
Denying Sk**ing's request for attorney-led voir dire, the court said that in 17 years on the bench:
“I've found ... I get more forthcoming responses from potential jurors than the lawyers on either side. I don't know whether people are suspicious of lawyers—but I think if I ask a person a question, I will get a candid response much easier than if a lawyer asks the question.” Id., at 11805.
But the court promised to give counsel an opportunity to ask follow-up questions, ibid., and it agreed that venire members should be examined individually about pretrial publicity, id., at 11051–11053. The court also allotted the defendants jointly 14 peremptory challenges, 2 more than the standard number prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b)(2) and (c)(4)(B). Id., at 13673–13675.
Voir dire began on January 30, 2006. The District Court first emphasized to the venire the importance of impartiality and explained the presumption of innocence and the Government's burden of proof. The trial, the court next instructed, was not a forum “to seek vengeance against Enron's former officers,” or to “provide remedies for” its victims. App. 823a. “The bottom line,” the court stressed, “is that we want ... jurors who ... will faithfully, conscientiously and impartially serve if selected.” Id., at 823a–824a. In response to the court's query whether any prospective juror questioned her ability to adhere to these instructions, two individuals indicated that they could not be fair; they were therefore excused for cause, id., at 816a, 819a–820a.
After questioning the venire as a group, the District Court brought prospective jurors one by one to the bench for individual examination. Although the questions varied, the process generally tracked the following format: The court asked about exposure to Enron-related news and the content of any stories that stood out in the prospective juror's mind. Next, the court homed in on questionnaire answers that raised a red flag signaling possible bias. The court then permitted each side to pose follow-up questions. Finally, after the venire member stepped away, the court entertained and ruled on challenges for cause. In all, the court granted one of the Government's for-cause challenges and denied four; it granted three of the defendants' challenges and denied six. The parties agreed to excuse three additional jurors for cause and one for hardship.
By the end of the day, the court had qualified 38 prospective jurors, a number sufficient, allowing for peremptory challenges, to empanel 12 jurors and 4 alternates. Before the jury was sworn in, Sk**ing objected to the seating of six jurors. He did not contend that they were in fact biased; instead, he urged that he would have used peremptories to exclude them had he not exhausted his supply by striking several venire members after the court refused to excuse them for cause. Supp.App. 3sa–4sa (Sealed). The court overruled this objection.
After the jurors took their oath, the District Court told them they could not discuss the case with anyone or follow media accounts of the proceedings. “[E]ach of you,” the court explained, “needs to be absolutely sure that your decisions concerning the facts will be based only on the evidence that you hear and read in this courtroom.” App. 1026a.
Following a 4–month trial and nearly five days of deliberation, the jury found Sk**ing guilty of 19 counts, including the honest-services-fraud conspiracy charge, and not guilty of 9 insider-trading counts. The District Court sentenced Sk**ing to 292 months' imprisonment, 3 years' supervised release, and $45 million in restitution.
On appeal, Sk**ing raised a host of challenges to his convictions, including the fair-trial and honest-services arguments he presses here. Regarding the former, the Fifth Circuit initially determined that the volume and negative tone of media coverage generated by Enron's collapse created a presumption of juror prejudice. 554 F.3d 529, 559 (2009). The court also noted potential prejudice stemming from Causey's guilty plea and from the large number of victims in Houston—from the “[t]housands of Enron employees ... [who] lost their jobs, and ... saw their 401(k) accounts wiped out,” to Houstonians who suffered spillover economic effects. Id., at 559–560.
The Court of Appeals stated, however, that “the presumption [of prejudice] is rebu*table,” and it therefore examined the voir dire to determine whether “the District Court empanelled an impartial jury.” Id., at 561 (internal quotation marks, italics, and some capitalization omitted). The voir dire was, in the Fifth Circuit's view, “proper and thorough.” Id., at 562. Moreover, the court noted, Sk**ing had challenged only one seated juror—Juror 11—for cause. Although Juror 11 made some troubling comments about corporate greed, the District Court “observed [his] demeanor, listened to his answers, and believed he would make the government prove its case.” Id., at 564. In sum, the Fifth Circuit found that the Government had overcome the presumption of prejudice and that Sk**ing had not “show[n] that any juror who actually sat was prejudiced against him.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also rejected Sk**ing's claim that his conduct did not indicate any conspiracy to commit honest-services fraud. “[T]he jury was entitled to convict Sk**ing,” the court stated, “on these elements”: “(1) a material breach of a fiduciary duty ... (2) that results in a detriment to the employer,” including one occasioned by an employee's decision to “withhold material information, i.e., information that he had reason to believe would lead a reasonable employer to change its conduct.” Id., at 547. The Fifth Circuit did not address Sk**ing's argument that the honest-services statute, if not interpreted to exclude his actions, should be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague. Brief of Defendant–Appellant Jeffrey K. Sk**ing in No. 06–20885(CA5), p. 65, n. 21.
Arguing that the Fifth Circuit erred in its consideration of these claims, Sk**ing sought relief from this Court. We granted certiorari, 558 U.S. 945, 130 S.Ct. 393, 175 L.Ed.2d 267 (2009), and now affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. We consider first Sk**ing's allegation of juror prejudice, and next, his honest-services argument.
II. Pointing to “the community pa**ion aroused by Enron's collapse and the vitriolic media treatment” aimed at him, Sk**ing argues that his trial “never should have proceeded in Houston.” Brief for Petitioner 20. And even if it had been possible to select impartial jurors in Houston, “[t]he truncated voir dire ... did almost nothing to weed out prejudices,” he contends, so “[f]ar from rebu*ting the presumption of prejudice, the record below affirmatively confirmed it.” Id., at 21. Sk**ing's fair-trial claim thus raises two distinct questions. First, did the District Court err by failing to move the trial to a different venue based on a presumption of prejudice? Second, did actual prejudice contaminate Sk**ing's jury?
A. 1. The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury. By constitutional design, that trial occurs “in the State where the ... Crimes ... have been committed.” Art. III, § 2, cl. 3. See also Amdt. 6 (right to trial by “jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). The Constitution's place-of-trial prescriptions, however, do not impede transfer of the proceeding to a different district at the defendant's request if extraordinary local prejudice will prevent a fair trial—a “basic requirement of due process,” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955).
