WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6TH, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment.
Mr. Pinkney moved (pursuant to a standing order forre-consideration) that in the 4th resolve, the words by the people, be expunged, and the words by the legislature, be inserted.
Mr. GERRY. -If the national legislature are appointed by the state legislatures, demagogues and corrupt members will creep in.
Mr. Wilson is of opinion that the national legislative powers ought to flow immediately from the people, so as to contain all their understanding, and to be an exact transcript of their minds. He observed that the people had already parted with as much of their power as was necessary, to form on its basis a perfect government; and the particular states must part with such a portion of it as to make the present national government, adequate to their peace and the security of their liberties. He admitted that the State governments would probably be rivals and opposers of the national government.
Mr. Mason observed that the national legislature, as to one branch, ought to be elected by the people; because the objects of their legislation will not be on States, but on individual persons.
Mr. Dickinson is for combining the State and national legislatures in the same views and measures, and that this object can only be effected by the national legislature flowing from the State legislatures.
Mr. Read is of opinion, that the State governments must sooner or later be at an end, and that therefore we must make the present national government as perfect as possible.
Mr. Madison is of opinion, that when we agreed to the first resolve of having a national government, consisting of a supreme executive, judicial, and legislative power, it was then intended to operate to the exclusion of a federal government, and the more extensive we made the basis, the greater probability of duration, happiness, and good order.
The question for the amendment was negatived, by 8 States against 3. New York in the majority.
On the 8th resolve, Mr. Wilson moved (in consequence of a vote to re-concider the question on the revisional powers vested in the executive) that there be added these words, with a convenient number of the national judicial.
Upon debate, carried in the negative-3 states for and 8 against it. New York for the addition.
THURSDAY, JUNE 7TH, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment.
Mr. Rutledge moved to take into consideration the mode of electing the second branch of the national legislature.
Mr. Dickinson thereupon moved, that the second branch of the national legislature be chosen by the legislatures of the individual states. He observed, that this mode will more intimately connect the State governments with the national legislature-it will also draw forth the first characters either as to family or talent, and that it ought to consist of a considerable number.
Mr. Wilson against the motion, because the two branches thus constituted, cannot agree, they having different views and different sentiments.
Mr. Dickinson is of opinion that the mode by him proposed, like the British house of lords and commons, whose powers flow from different sources, are mutual checks on each other, and will thus promote the real happiness and security of the country-a government thus established would harmonize the whole, and like the planetary system, the national council like the sun, would illumine the whole-the planets revolving round it in perfect order; or like the union of several small streams, would at last form a respectable river, gently flowing to the sea.
Mr. WILSON. The State governments ought to be preserved-the freedom of the people and their internal good police depends on their existence in full vigor- but such a government can only answer local purposes-That it is not possible a general government, as despotic as even that of the Roman emperors, could be adequate to the government of the whole without this distinction. He hoped that the national government would be independent of State governments, in order to make it vigorous, and therefore moved that the above resolution be postponed, and that the convention in its room adopt the following resolve: That the second branch of the national legislature be chosen by districts, to be formed for that purpose.
Mr. Sherman supposes the election of the national legislature will be better vested in the State legislatures, than by the people, for by pursuing different objects, persons may be returned who have not one tenth of the votes.
Mr. Gerry observed, that the great mercantile interest and of stockholders, is not provided for in any mode of election-they will however be better represented if the State legislatures choose the second branch.
Question carried against the postponement-10 states against 1.
Mr. Mason then spoke to the general question-observing on the propriety, that the second branch of the national legislature should flow from the legislature of each State, to prevent the encroachments on each other and to harmonize the whole.
The question put on the first motion, and carried unanimously. Adjourned to to-morrow morning.
FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment-11 states.
Mr. Pinkney moved, That the national legislature shall have the power of negativing all laws to be pa**ed by the State legislatures which they may judge improper, in the room of the clause as it stood reported.
He grounds his motion on the necessity of one supreme controlling power, and he considers this as the corner-stone of the present system; and hence the necessity of retrenching the State authorities in order to preserve the good government of the national council.
Mr. Williamson against the motion. The national legislature ought to possess the power of negativing such laws only as will encroach on the national government.
Mr. Madison wished that the line of jurisprudence could be drawn-he would be for it-but upon reflection he finds it impossible, and therefore lie is for the amendment. If the clause remains without the amendment it is inefficient-The judges of the State must give the State laws their operation, although the law abridges the rights of the national government-how is it to be repealed? By the power who made it? How shall you compel them? By force? To prevent this disagreeable expedient, the power of negativing is absolutely necessary-this is the only attractive principle which will retain its centrifugal force, and without this the planets will fly from their orbits.
