After Confederation, the first government of Canada embarked on a policy aimed at bringing the western territories within the boundaries of Canada, and opening them up to settlement. Canada became the titular owner of Rupert's Land and the Red River Settlement; however, the French‑speaking Roman Catholic Métis, the dominant demographic group in the Red River Settlement, viewed with alarm the prospect of Canadian control leading to a wave of English‑speaking Protestant settlers that would threaten their traditional way of life. In the face of armed resistance, Canada had little choice but to adopt a diplomatic approach. The Red River settlers agreed to become part of Canada, and Canada agreed to grant 1.4 million acres of land to the Métis children (subsequently set out in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act) and to recognize existing landholdings (subsequently set out in s. 32 of the Manitoba Act). The Canadian government began the process of implementing s. 31 in early 1871. The land was set aside, but a series of errors and delays interfered with dividing the land among the eligible recipients. Initially, problems arose from errors in determining who had a right to a share of the land promised. As a result, two successive allotments were abandoned; the third and final allotment was not completed until 1880. The lands were distributed randomly to the eligible Métis children living within each parish.
While the allotment process lagged, speculators began acquiring the Métis children's yet‑to‑be granted interests in the s. 31 lands, aided by a range of legal devices. During the 1870s and 1880s, Manitoba pa**ed five statutes, now long spent and repealed, dealing with the technical requirements to transfer interests in s. 31 lands. Initially, Manitoba moved to curb speculation and improvident sales of the children's interests, but in 1877, it changed course, allowing sales of s. 31 entitlements.
Eventually, it became apparent that the number of eligible Métis children had been underestimated. Rather than starting a fourth allotment, the Canadian government provided that remaining eligible children would be issued with scrip redeemable for land. The scrip was based on 1879 land prices; however, when the scrip was delivered in 1885, land prices had increased so that the excluded children could not acquire the same amount of land granted to other children. In the decades that followed, the position of the Métis in the Red River Settlement deteriorated. White settlers soon constituted a majority in the territory and the Métis community began to unravel.
The Métis sought a declaration that (1) in implementing the Manitoba Act, the federal Crown breached fiduciary obligations owed to the Métis; (2) the federal Crown failed to implement the Manitoba Act in a manner consistent with the honour of the Crown; and (3) certain legislation pa**ed by Manitoba affecting the implementation of the Manitoba Act was ultra vires. The trial judge dismissed the claim for a declaration on the ground that ss. 31 and 32 of the Manitoba Act gave rise to neither a fiduciary duty nor a duty based on the honour of the Crown. He also found that the challenged Manitoba statutes were constitutional, and, in any event, the claim was barred by limitations and the doctrine of laches. Finally, he found that the Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. (“MMF”) should not be granted standing in the action, since the individual plaintiffs were capable of bringing the claims forward. A five‑member panel of the Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
Held (Rothstein and Moldaver JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed in part. The federal Crown failed to implement the land grant provision set out in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 in accordance with the honour of the Crown.
Per McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.: The MMF should be granted standing. The action advanced is a collective claim for declaratory relief for the purposes of reconciling the descendants of the Métis people of the Red River Valley and Canada. It merits allowing the body representing the collective Métis interest to come before the court.
The obligations enshrined in ss. 31 and 32 of the Manitoba Act did not impose a fiduciary duty on the government. In the Aboriginal context, a fiduciary duty may arise in two ways. First, it may arise as a result of the Crown a**uming discretionary control over specific Aboriginal interests. Where the Crown administers lands or property in which Aboriginal peoples have an interest, such a duty may arise if there is (1) a specific or cognizable Aboriginal interest, and (2) a Crown undertaking of discretionary control over that interest. The interest must be a communal Aboriginal interest in land that is integral to the nature of the Métis distinctive community and their relationship to the land. It must be predicated on historic use and occupation, and cannot be established by treaty or by legislation. Second, and more generally, a fiduciary duty may arise if there is (1) an undertaking by the alleged fiduciary to act in the best interests of the alleged beneficiary; (2) a defined person or cla** of persons vulnerable to a fiduciary's control; and (3) a legal or substantial practical interest of the beneficiary that stands to be adversely affected by the alleged fiduciary's exercise of discretion or control.
Although the Crown undertook discretionary control of the administration of the land grants under ss. 31 and 32 of the Manitoba Act, the Métis are Aboriginal, and they had an interest in the land, the first test for fiduciary duty is not made out because neither the words of s. 31 nor the evidence establish a pre‑existing communal Aboriginal interest held by the Métis. Their interests in land arose from their personal history, not their shared distinct Métis identity. Nor was a fiduciary duty established on the basis of an undertaking by the Crown. While s. 31 shows an intention to benefit the Métis children, it does not demonstrate an undertaking to act in their best interests, in priority to other legitimate concerns. Indeed, the discretion conferred by s. 31 to determine “such mode and on such conditions as to settlement and otherwise” belies a duty of loyalty and an intention to act in the best interests of the beneficiary, forsaking all other interests. Section 32 simply confirmed the continuance of different categories of landholdings in existence shortly before or at the creation of the new province. It did not constitute an undertaking on the part of the Crown to act as a fiduciary in settling the titles of the Métis landholders.