2. “The theory of our [trial] system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.” Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General of Colo., 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907) (opinion for the Court by Holmes, J.). When does the publicity attending conduct charged as criminal dim prospects that the trier can judge a case, as due process requires, impartially, unswayed by outside influence? Because most cases of consequence garner at least some pretrial publicity, courts have considered this question in diverse settings. We begin our discussion by addressing the presumption of prejudice from which the Fifth Circuit's an*lysis in Sk**ing's case proceeded. The foundation precedent is Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963).
Wilbert Rideau robbed a bank in a small Louisiana town, kidnaped three bank employees, and k**ed one of them. Police interrogated Rideau in jail without counsel present and obtained his confession. Without informing Rideau, no less seeking his consent, the police filmed the interrogation. On three separate occasions shortly before the trial, a local television station broadcast the film to audiences ranging from 24,000 to 53,000 individuals. Rideau moved for a change of venue, arguing that he could not receive a fair trial in the parish where the crime occurred, which had a population of approximately 150,000 people. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury eventually convicted Rideau. The Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the conviction.
We reversed. “What the people [in the community] saw on their television sets,” we observed, “was Rideau, in jail, flanked by the sheriff and two state troopers, admitting in detail the commission of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder.” Id., at 725, 83 S.Ct. 1417. “[T]o the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it,” we explained, the interrogation “in a very real sense was Rideau's trial—at which he pleaded guilty.” Id., at 726, 83 S.Ct. 1417. We therefore “d[id] not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire,” that “[t]he kangaroo court proceedings” trailing the televised confession violated due process. Id., at 726–727, 83 S.Ct. 1417.
We followed Rideau 's lead in two later cases in which media coverage manifestly tainted a criminal prosecution. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965), extensive publicity before trial swelled into excessive exposure during preliminary court proceedings as reporters and television crews overran the courtroom and “bombard[ed] ... the community with the sights and sounds of” the pretrial hearing. The media's overzealous reporting efforts, we observed, “led to considerable disruption” and denied the “judicial serenity and calm to which [Billie Sol Estes] was entitled.” Id., at 536, 85 S.Ct. 1628.
Similarly, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), news reporters extensively covered the story of Sam Sheppard, who was accused of bludgeoning his pregnant wife to d**h. “[B]edlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom,” thrusting jurors “into the role of celebrities.” Id., at 353, 355, 86 S.Ct. 1507. Pretrial media coverage, which we characterized as “months [of] virulent publicity about Sheppard and the murder,” did not alone deny due process, we noted. Id., at 354, 86 S.Ct. 1507. But Sheppard's case involved more than heated reporting pretrial: We upset the murder conviction because a “carnival atmosphere” pervaded the trial, id., at 358, 86 S.Ct. 1507.
In each of these cases, we overturned a “conviction obtained in a trial atmosphere that [was] utterly corrupted by press coverage”; our decisions, however, “cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to ... news accounts of the crime ... alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798–799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975).FN12 See also, e.g., *381 Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984).FN13 Prominence does not necessarily produce prejudice, and juror impartiality, we have reiterated, does not require ignorance. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (Jurors are not required to be “totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved”; “scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155–156, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879) (“[E]very case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its merits.”). A presumption of prejudice, our decisions indicate, attends only the extreme case.
3. Relying on Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, Sk**ing a**erts that we need not pause to examine the screening questionnaires or the voir dire before declaring his jury's verdict void. We are not persuaded. Important differences separate Sk**ing's prosecution from those in which we have presumed juror prejudice.
First, we have emphasized in prior decisions the size and characteristics of the community in which the crime occurred. In Rideau, for example, we noted that the murder was committed in a parish of only 150,000 residents. Houston, in contrast, is the fourth most populous city in the Nation: At the time of Sk**ing's trial, more than 4.5 million individuals eligible for jury duty resided in the Houston area. App. 627a. Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled is hard to sustain. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991) (potential for prejudice mitigated by the size of the “metropolitan Washington [D.C.] statistical area, which has a population of over 3 million, and in which, unfortunately, hundreds of murders are committed each year”); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991) (plurality opinion) (reduced likelihood of prejudice where venire was drawn from a pool of over 600,000 individuals).
Second, although news stories about Sk**ing were not kind, they contained no confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight. Rideau's dramatically staged admission of guilt, for instance, was likely imprinted indelibly in the mind of anyone who watched it. Cf. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 72, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he defendant's own confession [is] probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Pretrial publicity about Sk**ing was less memorable and prejudicial. No evidence of the smoking-gun variety invited prejudgment of his culpability. See United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 251–252, n. 11 (C.A.5 1982) (“A jury may have difficulty in disbelieving or forgetting a defendant's opinion of his own guilt but have no difficulty in rejecting the opinions of others because they may not be well-founded.”).
Third, unlike cases in which trial swiftly followed a widely reported crime, e.g., Rideau, 373 U.S., at 724, 83 S.Ct. 1417, over four years elapsed between Enron's bankruptcy and Sk**ing's trial. Although reporters covered Enron-related news throughout this period, the decibel level of media attention diminished somewhat in the years following Enron's collapse. See App. 700a; id., at 785a; Yount, 467 U.S., at 1032, 1034, 104 S.Ct. 2885.
Finally, and of prime significance, Sk**ing's jury acquitted him of nine insider-trading counts. Similarly, earlier instituted Enron-related prosecutions yielded no overwhelming victory for the Government. In Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, in marked contrast, the jury's verdict did not undermine in any way the supposition of juror bias. It would be odd for an appellate court to presume prejudice in a case in which jurors' actions run counter to that presumption. See, e.g., United States v. Arzola–Amaya, 867 F.2d 1504, 1514 (C.A.5 1989) (“The jury's ability to discern a failure of proof of guilt of some of the alleged crimes indicates a fair minded consideration of the issues and reinforces our belief and conclusion that the media coverage did not lead to the deprivation of [the] right to an impartial trial.”).