Mr. Gerry supposes that this power ought to extend to all laws already made; but the preferable mode would be to designate the powers of the national legislature, to which the negative ought to apply-he has no objection to restrain the laws which may be made for issuing paper money. Upon the whole he does not choose on this important trust, to take a leap in the dark.
Mr. Pinkney supposes that the proposed amendment had no retrospect to the State laws already made. The adoption of the new government must operate as a complete repeal of all the constitutions and State laws, as far as they are inconsistent with the new government.
Mr. Wilson supposes the surrender of the rights of a federal government to be a surrender of sovereignty. True, we may define some of the rights, but when we come near the line it cannot be found. One general excepting clause must therefore apply to the whole. In the beginning of our troubles, congress themselves were as one State-dissentions or State interests were not known-they gradually crept in after the formation of the constitution, and each took to himself a slice. The original draft of confederation was drawn on the first ideas, and the draft concluded on how different!
Mr. Bedford was against the motion, and states the proportion of the intended representation of the number 90: Delaware 1-Pennsylvania and Virginia one third. On this computation where is the weight of the small States when the interest of the one is in competition with the other on trade, manufactures, and agriculture? When he sees this mode of government so strongly advocated by the members of the great States, he must suppose it a question of interest.
Mr. Madison confesses it is not without its difficulties on many accounts-some may be removed, others modified, and some are unavoidable. May not this power be vested in the senatorial branch? they will probably be always sitting. Take the question on the other ground, who is to determine the line when drawn in doubtful cases? The State legislatures cannot, for they will be partial in support of their own powers-no tribunal can be found. It is impossible that the articles of confederation can be amended-they are too tottering to be invigorated-nothing but the present system, or something like it, can restore the peace and harmony of the country.
The question put on Mr. Pinkney's motion-7 States against it-Delaware divided- Virginia, Pennsylvania and Ma**achusetts for it.
Adjourned to to-morrow morning.
SATURDAY, JUNE 9TH, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment.
Motion by Mr. Gerry to reconsider the appointment of the national executive.
That the national executive be appointed by the State executives.
He supposed that in the national legislature there will be a great number of bad men of various descriptions-these will make a wrong appointment. Besides, an executive thus appointed, will have his partiality in favor of those who appointed him-that this will not be the case by the effect of his motion, and the executive will by this means be independent of the national legislature, but the appointment by the State executives ought to be made by votes in proportion to their weight in the scale of the representation.
Mr. Randolph opposes the motion. The power vested by it is dangerous- confidence will be wanting-the large States will be masters of the election-an executive ought to have great experience, integrity, and activity. The executives of the States cannot know the persons properly qualified as possessing these. An executive thus appointed will court the officers of his appointment, and will relax him in the duties of commander of the militia-Your single executive is already invested with negativing laws of the State. Will he duly exercise the power? Is there no danger in the combinations of States to appoint such an executive as may be too favorable to local State governments? Add to this the expense and difficulty of bringing the executives to one place to exercise their powers. Can you suppose they will ever cordially raise the great oak, when they must sit as shrubs under its shade?
Carried against the motion, 10 noes, and Delaware divided.
On motion of Mr. Patterson, the consideration of the 2d resolve was taken up, which is as follows: Resolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be apportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of inhabitants, as the one or other rule may seem best in different cases.
Judge BREARLY. -The present question is an important one. On the principle that each State in the Union was sovereign, congress, in the articles of confederation, determined that each State in the public councils had one vote. If the States still remain sovereign, the form of the present resolve is founded on principles of injustice. He then stated the comparative weight of each State-the number of votes 90. Georgia would be 1, Virginia 16, and so of the rest. This vote must defeat itself, or end in despotism. If we must have a national government, what is the remedy? Lay the map of the confederation on the table, and extinguish the present boundary lines of the respective State jurisdictions, and make a new division so that each State is equal-then a government on the present system will be just.
Mr. Patterson opposed the resolve. Let us consider with what powers are we sent here? (moved to have the credentials of Ma**achusetts read, which was done.) By this and the other credentials we see, that the basis of our present authority is founded on a revision of the articles of the present confederation, and to alter or amend them in such parts where they may appear defective. Can we on this ground form a national government? I fancy not. - Our commissions give a complexion to the business; and can we suppose that when we exceed the bounds of our duty, the people will approve our proceedings?
We are met here as the deputies of 13 independent, sovereign States, for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their sovereignty and form one nation, and annihilate the sovereignties of our States who have sent us here for other purposes?