However, the Métis are entitled to a declaration that the federal Crown failed to act with diligence in implementing the land grant provision set out in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, in accordance with the honour of the Crown. The ultimate purpose of the honour of the Crown is the reconciliation of pre‑existing Aboriginal societies with the a**ertion of Canadian sovereignty. Where this is at stake, it requires the Crown to act honourably in its dealings with the Aboriginal peoples in question. This flows from the guarantee of Aboriginal rights in s. 35(1) of the Constitution. The honour of the Crown is engaged by an explicit obligation to an Aboriginal group enshrined in the Constitution. The Constitution is not a mere statute; it is the very document by which the Crown a**erted its sovereignty in the face of prior Aboriginal occupation. An explicit obligation to an Aboriginal group in the Constitution engages the honour of the Crown.
The honour of the Crown speaks to how obligations that attract it must be fulfilled, so the duties that flow from it vary with the situation. In the context of the implementation of a constitutional obligation to an Aboriginal people, the honour of the Crown requires that the Crown: (1) take a broad purposive approach to the interpretation of the promise; and (2) act diligently to fulfill it. The question is whether, viewing the Crown's conduct as a whole in the context of the case, it acted with diligence to pursue the fulfillment of the purposes of the obligation. The duty to act diligently is a narrow and circumscribed duty. Not every mistake or negligent act in implementing a constitutional obligation to an Aboriginal people brings dishonour to the Crown, and there is no guarantee that the purposes of the promise will be achieved. However, a persistent pattern of errors and indifference that substantially frustrates the purposes of a solemn promise may amount to a betrayal of the Crown's duty to act honourably in fulfilling its promise.
Section 31 of the Manitoba Act is a solemn constitutional obligation to the Métis people of Manitoba, an Aboriginal people, and it engaged the honour of the Crown. Its immediate purpose was to give the Métis children a head start over the expected influx of settlers from the east. Its broader purpose was to reconcile the Métis' Aboriginal interests in the Manitoba territory with the a**ertion of Crown sovereignty over the area that was to become the province of Manitoba. By contrast, s. 32 was a benefit made generally available to all settlers and did not engage the honour of the Crown.
Although the honour of the Crown obliged the government to act with diligence to fulfill s. 31, it acted with persistent inattention and failed to act diligently to achieve the purposes of the s. 31 grant. This was not a matter of occasional negligence, but of repeated mistakes and inaction that persisted for more than a decade, substantially defeating a purpose of s. 31. This was inconsistent with the behaviour demanded by the honour of the Crown: a government sincerely intent on fulfilling the duty that its honour demanded could and should have done better.
None of the government's other failures — failing to prevent Métis from selling their land to speculators, issuing scrip in place of land, and failing to cluster family allotments — were in themselves inconsistent with the honour of the Crown. That said, the impact of these measures was exacerbated by the delay inconsistent with the honour of the Crown: it increased improvident sales to speculators; it meant that when the children received scrip, they obtained significantly less than the 240 acres provided to those who took part in the initial distribution, because the price of land had increased in the interim; and it made it more difficult for Métis to trade grants amongst themselves to achieve contiguous parcels.
It is unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the implementing statutes because they are moot.
The Métis claim based on the honour of the Crown is not barred by the law of limitations. Although claims for personal remedies flowing from unconstitutional statutes may be time‑barred, the Métis seek no personal relief and make no claim for damages or for land. Just as limitations acts cannot prevent the courts from issuing declarations on the constitutionality of legislation, limitations acts cannot prevent the courts from issuing a declaration on the constitutionality of the Crown's conduct. So long as the constitutional grievance at issue here remains outstanding, the goals of reconciliation and constitutional harmony remain unachieved. In addition, many of the policy rationales underlying limitations statutes do not apply in an Aboriginal context. A declaration is a narrow remedy and, in some cases, may be the only way to give effect to the honour of the Crown.
Nor is the claim barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. Given the context of this case, including the historical injustices suffered by the Métis, the imbalance in power that followed Crown sovereignty, and the negative consequences following delays in allocating the land grants, delay on the part of the appellants cannot, by itself, be interpreted as some clear act which amounts to acquiescence or waiver. It is rather unrealistic to suggest that the Métis sat on their rights before the courts were prepared to recognize those rights. Furthermore, Canada has not changed its position as a result of the delay. This suffices to find that the claim is not barred by laches. However, it is difficult to see how a court, in its role as guardian of the Constitution, could apply an equitable doctrine to defeat a claim for a declaration that a Constitutional provision has not been fulfilled as required by the honour of the Crown.
Per Rothstein and Moldaver JJ. (dissenting): There is agreement with the majority that there was no fiduciary duty here, that no valid claims arise from s. 32 of the Manitoba Act, that any claims that might have arisen from the now repealed Manitoba legislation on the land grants are moot, that the random allocation of land grants was an acceptable means for Canada to implement the s. 31 land grants, and that the MMF has standing to bring these claims. However, the majority proposes a new common law constitutional obligation derived from the honour of the Crown. The courts below did not consider this issue and the parties did not argue it before this Court. This is an unpredictable expansion of the scope of the duties engaged under the honour of the Crown. The claim based on the honour of the Crown is also barred by both limitations periods and laches.