4. Sk**ing's trial, in short, shares little in common with those in which we approved a presumption of juror prejudice. The Fifth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion based primarily on the magnitude and negative tone of media attention directed at Enron. But “pretrial publicity—even pervasive, adverse publicity—does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.” Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). In this case, as just noted, news stories about Enron did not present the kind of vivid, unforgettable information we have recognized as particularly likely to produce prejudice, and Houston's size and diversity diluted the media's impact.
Nor did Enron's “sheer number of victims,” 554 F.3d, at 560, trigger a presumption of prejudice. Although the widespread community impact necessitated careful identification and inspection of prospective jurors' connections to Enron, the extensive screening questionnaire and follow-up voir dire were well suited to that task. And hindsight shows the efficacy of these devices; as we discuss infra, at 2919 – 2920, jurors' links to Enron were either nonexistent or attenuated.
Finally, although Causey's “well-publicized decision to plead guilty” shortly before trial created a danger of juror prejudice, 554 F.3d, at 559, the District Court took appropriate steps to reduce that risk. The court delayed the proceedings by two weeks, lessening the immediacy of that development. And during voir dire, the court asked about prospective jurors' exposure to recent publicity, including news regarding Causey. Only two venire members recalled the plea; neither mentioned Causey by name, and neither ultimately served on Sk**ing's jury. App. 888a, 993a. Although publicity about a codefendant's guilty plea calls for inquiry to guard against actual prejudice, it does not ordinarily—and, we are satisfied, it did not here—warrant an automatic presumption of prejudice.
Persuaded that no presumption arose we conclude that the District Court, in declining to order a venue change, did not exceed constitutional limitations.
B. We next consider whether actual prejudice infected Sk**ing's jury. Voir dire, Sk**ing a**erts, did not adequately detect and defuse juror bias. “[T]he record ... affirmatively confirm[s]” prejudice, he maintains, because several seated jurors “prejudged his guilt.” Brief for Petitioner 21. We disagree with Sk**ing's characterization of the voir dire and the jurors selected through it.
1. No hard-and-fast formula dictates the necessary depth or breadth of voir dire. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145–146, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936) (“Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula.”). Jury selection, we have repeatedly emphasized, is “particularly within the province of the trial judge.” Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594–595, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Mu'Min, 500 U.S., at 424, 111 S.Ct. 1899; Yount, 467 U.S., at 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885; Rosales–Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188–189, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality opinion); Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408–413, 15 S.Ct. 951, 39 L.Ed. 1033 (1895).
When pretrial publicity is at issue, “primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes [especially] good sense” because the judge “sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect” and may base her evaluation on her “own perception of the depth and extent of news stories that might influence a juror.” Mu'Min, 500 U.S., at 427, 111 S.Ct. 1899. Appellate courts making after-the-fact a**essments of the media's impact on jurors should be mindful that their judgments lack the on-the-spot comprehension of the situation possessed by trial judges.
Reviewing courts are properly resistant to second-guessing the trial judge's estimation of a juror's impartiality, for that judge's appraisal is ordinarily influenced by a host of factors impossible to capture fully in the record—among them, the prospective juror's inflection, sincerity, demeanor, candor, body language, and apprehension of duty. See Reynolds, 98 U.S., at 156–157. In contrast to the cold transcript received by the appellate court, the in-the-moment voir dire affords the trial court a more intimate and immediate basis for a**essing a venire member's fitness for jury service. We consider the adequacy of jury selection in Sk**ing's case, therefore, attentive to the respect due to district-court determinations of juror impartiality and of the measures necessary to ensure that impartiality.
2. Sk**ing deems the voir dire insufficient because, he argues, jury selection lasted “just five hours,” “[m]ost of the court's questions were conclusory[,] high-level, and failed adequately to probe jurors' true feelings,” and the court “consistently took prospective jurors at their word once they claimed they could be fair, no matter what other indications of bias were present.” Brief for Petitioner 10–11 (emphasis deleted). Our review of the record, however, yields a different appraisal.
As noted, supra, at 2908 – 2910, and n. 4, the District Court initially screened venire members by eliciting their responses to a comprehensive questionnaire drafted in large part by Sk**ing. That survey helped to identify prospective jurors excusable for cause and served as a springboard for further questions put to remaining members of the array. Voir dire thus was, in the court's words, the “culmination of a lengthy process.” App. 841a; see 554 F.3d, at 562, n. 51 (“We consider the ... questionnaire in a**essing the quality of voir dire as a whole.”). In other Enron-related prosecutions, we note, District Courts, after inspecting venire members' responses to questionnaires, completed the jury-selection process within one day. See supra, at 2911, n. 6.
The District Court conducted voir dire, moreover, aware of the greater-than-normal need, due to pretrial publicity, to ensure against jury bias. At Sk**ing's urging, the court examined each prospective juror individually, thus preventing the spread of any prejudicial information to other venire members. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S., at 425, 111 S.Ct. 1899. To encourage candor, the court repeatedly admonished that there were “no right and wrong answers to th [e] questions.” E.g., App. 843a. The court denied Sk**ing's request for attorney-led voir dire because, in its experience, potential jurors were “more forthcoming” when the court, rather than counsel, asked the question. Record 11805. The parties, however, were accorded an opportunity to ask follow-up questions of every prospective juror brought to the bench for colloquy. Sk**ing's counsel declined to ask anything of more than half of the venire members questioned individually, including eight eventually selected for the jury, because, he explained, “the Court and other counsel have covered” everything he wanted to know. App. 967a.
Inspection of the questionnaires and voir dire of the individuals who actually served as jurors satisfies us that, notwithstanding the flaws Sk**ing lists, the selection process successfully secured jurors who were largely untouched by Enron's collapse. Eleven of the seated jurors and alternates reported no connection at all to Enron, while all other jurors reported at most an insubstantial link. See, e.g., Supp.App. 101sa (Juror 63) (“I once met a guy who worked for Enron. I cannot remember his name.”). As for pretrial publicity, 14 jurors and alternates specifically stated that they had paid scant attention to Enron-related news. See, e.g., App. 859a–860a (Juror 13) (would “[b]asically” start out knowing nothing about the case because “I just ... didn't follow [it] a whole lot”); id., at 969a (Juror 78) (“[Enron] wasn't anything that I was interested in reading [about] in detail. ... I don't really know much about it.”). The remaining two jurors indicated that nothing in the news influenced their opinions about Sk**ing.