What, pray, is intended by a proportional representation? Is property to be considered as part of it? Is a man, for example, possessing a property of 4000 to have 40 votes to one possessing only 100? This has been a**erted on a former occasion. If State distinctions are still to be held up, shall I submit the welfare of the State of New Jersey, with 5 votes in the national council, opposed to Virginia who has 16 votes? Suppose, as it was in agitation before the war, that America had been represented in the British parliament, and had sent 200 members; what would this number avail against 600? We would have been as much enslaved in that case as when unrepresented; and what is worse, without the prospect of redress. But it is said that this national government is to act on individuals and not on States; and cannot a federal government be so framed as to operate in the same way? It surely may. I therefore declare, that I will never consent to the present system, and I shall make all the interest against it in the State which I represent that I can. Myself or my State will never submit to tyranny or despotism.
Upon the whole, every sovereign State, according to a confederation, must have an equal vote, or there is an end to liberty. As long, therefore, as State distinctions are held up, this rule must invariably apply; and if a consolidated national government must take place, then State distinctions must cease, or the States must be equalized.
Mr. Wilson was in favor of the resolve. He observed that a majority, nay, even a minority of the States, have a right to confederate with each other, and the rest may do as they please. He considered numbers as the best criterion to determine representation. Every citizen of one State possesses the same rights with the citizen of another. Let us see how this rule will apply to the present question. Pennsylvania, from its numbers, has a right to 12 votes, when on the same principle New Jersey is entitled to 5 votes. Shall New Jersey have the same right or influence in the councils of the nation with Pennsylvania? I say no. It is unjust-I never will confederate on this plan. The gentleman from New Jersey is candid in declaring his opinion-I commend him for it-I am equally so. I say again, I never will confederate on his principles. If no State will part with any of its sovereignty, it is in vain to talk of a national government. The State who has five times the number of inhabitants ought, nay must have the same proportion of weight in the representation. If there was a probability of equalizing the States, he would be for it. But we have no such power. If, however, we depart from the principles of representation in proportion to numbers, we will lose the object of our meeting.
The question postponed for farther consideration.
Adjourned to to-morrow morning.
MONDAY, JUNE 11TH, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 States.
Mr. Sherman moved that the first branch of the national legislature be chosen in proportion to the number of the whole inhabitants in each State. He observed that as the people ought to have the election of one of the branches of the legislature, the legislature of each State ought to have the election of the second branch, in order to preserve the State sovereignty; and that each State ought in this branch to have one vote.
Governor Rutledge moved, as an amendment of the first proposition, that the proportion of representation ought to be according to, and in proportion to the contribution of each State.
Mr. Butler supported the motion, by observing that money is strength, and every State ought to have its weight in the national council in proportion to the quantity it possesses. He further observed, that when a boy he read this as one of the remarks of Julius Caesar, who declared if he had but money he would find soldiers, and every thing necessary to carry on a war.
Mr. King observed, that it would be better first to establish a principle (that is to say) whether we will depart from federal grounds in forming a national government; and therefore, to bring this point to view, he moved, as a previous question, that the sense of the committee be taken on the following question:
That the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national legislature, ought not to be according to the rule in the articles of confederation, but according to some equitable ratio ofrepresentation.
Gov. Franklin's written remarks on this point were read by Mr. Wilson. In these Gov. Franklin observes, that representation ought to be in proportion to the importance of numbers or wealth in each State-that there can be no danger of undue influence of the greater against the lesser States. This was the apprehension of Scotland when the union with England was proposed, when in parliament they were allowed only 16 peers and 45 commons; yet experience has proved that their liberties and influence were in no danger.
The question on Mr. King's motion was carried in the affirmative-7 ayes-3 noes, and Maryland divided. New York, New Jersey, and Delaware in the negative.
Mr. Dickinson moved as an amendment, to add the words, according to the taxes and contributions of each State actually collected and paid into the national treasury.
Mr. Butler was of opinion that the national government will only have the right of making and collecting the taxes, but that the States individually must lay their own taxes.
Mr. Wilson was of opinion, and therefore moved, that the mode of representation of each of the States ought to be from the number of its free inhabitants, and of every other description three fifths to one free inhabitant. He supposed that the impost will not be the only revenue-the post office he supposes would be another substantial source of revenue. He observed further, that this mode had already received the approbation of eleven States in their acquiescence to the quota made by congress. He admitted that this resolve would require further restrictions, for where numbers determined the representation a census at different periods of 5, 7 or 10 years, ought to be taken.
Mr. GERRY. The idea of property ought not to be the rule of representation. Blacks are property, and are used to the southward as horses and cattle to the northward: and why should their representation be increased to the southward on account of the number of slaves, than horses or oxen to the north?
Mr. Madison was of opinion at present, to fix the standard of representation, and let the detail be the business of a sub-committee.
Mr. Rutledge's motion was postponed.
Mr. Wilson's motion was then put, and carried by 9 States against 2. New York in the majority.
Mr. Wilson then moved, as an amendment to Mr. Sherman's motion, That the same proportion be observed in the election of the second branch as the first.