While a duty of diligent fulfillment may well prove to be an appropriate expansion of Crown obligations, and while a faster process would most certainly have been better, the duty crafted by the majority creates an unclear rule that is unconstrained by laches or limitation periods and immune from legislative redress, making the extent and consequences of the Crown's new obligations impossible to predict. It is not clear when an obligation rises to the “solemn” level that triggers the duty, what types of legal documents will give rise to solemn obligations, whether an obligation with a treaty‑like character imposes higher obligations than other constitutional provisions, and whether it is sufficient for the obligation to be owed to an Aboriginal group. The idea that how the government is obliged to perform a constitutional obligation depends on how closely it resembles a treaty should be rejected. It would be a significant expansion of Crown liability to permit a claimant to seek relief so long as the promise was made to an Aboriginal group, without proof of an Aboriginal interest sufficient to ground a fiduciary duty, and based on actions that would not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
Even if the honour of the Crown was engaged and required the diligent implementation of s. 31, and even if this duty was not fulfilled, any claims arising from such a cause of action have long been barred by statutes of limitations and the equitable doctrine of laches. Limitations and laches cannot fulfill their purposes if they are not universally applicable. Limitations periods apply to the government as they do to all other litigants both generally and in the area of Aboriginal claims. This benefits the legal system by creating certainty and predictability, and serves to protect society at large by ensuring that claims against the Crown are made in a timely fashion so that the Crown is able to defend itself adequately.
Limitations periods have existed in Manitoba continuously since 1870, and, since 1931, Manitoba limitations legislation has provided a six‑year limitation period for all causes of action, whether the cause of action arose before or after the legislation came into force. Manitoba has a 30‑year ultimate limitation period. The Crown is entitled to the benefit of those limitations periods. The policy rationales underlying limitations periods do not support the creation of an exemption from those periods in this case. Manitoba legislation does not contain an exception from limitations periods for declaratory judgments and no such exception should be judicially created. In this case, the risk that a declaratory judgment will lead to additional remedies is fully realized: the Métis plan to use the declaration in extra‑judicial negotiations with the Crown, so the declaration exposes the Crown to an obligation long after the time when the limitations period expired.
Moreover, this Court has never recognized a general exception from limitations for constitutionally derived claims. Rather, it has consistently held that limitations periods apply to factual claims with constitutional elements. While limitations periods do not apply to prevent a court from declaring a statute unconstitutional, the Métis' claim about unconstitutional statutes is moot. The remaining declaration sought concerns factual issues and alleged breaches of obligations which have always been subject to limitation periods. In suggesting that the goal of reconciliation must be given priority in the Aboriginal context, it appears that the majority has departed from the principle that the same policy rationales that support limitations generally should apply to Aboriginal claims.
These claims are also subject to laches. Laches can be used to defend against equitable claims that have not been brought in a sufficiently timely manner, and as breaches of fiduciary duty can be subject to laches, it would be fundamentally inconsistent to permit certain claims based on the honour of the Crown to escape the imputation of laches. Both branches of laches are satisfied: the Métis have knowingly delayed their claim by over a hundred years and in so doing have acquiesced to the circumstances and invited the government to rely on that, rendering the prosecution of this action unreasonable. As to acquiescence, the trial judge found that the Métis had the required knowledge in the 1870s, and that finding has not been shown to be an error. The suggestion that it is “unrealistic” to expect someone to have enforced their claim before the courts were prepared to recognize those rights is fundamentally at odds with the common law approach to changes in the law. Delay in making the grants cannot be both the wrong alleged and the reason the Crown cannot access the defence of laches: laches are always invoked as a defence by a party alleged to have wronged the plaintiff. If a**essing conscionability is reduced to determining if the plaintiff has proven the allegations, the defence of laches is rendered illusory. The imbalance in power between the Métis and the government did not undermine their knowledge, capacity or freedom to the extent required to prevent a finding of acquiescence. The inference that delays in the land grants caused the vulnerability of the Métis was neither made by the trial judge nor supported by the record. In any event, laches are imputed against vulnerable people just as limitations periods are applied against them.
As to reliance, had the claim been brought promptly, the unexplained delays referred to as evidence for the Crown acting dishonourably may well have been accounted for, or the government might have been able to take steps to satisfy the Métis community.
Finally, while not doing so explicitly, the majority departs from the factual findings of the trial judge, absent a finding of palpable and overriding error, in two main areas: (1) the extent of the delay in distributing the land, and (2) the effect of that delay on the Métis. Manifestly, the trial judge made findings of delay. Nonetheless these findings and the evidence do not reveal a pattern of inattention, a lack of diligence, or that the purposes of the land grant were frustrated. That alone would nullify any claim the Métis might have based on a breach of duty derived from the honour of the Crown, a**uming that any such duty exists.