The questionnaires confirmed that, whatever community prejudice existed in Houston generally, Sk**ing's jurors were not under its sway. Although many expressed sympathy for victims of Enron's bankruptcy and speculated that greed contributed to the corporation's collapse, these sentiments did not translate into animus toward Sk**ing. When asked whether they “ha[d] an opinion about ... Jeffrey Sk**ing,” none of the seated jurors and alternates checked the “yes” box. And in response to the question whether “any opinion [they] may have formed regarding Enron or [Sk**ing]*392 [would] prevent” their impartial consideration of the evidence at trial, every juror—despite options to mark “yes” or “unsure”—instead checked “no.”
The District Court, Sk**ing a**erts, should not have “accept[ed] at face value jurors' promises of fairness.” Brief for Petitioner 37. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S., at 727–728, 81 S.Ct. 1639, Sk**ing points out, we found actual prejudice despite jurors' a**urances that they could be impartial. Brief for Petitioner 26. Justice Sotomayor, in turn, repeatedly relies on Irvin, which she regards as closely an*logous to this case. See post, at 2954 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part) (hereinafter dissent). See also, e.g., post, at 2949–2950, 2959–2960, 2961, 2963. We disagree with that characterization of Irvin.
The facts of Irvin are worlds apart from those presented here. Leslie Irvin stood accused of a brutal murder and robbery spree in a small rural community. 366 U.S., at 719, 81 S.Ct. 1639. In the months before Irvin's trial, “a barrage” of publicity was “unleashed against him,” including reports of his confessions to the slayings and robberies. Id., at 725–726, 81 S.Ct. 1639. This Court's description of the media coverage in Irvin reveals why the dissent's “best case” is not an apt comparison:
“[S]tories revealed the details of [Irvin's] background, including a reference to crimes committed when a juvenile, his convictions for arson almost 20 years previously, for burglary and by a court-martial on AWOL charges during the war. He was accused of being a parole violator. The headlines announced his police line-up identification, that he faced a lie detector test, had been placed at the scene of the crime and that the six murders were solved but [he] refused to confess. Finally, they announced [Irvin's] confession to the six murders and the fact of his indictment for four of them in Indiana. They reported [Irvin's] offer to plead guilty if promised a 99–year sentence, but also the determination, on the other hand, of the prosecutor to secure the d**h penalty, and that [Irvin] had confessed to 24 burglaries (the modus operandi of these robberies was compared to that of the murders and the similarity noted). One story dramatically relayed the promise of a sheriff to devote his life to securing [Irvin's] execution .... Another characterized [Irvin] as remorseless and without conscience but also as having been found sane by a court-appointed panel of doctors. In many of the stories [Irvin] was described as the ‘confessed slayer of six,' a parole violator and fraudulent-check artist. [Irvin's] court-appointed counsel was quoted as having received ‘much criticism over being Irvin's counsel' and it was pointed out, by way of excusing the attorney, that he would be subject to disbarment should he refuse to represent Irvin. On the day before the trial the newspapers carried the story that Irvin had orally admitted [to] the murder of [one victim] as well as ‘the robbery-murder of [a second individual]; the murder of [a third individual], and the slaughter of three members of [a different family].' ” Id., at 725–726, 81 S.Ct. 1639.
“[N]ewspapers in which the[se] stories appeared were delivered regularly to 95% of the dwellings in” the county where the trial occurred, which had a population of only 30,000; “radio and TV stations, which likewise blanketed that county, also carried extensive newscasts covering the same incidents.” Id., at 725, 81 S.Ct. 1639.
Reviewing Irvin's fair-trial claim, this Court noted that “the pattern of deep and bitter prejudice” in the community “was clearly reflected in the sum total of the voir dire ”: prospective jurors or almost 90% of those examined on the point ... entertained some opinion as to guilt,” and “[8] out of the 12 [jurors] thought [Irvin] was guilty.” Id., at 727, 81 S.Ct. 1639 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although these jurors declared they could be impartial, we held that, “[w]ith his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that [Irvin] be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public pa**ion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of the members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt.” Id., at 728, 81 S.Ct. 1639.
In this case, as noted, supra, at 2916, news stories about Enron contained nothing resembling the horrifying information rife in reports about Irvin's rampage of robberies and murders. Of key importance, Houston shares little in common with the rural community in which Irvin's trial proceeded, and circulation figures for Houston media sources were far lower than the 95% saturation level recorded in Irvin, see App. to Brief for United States 15a (“The Houston Chronicle ... reaches less than one-third of occupied households in Houston.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Sk**ing's seated jurors, moreover, exhibited nothing like the display of bias shown in Irvin. See supra, at 2919–2921 (noting, inter alia, that none of Sk**ing's jurors answered “yes” when asked if they “ha[d] an opinion about ... Sk**ing”). See also post, at 2952 (dissent) (distinguishing Mu'Min from Irvin on similar bases: the “offense occurred in [a large] metropolitan ... area,” media “coverage was not as pervasive as in Irvin and did not contain the same sort of damaging information,” and “the seated jurors uniformly disclaimed having ever formed an opinion about the case” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In light of these large differences, the District Court had far less reason than did the trial court in Irvin to discredit jurors' promises of fairness.
The District Court, moreover, did not simply take venire members who proclaimed their impartiality at their word. As noted, all of Sk**ing's jurors had already affirmed on their questionnaires that they would have no trouble basing a verdict only on the evidence at trial. Nevertheless, the court followed up with each individually to uncover concealed bias. This face-to-face opportunity to gauge demeanor and credibility, coupled with information from the questionnaires regarding jurors' backgrounds, opinions, and sources of news, gave the court a sturdy foundation to a**ess fitness for jury service. See 554 F.3d, at 562 (The District Court made “thorough” credibility determinations that “requir[ed] more than just the [venire members'] statements that [they] could be fair.”). The jury's not-guilty verdict on nine insider-trading counts after nearly five days of deliberation, meanwhile, suggests the court's a**essments were accurate. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 60, n. 28 (C.A.D.C.1976). Sk**ing, we conclude, failed to show that his voir dire fell short of constitutional requirements.