The question however was first put on Mr. Sherman's motion, and lost-6 States against, and 5 for it.
Then Mr. Wilson's motion was put and carried-6 ayes, 5 noes.
The eleventh resolve was then taken into consideration. Mr. Madison moved to add after the word junctions, the words, or separation.
Mr. Read against the resolve in toto. We must put away State governments, and we will then remove all cause of jealousy. The guarantee will confirm the a**umed rights of several States to lands which do belong to the confederation.
Mr. Madison moved an amendment, to add to or alter the resolution as follows: The republican constitutions and the existing laws of each State, to be guaranteed by the United States.
Mr. Randolph was for the present amendment, because a republican government must be the basis of our national union; and no State in it ought to have it in their power to change its government into a monarchy. -Agreed to.
13th Resolve-the first part agreed to.
14th Resolve-taken into consideration.
Mr. WILLIAMSON. This resolve will be unnecessary, as the union will become the law of the land.
Governor RANDOLPH. He supposes it to be absolutely necessary. Not a State government, but its officers will infringe on the rights of the national government. If the State judges are not sworn to the observance of the new government, will they not judicially determine in favor of their State laws? We are erecting a supreme national government; ought it not to be supported, and can we give it too many sinews?
Mr. Gerry rather supposes that the national legislators ought to be sworn to preserve the State constitutions, as they will run the greatest risk to be annihilated-and therefore moved it.
For Mr. Gerry's amendment, 7 ayes, 4 noes.
Main question then put on the clause or resolve-6 ayes, 5 noes. New York in the negative.
Adjourned to to-morrow morning.
TUESDAY, JUNE 12TH, 1787.
Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 States.
The 15th, or last resolve, was taken into consideration. No debate arose on it, and the question was put and carried-5 States for it, 3 against, and 2 divided. New York in the negative.
Having thus gone through with the resolves, it was found necessary to take up such parts of the preceding resolves as had been postponed, or not agreed to. The remaining part of the 4th resolve was taken into consideration.
Mr. Sherman moved that the blank of the duration of the first branch of the national legislature, be filled with one year. Mr. Rutledge with two years, and Mr. Jenifer with three years.
Mr. Madison was for the last amendment-observing that it will give it stability, and induce gentlemen of the first weight to engage in it.
Mr. Gerry is afraid the people will be alarmed, as savoring of despotism.
Mr. MADISON. The people's opinions cannot be known, as to the particular modifications which may be necessary in the new government-In general, they believe there is something wrong in the present system that requires amendment; and he could wish to make the republican system the basis of the change-because if our amendments should fail of securing their happiness, they will despair it can be done in this way, and incline to monarchy.
Mr. Gerry could not be governed by the prejudices of the people-Their good sense will ever have its weight. Perhaps a limited monarchy would be the best government, if we could organize it by creating a house of peers; but that cannot be done.
The question was put on the three years' amendment, and carried-7 ayes-4 noes. New York in the affirmative.
On motion to expunge the clause of the qualification as to age, it was carried, 10 States against one.
On the question for fixed stipends, without augmentation or diminution, to this branch of the legislature, it was moved that the words, to be paid by the national treasury, be added-Carried, 8 States for-3 against. New York in the negative.
The question was then put on the clause as amended, and carried, 8 ayes-3 noes. New York in the negative.
On the clause respecting the ineligibility to any other office, it was moved that the words, by any particular State, be expunged. 4 States for-5 against, and 2 divided. New York affirmative.
The question was then put on the whole clause, and carried, 10 ayes-1 no.
The last blank was filled up with one year, and carried-8 ayes-2 noes, 1 divided.
Mr. Pinkney moved to expunge the clause. Agreed to, nem. con.
The question to fill up the blank with 30 years. Agreed to-7 States for-4 against.
It was moved to fill the blank, as to the duration, with seven years.
Mr. Pierce moved to have it for three years-instanced the danger of too long a continuance, from the evils arising in the British parliaments from their septenual duration, and the clamors against it in that country by its real friends.
Mr. Sherman was against the 7 years, because if they are bad men it is too long, and if good they may be again elected.
Mr. Madison was for 7 years-Considers this branch as a check on the democracy- it cannot therefore be made too strong.
For the motion, 8 ayes-1 no-2 States divided. New York one of the last.
Mr. Butler moved to expunge the clause of the stipends. Lost-7 against-3 for- 1 divided.
Agreed that the second branch of the national legislature be paid in the same way as the first branch.
Upon the subject of ineligibility, it was agreed that the same rule should apply as to the first branch.
6th resolve agreed to be postponed, sine die.
9th resolve taken into consideration, but postponed to to-morrow. Then adjourned to to-morrow morning.