PBSUCCESS
By the fall of 1953, US policymakers, including CIA officials, were searching for a new overall program for dealing with Arbenz. The Guatemalan leader had moved even closer to the Communists. He had expropriated additional United Fruit Company holdings, legalized the Guatemalan Communist Party, the PGT, and suppressed anti-Communist opposition following an abortive uprising at Salmá. In response, the National Security Council authorized a covert action operation against Arbenz and gave the CIA primary responsibility.
The CIA plan, as drawn up by [Redacted]s Western Hemisphere Division, combined psychological warfare, economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary actions against Guatemala. Named PBSUCCESS, and coordinated with the Department of State, the plan's stated objective was "to remove covertly, and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled government of Guatemala." In the outline of the operation the sixth stage called for the "roll-up" of Communists and collaborators after a successful coup.
Dulles placed [Redacted ] in charge of PBSUCCESS and sent a senior DDP officer, [Redacted ] to establish a temporary station (LINCOLN), to coordinate the planning and execution of PBSUCCESS. Other key Agency figures involved were [Redacted ] and [Redacted ] Chief of the [Redacted ] Staff. Department of State [ Redacted] Assistant Secretary of State for [Redacted ] from the office of [Redacted ] Affairs, and [ Redacted] State liasion to the agency, also played major roles.
Training
Although a**a**ination was not mentioned specifically in the overall plan, the Chief of [Redacted ] at [Redacted ] requested a special paper on the liquidation of personnel on 5 January 1954. This paper, according to the [Redacted ] chief, was to be utilized to brief the training chief for PBSUCCESS before he left to begin training Castillo Armas' forces in Honduras on 10 January 1954. A cable from [Redacted ] the following day requested 20 silencers (converters) for .22 caliber rifles. Headquarters sent the rifles. The [Redacted ] chief also discussed the training plan with the agent SEEKFORD on 13 January 1954, indicating that he wanted Castillo Armas and the PBSUCCESS [Redacted ] offices to train two a**a**ins. In addition, he discussed these "a**a**ination specialists" with Castillo Armas on 3 February 1954.
The idea of forming a**a**ination teams ("K" groups) apparently originated with Castillo Armas in 1952. Adapting Castillo Armas' concept, the [ Redacted] chief routinely included two a**a**ination specialists in his training plans.
CIA planning for sabotage teams in early 1954 also included creating a "K" group trained to perform a**a**inations. The main mission of the sabotage teams or hara**ment teams, however, was to attack local Communists and Communist property and to avoid attacks on the army. A chart depicting the [Redacted ] chief's plan for the CALLIGERIS (Castillo Armas) organization showed the "K" Group. It was distributed in various paramilitary planning packets as late as the spring of 1954. In a briefing for [ ] in June 1954, [ ] also mentioned that sabotage teams would a**a**inate known Communists once the invasion operation began.
Psychological Warfare
As in PBFORTUNE, an intensive psychological warfare program paralleled the planning for paramilitary action. Utilizing the anti-Communist network established by a Guatemalan dissident, the Chief of Political and Psychological Operations at LINCOLN developed a major propaganda campaign against the Arbenz government. Part of this program included the sending of new mourning cards to top Communist leaders. These cards mourned the imminent purge or execution of various Communists throughout the world and hinted of the forthcoming doom of the addressee. d**h letters were also sent to top Guatemalan Communists such as [Redacted ] Guatemala City Station, [Redacted ] prepared these letters for the dissident leader. The "Nerve War Against Individuals," as it was called, also included sending wooden coffins, hangman's nooses, and phony bombs to selected individuals. Such slogans as "Here Lives a Spy" and "You have Only 5 Days" were painted on their houses.
Wanting to go beyond mere threats, the dissident leader suggested that the "violent disposal" of one of the top Guatemalan Communists would have a positive effect on the resistance movement and undermine Communist morale. The dissident leader's recommendations called for the formulation of a covert action group to perform violent, illegal acts against the government. LINCOLN cautioned the dissident leader, however, that such techniques were designed only to destroy a person's usefulness. By destroy "we do not mean to k** the man," LINCOLN cabled the dissident leader. Responding to the proposal that a top Communist leader be k**ed, [ Redacted] Guatemala City told [Redacted ] he could not recommend a**a**inating any "d**h letter" recipients at this time because it might touch off "wholesale reprisals." Reiterating that the plan was "to scare not k**" he nevertheless suggested that [Redacted ] might wish to "study the suggestion for utility now or in the future."