3. Sk**ing also singles out several jurors in particular and contends they were openly biased. See United States v. Martinez–Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (“[T]he seating of any juror who should have been dismissed for cause ... require[s] reversal.”). In reviewing claims of this type, the deference due to district courts is at its pinnacle: “A trial court's findings of juror impartiality may be overturned only for manifest error.” Mu'Min, 500 U.S., at 428, 111 S.Ct. 1899 (internal quotation marks omitted). Sk**ing, moreover, unsuccessfully challenged only one of the seated jurors for cause, “strong evidence that he was convinced the [other] jurors were not biased and had not formed any opinions as to his guilt.” Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 557–558, 82 S.Ct. 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962). With these considerations in mind, we turn to Sk**ing's specific allegations of juror partiality.
Sk**ing contends that Juror 11—the only seated juror he challenged for cause—“expressed the most obvious bias.” Brief for Petitioner 35. See also post, at 2961 (dissent). Juror 11 stated that “greed on Enron's part” triggered the company's bankruptcy and that corporate executives, driven by avarice, “walk a line that stretches sometimes the legality of something.” App. 854a–855a. But, as the Fifth Circuit accurately summarized, Juror 11
“had ‘no idea' whether Sk**ing had ‘crossed that line,' and he ‘didn't say that' every CEO is probably a crook. He also a**erted that he could be fair and require the government to prove its case, that he did not believe everything he read in the paper, that he did not ‘get into the details' of the Enron coverage, that he did not watch television, and that Enron was ‘old news.' ” 554 F.3d, at 563–564.
Despite his criticism of greed, Juror 11 remarked that Sk**ing “earned [his] salar[y],” App. 857a, and said he would have “no problem” telling his co-worker, who had lost 401(k) funds due to Enron's collapse, that the jury voted to acquit, if that scenario came to pa**, id., at 854a. The District Court, noting that it had “looked [Juror 11] in the eye and ... heard all his [answers],” found his a**ertions of impartiality credible. Id., at 858a; cf. supra, at 2922–2923, n. 30. We agree with the Court of Appeals that “[t]he express finding that Juror 11 was fair is not reversible error.” 554 F.3d, at 564.
Sk**ing also objected at trial to the seating of six specific jurors whom, he said, he would have excluded had he not already exhausted his peremptory challenges. See supra, at 2910–2911. Juror 20, he observes, “said she was ‘angry' about Enron's collapse and that she, too, had been ‘forced to forfeit [her] own 401(k) funds to survive layoffs.' ” Reply Brief 13. But Juror 20 made clear during voir dire that she did not “personally blame” Sk**ing for the loss of her retirement account. App. 875a. Having not “pa[id] much attention” to Enron-related news, she “quite honestly” did not “have enough information to know” whether Sk**ing was probably guilty, id., at 873a, and she “th[ought] [she] could be” fair and impartial, id., at 875a. In light of these answers, the District Court did not commit manifest error in finding Juror 20 fit for jury service.
The same is true of Juror 63, who, Sk**ing points out, wrote on her questionnaire “that [Sk**ing] ‘probably knew [he] w[as] breaking the law.' ” Reply Brief 13. During voir dire, however, Juror 63 insisted that she did not “really have an opinion [about Sk**ing's guilt] either way,” App. 936a; she did not “know what [she] was thinking” when she completed the questionnaire, but she “absolutely” presumed Sk**ing innocent and confirmed her understanding that the Government would “have to prove” his guilt, id., at 937a. In response to follow-up questions from Sk**ing's counsel, she again stated she would not presume that Sk**ing violated any laws and could “[a]bsolutely” give her word that she could be fair. Id., at 937a–938a. “Jurors,” we have recognized, “cannot be expected invariably to express themselves carefully or even consistently.” Yount, 467 U.S., at 1039, 104 S.Ct. 2885. See also id., at 1040, 104 S.Ct. 2885 (“It is here that the federal [appellate] court's deference must operate, for while the cold record arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell which of these answers was said with the greatest comprehension and certainty.”). From where we sit, we cannot conclude that Juror 63 was biased.
The four remaining jurors Sk**ing said he would have excluded with extra peremptory strikes exhibited no sign of prejudice we can discern. See App. 891a–892a (Juror 38) (remembered no media coverage about Enron and said nothing in her experience would prevent her from being fair and impartial); Supp.App. 131sa–133sa, 136sa (Juror 67) (had no connection to Enron and no anger about its collapse); App. 969a (Juror 78) (did not “know much about” Enron); Supp.App. 165sa, App. 971a (Juror 84) (had not heard or read anything about Enron and said she did not “know enough to answer” the question whether she was angry about the company's demise). Sk**ing's counsel declined to ask follow-up questions of any of these jurors and, indeed, told Juror 84 he had nothing to ask because she “gave all the right answers.” Id., at 972a. Whatever Sk**ing's reasons for wanting to strike these four individuals from his jury, he cannot credibly a**ert they displayed a disqualifying bias.
In sum, Sk**ing failed to establish that a presumption of prejudice arose or that actual bias infected the jury that tried him. Jurors, the trial court correctly comprehended, need not enter the box with empty heads in order to determine the facts impartially. “It is sufficient if the juror[s] can lay aside [their] impression[s] or opinion[s] and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Irvin, 366 U.S., at 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639. Taking account of the full record, rather than incomplete exchanges selectively culled from it, we find no cause to upset the lower courts' judgment that Sk**ing's jury met that measure. We therefore affirm the Fifth Circuit's ruling that Sk**ing received a fair trial.
III. We next consider whether Sk**ing's conspiracy conviction was premised on an improper theory of honest-services wire fraud. The honest-services statute, § 1346, Sk**ing maintains, is unconstitutionally vague. Alternatively, he contends that his conduct does not fall within the statute's compa**.
A. To place Sk**ing's constitutional challenge in context, we first review the origin and subsequent application of the honest-services doctrine.
1. Enacted in 1872, the original mail-fraud provision, the predecessor of the modern-day mail- and wire-fraud laws, proscribed, without further elaboration, use of the mails to advance “any scheme or artifice to defraud.” See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987). In 1909, Congress amended the statute to prohibit, as it does today, “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” § 1341 (emphasis added); see id., at 357–358, 107 S.Ct. 2875. Emphasizing Congress' disjunctive phrasing, the Courts of Appeals, one after the other, interpreted the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” to include deprivations not only of money or property, but also of intangible rights.
In an opinion credited with first presenting the intangible-rights theory, Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (1941), the Fifth Circuit reviewed the mail-fraud prosecution of a public official who allegedly accepted bribes from entrepreneurs in exchange for urging city action beneficial to the bribe payers. “It is not true that because the [city] was to make and did make a saving by the operations there could not have been an intent to defraud,” the Court of Appeals maintained. Id., at 119. “A scheme to get a public contract on more favorable terms than would likely be got otherwise by bribing a public official,” the court observed, “would not only be a plan to commit the crime of bribery, but would also be a scheme to defraud the public.” Id., at 115.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Shushan stimulated the development of an “honest-services” doctrine. Unlike fraud in which the victim's loss of money or property supplied the defendant's gain, with one the mirror image of the other, see, e.g., United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 101 (C.A.2 1987), the honest-services theory targeted corruption that lacked similar symmetry. While the offender profited, the betrayed party suffered no deprivation of money or property; instead, a third party, who had not been deceived, provided the enrichment. For example, if a city mayor (the offender) accepted a bribe from a third party in exchange for awarding that party a city contract, yet the contract terms were the same as any that could have been negotiated at arm's length, the city (the betrayed party) would suffer no tangible loss. Cf. McNally, 483 U.S., at 360, 107 S.Ct. 2875. Even if the scheme occasioned a money or property gain for the betrayed party, courts reasoned, actionable harm lay in the denial of that party's right to the offender's “honest services.” See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1400 (C.A.2 1976).
“Most often these cases ... involved bribery of public officials,” United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (C.A.9 1980), but courts also recognized private-sector honest-services fraud. In perhaps the earliest application of the theory to private actors, a District Court, reviewing a bribery scheme, explained:
“When one tampers with [the employer-employee] relationship for the purpose of causing the employee to breach his duty [to his employer,] he in effect is defrauding the employer of a lawful right. The actual deception that is practised is in the continued representation of the employee to the employer that he is honest and loyal to the employer's interests.” United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F.Supp. 676, 678 (D.Ma**.1942).
Over time, “[a]n increasing number of courts” recognized that “a recreant employee”—public or private—“c[ould] be prosecuted under [the mail-fraud statute] if he breache[d] his allegiance to his employer by accepting bribes or kickbacks in the course of his employment,” United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.A.8 1976); by 1982, all Courts of Appeals had embraced the honest-services theory of fraud, Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute—A Legislative Approach, 20 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 423, 456 (1983). FN35
2. In 1987, this Court, in McNally v. United States, stopped the development of the intangible-rights doctrine in its tracks. McNally involved a state officer who, in selecting Kentucky's insurance agent, arranged to procure a share of the agent's commissions via kickbacks paid to companies the official partially controlled. 483 U.S., at 360, 107 S.Ct. 2875. The prosecutor did not charge that, “in the absence of the alleged scheme[,] the Commonwealth would have paid a lower premium or secured better insurance.” Ibid. Instead, the prosecutor maintained that the kickback scheme “defraud [ed] the citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly.” Id., at 353, 107 S.Ct. 2875.
We held that the scheme did not qualify as mail fraud. “Rather than constru [ing] the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials,” we read the statute “as limited in scope to the protection of property rights.” Id., at 360, 107 S.Ct. 2875. “If Congress desires to go further,” we stated, “it must speak more clearly.” Ibid.
3. Congress responded swiftly. The following year, it enacted a new statute “specifically to cover one of the ‘intangible rights' that lower courts had protected ... prior to McNally: ‘the intangible right of honest services.' ” Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 19–20, 121 S.Ct. 365, 148 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000). In full, the honest-services statute stated:
“For the purposes of th[e] chapter [of the United States Code that prohibits, inter alia, mail fraud, § 1341, and wire fraud, § 1343], the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” § 1346.
B. Sk**ing charges, reacted quickly but not clearly: He a**erts that § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague. To satisfy due process, “a penal statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). The void-for-vagueness doctrine embraces these requirements.
According to Sk**ing, § 1346 meets neither of the two due process essentials. First, the phrase “the intangible right of honest services,” he contends, does not adequately define what behavior it bars. Brief for Petitioner 38–39. Second, he alleges, § 1346's “standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections,” thereby “facilitat[ing] opportunistic and arbitrary prosecutions.” Id., at 44 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S., at 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855).
In urging invalidation of § 1346, Sk**ing swims against our case law's current, which requires us, if we can, to construe, not condemn, Congress' enactments. See, e.g., Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973). See also United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963) (stressing, in response to a vagueness challenge, “[t]he strong presumptive validity that attaches to an Act of Congress”). Alert to § 1346's potential breadth, the Courts of Appeals have divided on how best to interpret the statute. Uniformly, however, they have declined to throw out the statute as irremediably vague.
We agree that § 1346 should be construed rather than invalidated. First, we look to the doctrine developed in pre- McNally cases in an endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the phrase “the intangible right of honest services.” Second, to preserve what Congress certainly intended the statute to cover, we pare that body of precedent down to its core: In the main, the pre- McNally cases involved fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied by a third party who had not been deceived. Confined to these paramount applications, § 1346 presents no vagueness problem.
1. There is no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to refer to and incorporate the honest-services doctrine recognized in Court of Appeals' decisions before McNally derailed the intangible-rights theory of fraud. See Brief for Petitioner 39; Brief for United States 37–38; post, at 2935–2936, 2938–2939 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Congress enacted § 1346 on the heels of McNally and drafted the statute using that decision's terminology. See 483 U.S., at 355, 107 S.Ct. 2875 (“intangible righ[t]”); id., at 362, 107 S.Ct. 2875 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (“right to ... honest services”). As the Second Circuit observed in its leading an*lysis of § 1346:
“The definite article ‘the' suggests that ‘intangible right of honest services' had a specific meaning to Congress when it enacted the statute—Congress was recriminalizing mail- and wire-fraud schemes to deprive others of that ‘intangible right of honest services,' which had been protected before McNally, not all intangible rights of honest services whatever they might be thought to be.” United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 137–138 (2003) (en banc).
2. Satisfied that Congress, by enacting § 1346, “meant to reinstate the body of pre- McNally honest-services law,” post, at 2938–2939 (opinion of SCALIA, J.), we have surveyed that case law. See infra, at 2930–2931, 2932. In parsing the Courts of Appeals decisions, we acknowledge that Sk**ing's vagueness challenge has force, for honest-services decisions preceding McNally were not models of clarity or consistency. See Brief for Petitioner 39–42 (describing divisions of opinions). See also post, at 2935–2939 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). While the honest-services cases preceding McNally dominantly and consistently applied the fraud statute to bribery and kickback schemes—schemes that were the basis of most honest-services prosecutions—there was considerable disarray over the statute's application to conduct outside that core category. In light of this disarray, Sk**ing urges us, as he urged the Fifth Circuit, to invalidate the statute in toto. Brief for Petitioner 48 (Section 1346 “is intolerably and unconstitutionally vague.”); Brief of Defendant–Appellant Jeffrey K. Sk**ing in No. 06–20885(CA5), p. 65, n. 21 (“[S]ection 1346 should be invalidated as unlawfully vague on its face.”).
It has long been our practice, however, before striking a federal statute as impermissibly vague, to consider whether the prescription is amenable to a limiting construction. See, e.g., Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” (emphasis added)). See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330–331, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 26, 88 S.Ct. 682, 19 L.Ed.2d 799 (1968). We have accordingly instructed “the federal courts ... to avoid constitutional difficulties by [adopting a limiting interpretation] if such a construction is fairly possible.” Boos, 485 U.S., at 331, 108 S.Ct. 1157; see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954) (“[I]f the general cla** of offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague .... And if this general cla** of offenses can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, this Court is under a duty to give the statute that construction.”).
Arguing against any limiting construction, Sk**ing contends that it is impossible to identify a salvageable honest-services core; “the pre- McNally caselaw,” he a**erts, “is a hodgepodge of oft-conflicting holdings” that are “hopelessly unclear.” Brief for Petitioner 39 (some capitalization and italics omitted). We have rejected an argument of the same tenor before. In Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, federal employees challenged a provision of the Hatch Act that incorporated earlier decisions of the United States Civil Service Commission enforcing a similar law. “[T]he several thousand adjudications of the Civil Service Commission,” the employees maintained, were “an impenetrable jungle”—“undiscoverable, inconsistent, [and] incapable of yielding any meaningful rules to govern present or future conduct.” 413 U.S., at 571, 93 S.Ct. 2880. Mindful that “our task [wa]s not to destroy the Act if we c[ould], but to construe it,” we held that “the rules that had evolved over the years from repeated adjudications were subject to sufficiently clear and summary statement.” Id., at 571–572, 93 S.Ct. 2880.
A similar observation may be made here. Although some applications of the pre- McNally honest-services doctrine occasioned disagreement among the Courts of Appeals, these cases do not cloud the doctrine's solid core: The “vast majority” of the honest-services cases involved offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes. United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1187 (C.A.6 1987); see Brief for United States 42, and n. 4 (citing dozens of examples).FN41 Indeed, the McNally case itself, which spurred Congress to enact § 1346, presented a paradigmatic kickback fact pattern. 483 U.S., at 352–353, 360, 107 S.Ct. 2875. Congress' reversal of McNally and reinstatement of the honest-services doctrine, we conclude, can and should be salvaged by confining its scope to the core pre- McNally applications.
As already noted, supra, at 2926–2927, the honest-services doctrine had its genesis in prosecutions involving bribery allegations. See Shushan, 117 F.2d, at 115 (public sector); Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F.Supp., at 678 (private sector). See also United States v. Orsburn, 525 F.3d 543, 546 (C.A.7 2008). Both before McNally and after § 1346's enactment, Courts of Appeals described schemes involving bribes or kickbacks as “core ... honest services fraud precedents,” United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (C.A.1 1997); “paradigm case[s],” United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1327–1328 (C.A.11 1999); “[t]he most obvious form of honest services fraud,” United States v. Carbo, 572 F.3d 112, 115 (C.A.3 2009); “core misconduct covered by the statute,” United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 294 (C.A.1 2008); “most [of the] honest services cases,” United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 707 (C.A.7 2008); “typical,” United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (C.A.8 1976); “clear-cut,” United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1363 (C.A.4 1979); and “uniformly ... cover[ed],” United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1283, n. 30 (C.A.11 1996). See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (counsel for the Government) (“[T]he bulk of pre- McNally honest services cases” entailed bribes or kickbacks); Brief for Petitioner 49 (“Bribes and kickbacks were the paradigm [pre- McNally ] cases,” constituting “[t]he overwhelming majority of prosecutions for honest services fraud.”).
In view of this history, there is no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to reach at least bribes and kickbacks. Reading the statute to proscribe a wider range of offensive conduct, we acknowledge, would raise the due process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine. To preserve the statute without transgressing constitutional limitations, we now hold that § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre- McNally case law.
3. The Government urges us to go further by locating within § 1346's compa** another category of proscribed conduct: “undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or private employee— i.e., the taking of official action by the employee that furthers his own undisclosed financial interests while purporting to act in the interests of those to whom he owes a fiduciary duty.” Id., at 43–44. “[T]he theory of liability in McNally itself was nondisclosure of a conflicting financial interest,” the Government observes, and “Congress clearly intended to revive th[at] nondisclosure theory.” Id., at 44. Moreover, “[a]lthough not as numerous as the bribery and kickback cases,” the Government a**erts, “the pre- McNally cases involving undisclosed self-dealing were abundant.” Ibid.
Neither of these contentions withstands close inspection. McNally, as we have already observed, supra, at 2927, 2930, involved a cla**ic kickback scheme: A public official, in exchange for routing Kentucky's insurance business through a middleman company, arranged for that company to share its commissions with entities in which the official held an interest. 483 U.S., at 352–353, 360, 107 S.Ct. 2875. This was no mere failure to disclose a conflict of interest; rather, the official conspired with a third party so that both would profit from wealth generated by public contracts. See id., at 352–353, 107 S.Ct. 2875. Reading § 1346 to proscribe bribes and kickbacks—and nothing more—satisfies Congress' undoubted aim to reverse McNally on its facts.
Nor are we persuaded that the pre- McNally conflict-of-interest cases constitute core applications of the honest-services doctrine. Although the Courts of Appeals upheld honest-services convictions for “some schemes of non-disclosure and concealment of material information,” Mandel, 591 F.2d, at 1361, they reached no consensus on which schemes qualified. In light of the relative infrequency of conflict-of-interest prosecutions in comparison to bribery and kickback charges, and the intercircuit inconsistencies they produced, we conclude that a reasonable limiting construction of § 1346 must exclude this amorphous category of cases.
Further dispelling doubt on this point is the familiar principle that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Cleveland, 531 U.S., at 25, 121 S.Ct. 365 (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971)). “This interpretive guide is especially appropriate in construing [§ 1346] because ... mail [and wire] fraud [are] predicate offense[s] under [the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act], 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994 ed., Supp. IV), and the money laundering statute, § 1956(c)(7)(A).” Cleveland, 531 U.S., at 25, 121 S.Ct. 365 . Holding that honest-services fraud does not encompa** conduct more wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and kickbacks, we resist the Government's less constrained construction absent Congress' clear instruction otherwise. E.g., United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–222, 73 S.Ct. 227, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952).
In sum, our construction of § 1346 “establish[es] a uniform national standard, define[s] honest services with clarity, reach[es] only seriously culpable conduct, and accomplish[es] Congress's goal of ‘overruling' McNally.” Brief for Albert W. Alschuler as Amicus Curiae in Weyhrauch v. United States, O.T.2009, No. 08–1196, pp. 28–29. “If Congress desires to go further,” we reiterate, “it must speak more clearly than it has.” McNally, 483 U.S., at 360, 107 S.Ct. 2875.FN44
4. Interpreted to encompa** only bribery and kickback schemes, § 1346 is not unconstitutionally vague. Recall that the void-for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions. See Kolender, 461 U.S., at 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855. A prohibition on fraudulently depriving another of one's honest services by accepting bribes or kickbacks does not present a problem on either score.
As to fair notice, “whatever the school of thought concerning the scope and meaning of § 1346, it has always been “as plain as a pikestaff that” bribes and kickbacks constitute honest-services fraud,” Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101, 71 S.Ct. 576, 95 L.Ed. 774 (1951), and the statute's mens rea requirement further blunts any notice concern, see, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101–104, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (plurality opinion). See also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (“[E]ven if the outermost boundaries of [a statute are] imprecise, any such uncertainty has little relevance ... where appellants' conduct falls squarely within the ‘hard core' of the statute's proscriptions.”). Today's decision clarifies that no other misconduct falls within § 1346's province. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (“[C]larity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute.”).
As to arbitrary prosecutions, we perceive no significant risk that the honest-services statute, as we interpret it today, will be stretched out of shape. Its prohibition on bribes and kickbacks draws content not only from the pre- McNally case law, but also from federal statutes proscribing—and defining—similar crimes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 666(a)(2); 41 U.S.C. § 52(2) (“The term ‘kickback' **2934 means any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or compensation of any kind which is provided, directly or indirectly, to [enumerated persons] for the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding favorable treatment in connection with [enumerated circumstances].”). See also, e.g., United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 147–149 (C.A.2 2007) (Sotomayor, J.) (reviewing honest-services conviction involving bribery in light of elements of bribery under other federal statutes); United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 352–353 (C.A.5 2009); United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 281–286 (C.A.3 2007). A criminal defendant who participated in a bribery or kickback scheme, in short, cannot tenably complain about prosecution under § 1346 on vagueness grounds.
C. It remains to determine whether Sk**ing's conduct violated § 1346. Sk**ing's honest-services prosecution, the Government concedes, was not “prototypical.” Brief for United States 49. The Government charged Sk**ing with conspiring to defraud Enron's shareholders by misrepresenting the company's fiscal health, thereby artificially inflating its stock price. It was the Government's theory at trial that Sk**ing “profited from the fraudulent scheme ... through the receipt of salary and bonuses, ... and through the sale of approximately $200 million in Enron stock, which netted him $89 million.” Id., at 51.
The Government did not, at any time, allege that Sk**ing solicited or accepted side payments from a third party in exchange for making these misrepresentations. See Record 41328 (May 11, 2006 Letter from the Government to the District Court) (“[T]he indictment does not allege, and the government's evidence did not show, that [Sk**ing] engaged in bribery.”). It is therefore clear that, as we read § 1346, Sk**ing did not commit honest-services fraud.
Because the indictment alleged three objects of the conspiracy—honest-services wire fraud, money-or-property wire fraud, and securities fraud—Sk**ing's conviction is flawed. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957) (constitutional error occurs when a jury is instructed on alternative theories of guilt and returns a general verdict that may rest on a legally invalid theory). This determination, however, does not necessarily require reversal of the conspiracy conviction; we recently confirmed, in Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 129 S.Ct. 530, 172 L.Ed.2d 388 (2008) (per curiam), that errors of the Yates variety are subject to harmless-error an*lysis. The parties vigorously dispute whether the error was harmless. Compare Brief for United States 52 (“[A]ny juror who voted for conviction based on [the honest-services theory] also would have found [Sk**ing] guilty of conspiring to commit securities fraud.”) with Reply Brief 30 (The Government “cannot show that the conspiracy conviction rested only on the securities-fraud theory, rather than the distinct, legally-flawed honest-services theory.”). We leave this dispute for resolution on remand.
Whether potential reversal on the conspiracy count touches any of Sk**ing's other convictions is also an open question. All of his convictions, Sk**ing contends, hinged on the conspiracy count and, like dominoes, must fall if it falls. The District Court, deciding Sk**ing's motion for bail pending appeal, found this argument dubious, App. 1141a–1142a, but the Fifth Circuit had no occasion to rule on it. That court may do so on remand.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Fifth Circuit's ruling on Sk**ing's fair-trial argument, vacate its ruling on his conspiracy conviction, and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[Footnotes omitted hereinabove]